[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

Fire Protection Engineering Culminating Project
Analysis of the Seattle Customer Delivery Center
Prepared by Cynthia Wernet
California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo
June 9, 2016

Cynthia Wernet

Page 1

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

Statement of Disclaimer
This project report is a result of a class assignment; it has been graded and accepted as fulfillment of the
course requirements. Acceptance of this report in fulfillment of the course requirements does not imply
technical accuracy or reliability. Any use of information in this report is done at the risk of the user.
These risks may include, but may not be limited to, catastrophic failure of the device or infringement of
patent or copyright laws. California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo and its staff cannot
be held liable for any use or misuse of the project.
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ABSTRACT
This report covers both a prescriptive and a performance based review of fire and life safety systems for
the new Customer Delivery Center (CDC) located at the King County Airport in Seattle, Washington. The
building satisfies all prescriptive design requirements of the building code for fire and emergency
exiting, structural design, smoke detection, alarm notification and communication and water-based fire
suppression. A performance-based analysis is then performed using hand calculations and computerbased models to determine how the available safe egress time exceeds the required safe egress time
from the building for an interior fire. Prescriptive analysis of the building for non-mandatory standards
for Airport Terminal Facilities and a performance based analysis of an exterior exposure to a fuel spill
fire are also included.
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Executive Summary
The purpose of this analysis is to assess how the Customer Delivery Center (CDC) satisfies prescriptive
design requirements of the 2012 International Building Code (IBC) for fire exiting, structural design,
smoke detection, alarm notification and communication and water-based fire suppression. A
performance-based analysis is then performed using hand calculations and computer-based models to
determine if the available safe egress time exceeds the required safe egress time from the building.
In order to complete this analysis, the issued-for-construction design and the contractor submittals were
made accessible by the owner’s fire protection engineer and the project management group overseeing
construction. These documents were reviewed and a thorough study was performed using the 2012
IBC, the NFPA 101 Life Safety Code (LSC) and other NFPA standards.
All design elements that have been analyzed meet the IBC 2012 code requirements for safe egress.
Occupants of this multi-use facility have been characterized and literature has been used to identify
model parameters to determine total evacuation time for the building. The estimated total required
evacuation time ranges from 6.5 to 9.9 minutes after alarm notification.
The structural design satisfies all prescriptive requirements. The construction and building elements
are designed to meet Type I-A per the IBC Section 503.
The alarm system satisfies all prescriptive requirements. The current NFPA National Fire Alarm and
Signaling Code (2013) and handbooks for fire alarm and signaling and system commissioning were
consulted. Although a couple of omissions in the drawings were found during this analysis, only one
recommendation for improving the design is made. Visual inspection of the ceiling mounted strobes in
the warehouse should be performed to ensure that all areas have visibility of the signal.
The water supply is sufficient in capacity and pressure to meet the system demand. The current NFPA
standards for automatic sprinkler systems, private fire service mains, rack storage and system
commissioning were consulted. The water suppression system design exceeds the minimum
requirements in the code for water protection. No recommendations for improving the design have
been made.
Several performance based analyses are considered based on a hazard assessment and criteria from the
Life Safety Code. The results of the performance based analysis of an open office workstation fire are
included. A design fire in the third floor open office area results in tenable conditions of visibility,
temperature and toxicity for allowing occupants to safely leave the third floor and all occupants to safely
exit the building.
Finally, a prescriptive analysis and a performance based analysis of an exterior exposure fire involving an
aircraft fuel spill is included. Background on the NFPA 415 “Standard for Airport Terminal Buildings,
Fueling Ramp Drainage, and Loading Walkways” (2016) is provided. Life safety and asset protection
objectives are met by a combination of building features.
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Description of the Building:
The Customer Delivery Center is a building under construction in 2014 and completed in 2015 during the
time period of this multi-phase analysis.
The new building, highlighted in Figure 1, is part of an existing complex, attached to an existing building
which already functions as a delivery center. The existing building is undergoing a partial remodel
during the construction of the new Customer Delivery Center. The two buildings, existing and new, are
separated by a fire barrier. Although a corridor on the second floor serves as a horizontal means of
egress from the new building to the existing building, this report focuses on the new building and only
refers to the existing building as needed for the purpose of egress analysis.
The owner uses this complex for conducting business with customers, storing customer items, hosting
customer delivery celebration events and serving as a terminal for new commercial airplane departures.
Consequently, the building is primarily designated as a business occupancy but also has separated areas
for assembly and warehouse use. In many ways the building design, layout, furnishings and finishes
support a unique blend of professional office, commercial warehousing, transportation terminal and
dining functions.

Figure 1: Customer Delivery Center Building and Existing Building

Use & Occupancy
This multi-purpose complex is integral to a 130-acre occupant-owned industrial facility on the west side
of the King County airport. Security measures used at the facility limit access only to employees,
contractors, and escorted visitors. The public does not have access to the property or the building.
The building is primarily occupied by company employees working in the lobby, offices, meeting rooms,
break rooms, warehouse and security checkpoints and is also occupied by full-time customer
representatives in the office areas. Transient employees and contractors providing maintenance and
food service to the entire property occupy service areas of the building occasionally but are not
permanently assigned to the building. Most of these occupants are in the building during day-time
Cynthia Wernet
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hours, however, other employees utilizing the warehouse, the first floor break room and the locker
room adjacent to the flight ramp will routinely utilize the building during evenings and weekends.
In addition to the typical occupants, other airline customer representatives who are not familiar with
the building will, on occasion, attend delivery events and make use of the departure lounges. These
customers will include US and international persons such as pilots, airline executives, quality and
purchasing managers, and even family members ready to travel.
Unique egress features of this building include:






Communicating stairway near the main entrance lobby that opens to the second floor.
Architectural features in the second floor assembly area creating a focal point for occupants
over-looking the airport ramp including the high ceilings, floor to ceiling windows and a floor
shape that extends into the airplane ramp area. The orientation and the external architectural
design create the feeling of being inside of an airplane.
Second floor balconies wrap around the assembly area and also extend from meeting areas to
allow customers viewing access to their new airplane adjacent to the Customer Delivery Center.
Auxiliary spaces normally associated with transportation terminals such as passenger screening
areas, luggage screening and storage room, airplane access gates.

Structural
In the prescriptive analysis, the required construction classification is determined and the rationale is
presented in accordance with the International Building Code. The fire resistance requirements for
different elements of the building are identified. A calculation of allowable building area per floor is
included, considering the use of sprinklers and frontage to public way.
Fire resistance ratings of all the actual building elements used, including columns, beams, floor
assemblies, roof assembly, exterior walls, interior walls and partitions, doors, joints and penetrations are
provided and the actual construction classification of the building is determined.
Unique structural features of this building that affect the structural fire protection design include:




Multiple use and auxiliary occupancies in the building.
The owner typically specifies that new construction will provide for future change in use.
The owner is an FM Global client and will incorporate FM loss protection standards where
applicable, often exceeding life safety performance standards and prescriptive code
requirements.

Alarm System
Design aspects of the system detection, monitoring and control components are evaluated. Then a set
of design fire scenarios are presented and the performance of the detection system is evaluated based
on the type and size of fires predicted. Following the detection system analysis, the alarm notification,
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disposition and communication system design is described. A calculation of the necessary secondary
power supply is included. Lastly, inspection, testing and maintenance requirements are addressed.
The owner has a proprietary in-house fire department that provides emergency response and oversight
of system maintenance and fire prevention services in the building. A fire protection contractor
provides maintenance, testing and alarm supervision services. The alarm notification and response
procedures are uniquely integrated in order to provide the highest degree of life safety, property
protection, and continuous integrity of the fire protection systems throughout the owner’s facility.
Unique features of this building that affect the fire detection and alarm system design include:




Multiple use and auxiliary occupancies in the building generate the need to evaluate several
different fire detection arrangements. In particular, the NFPA standard for airport terminal and
fuel ramp protection is considered. Flame detection is not used. Heat detection exterior to the
building facing the ramp is evaluated, but is not required.
Second floor balconies wrap around the assembly area and also exist on the third floor to allow
customers viewing access to their new airplane parked adjacent to the Customer Delivery
Center. Outside covered walkways on the ground floor are sprinklered by owner policy as they
are susceptible to collection of transient combustibles. Unenclosed spaces and other covered
load/unload areas need exterior fire detection systems.

Sprinkler System
Requirements for the water based suppression system in the building are presented, design elements
are described and the system is evaluated for compliance. This industrial complex has its own water
supply in addition to access to the city water supply. Hydraulic calculations are performed for the most
demanding area of the building, in the warehouse. Inspection, testing and maintenance requirements
are also addressed.
Unique features of this building that affect the sprinkler system design include:






Second floor balconies wrap around the assembly area and also exist on the third floor to allow
customers viewing access to their new airplane parked adjacent to the Customer Delivery
Center. Unprotected spaces and other covered load/unload areas require a dry pipe system.
Auxiliary spaces normally associated with transportation terminals such as passenger screening
areas, luggage screening and storage room, airplane access gates are ordinary hazard areas.
Outside covered walkways on the ground floor are sprinklered by owner policy as they are
susceptible to collection of transient combustibles.
A warehouse area on the first floor is used to store customer items that could vary widely in
combustibility, configuration and class. Therefore, the items stored have been classified at Class
IV commodities and it is expected that items will be stored on racks.

Cynthia Wernet
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Prescriptive Analysis:
An overview of the basic construction and referenced codes are described in this section. References in
this report are made to the applicable codes used for construction and Authority Having Jurisdiction
(AHJ) approval. NFPA standards and codes may also be referenced but only where the IBC does not
sufficiently describe the life safety issue.
Jurisdiction:

King County, Washington

Applicable Codes:

2012 International Building Code (IBC)
King County Fire Code: 2012 International Fire Code, as amended Chapters 5154 Washington Administrative Code
NFPA 101, Life Safety Code
NFPA 72 (2013), “National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code,” NFPA 70 (2014)
“National Electric Code,” and NFPA 3 (2012) “Recommended Practice for
Commissioning and Integrated Testing of Fire Protection and Life Safety
Systems.”
FM Global Loss Prevention Standards have also been incorporated into the
design of the fire protection systems. Specifically referenced: FM data sheets 20, 2-8, 3-26, 4-4N, 3-10 and 8-9. Fire protection systems are composed of FM
approved equipment and components.

Construction Type:

1A (IBC Table 602)

Fire Protection:

Automatic Sprinkler System throughout
1. Wet pipe sprinkler for heated interior areas.
2. Wet standpipe system for stairwells.
3. Combination wet standpipe/sprinkler system.
4. Dry pipe for unheated overhangs, canopies, and air handlers.
5. Wet pipe sprinkler for elevator shafts at the first level and elevator
equipment rooms at the top level (third or penthouse).

Hazard Occupancy:



Number of Stories:

Light Hazard (Business, Main Occupancy)
Ordinary Hazard Group 2 (mechanical & electrical rooms, baggage
areas, kitchens, TSA screening and storage less than 8 ft.)

Extra Hazard Group 1 (Loading Dock)
3 + Penthouse;
Building Height:
63’-0”; Separation Distance: ≥ 30’

Building Area and occupancy type by floor:





Cynthia Wernet

First:
Second:
Third:
Penthouse:
Total:

31,462sf
34,575sf
25,884sf
3,943sf
95,864sf

B, A-3, S-1
B, A-3
B
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Occupancy Classifications and Separations
A description is provided of the various occupancy classifications and the purpose of accessory spaces in
this multi-use facility. Also, separations are identified as needed for different occupancies, corridors,
and exits. Color-coded layouts of the occupancy classifications for each floor are presented in Figures 2
through 5, showing auxiliary spaces, corridors and fire separation barriers.

Figure 2: Occupancy Classification First Floor
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Figure 3: Occupancy Classification Second Floor

Figure 4: Occupancy Classification Third Floor
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Figure 5: Occupancy Classification Penthouse

Mixed Use Occupancies
Accessory Areas




Delivery Conference Rooms located on the second and third floors are small assembly use
spaces but are not classified as assembly. These rooms are classified as Business per IBC
303.1.2 Exception 2 “Small Assembly Spaces,” because each room is less than 750sf in area and
is also accessory to the Group B occupancy.1
Other accessory spaces are classified as the occupancy each is accessory to, per IBC 508.2.1
“Accessory Occupancies: Area Limitations.” Accessory spaces are not separated. For each story
the accessory spaces total less than 10% of the area of the main occupancy of that floor.
o First Floor is separated into an Assembly area (North) and Business area (South):
 Luggage Room (Accessory to Assembly) is 646sf
 Employee Break Room (Accessory to Business) is 2,475sf.
 Total 3,121sf is Less than 10% of 31,462sf.
o Second Floor is separated into an Assembly area (North) and Business area (South):
 Kitchen (Accessory to Assembly) is 671sf.
 Departure Lounge (Air passenger terminal space, Accessory to Business) is
1,619sf.
 Total 2,290sf is Less than 10% of 34,575sf.

1

The Life Safety Code describes occupancy of any room or space for assembly purposes by fewer than 50 persons in another
occupancy, and incidental to such other occupancy, should be classified as part of the other occupancy and should be subject to
the provisions applicable thereto.(LSC A6.1.2.1)
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Third Floor:
 Management Information Conference (MIC) Room is 1,657sf
 Roof Terrace is 722sf2
 Total 2,379sf. Less than 10% of 25,884sf

Separated Areas




Other Occupancies with area greater than 10% of the area of the floor are separated. Main
occupancy is Business.
o First Floor: Greater than 10% of 31,462sf.
 Logistics Warehouse is 14,628sf and classified as Storage S-1 and separated
from Business.
 Main entrance reception and seating area are classified as Assembly A-3 and
separated from Business.
o Second Floor: Greater than 10% of 34,575sf
 Delivery Event, Event Lobby and Delivery Balcony combined are 4,167sf.
 Include Kitchen and storage room for total of about 5,000sf and these areas are
classified as Assembly A-3 and separated from Business.
Rooftop Structure (Penthouse)
o Penthouse is considered as a portion of the story directly below the roof deck on which
it is located; therefore it is considered to be Business Occupancy per IBC 1509.2
“Penthouses.”
o The penthouse is not to be included in determining building area, fire area or stories.

Construction Separation of Occupancies
Per IBC Table 508.4 “Required Separation of Occupancies,” and per IBC Table 716.5 “Opening Fire
Protection Assemblies, Ratings and Markings”:




Assembly to Business: 1-hour wall assembly rating with ¾-hour door assembly rating
Assembly to Storage: 1-hour wall assembly rating with ¾-hour door assembly rating 3
Business to Storage: no separation required

Construction Separation for Paths of Egress
Per IBC Table 508.4 “Required Separation of Occupancies,” and per IBC Table 716.5 “Opening Fire
Protection Assemblies, Ratings and Markings”:
2

The roof terrace occupant load changed between 60% design and final design. Occupied area was reduced by 300sf. This
change satisfied the aggregate 10% rule for accessory space and avoided the need for additional fire separation from the
business occupancy area and also reduced the occupant load on the balcony below 50 in order to avoid additional exits in the
design. Maximum occupant load is posted at door to terrace.
3 According to the LSC Table 6.1.14.4.1(a)) Assembly should be separated from Storage areas with Light Ordinary Hazard by 2hour rating, which is greater protection than the IBC requires. This building has been designed per IBC, however, and so applies
the 1 hour fire barrier criteria.
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Interior Exit Stair Enclosure: 2-hour wall assembly rating with 1 ½ hour door assembly rating for
exit enclosures.
Lobby stairs are not an exit but are considered as a means of egress from second floor to first
floor main exit. Unenclosed stairs are permitted for only 2 stories per IBC 1009.3 Exception 1
“Exit Access Stairways.”
The elevator is not an exit. Elevator shaft enclosures connecting four floors have a fireresistance rating of 2-hours, (not less than the floor separation for a Type IA construction per
IBC 713.4 “Fire-resistance Rating”) and the Elevator Machine Room which is adjacent to the
elevator has the same rating (2-hour) as the elevator shaft per IBC 3006.4 “Machine Rooms.”

Corridors Fire Resistance Rating
Per IBC Table 1018.1 “Corridor Fire-Resistance Rating”



Corridor ratings for A, B and S occupancies are 0-hour as permitted for occupancies equipped
throughout with an automatic sprinkler system.
A section in this report is devoted to interior finish classifications for wall, ceilings and floors.

Exit Discharge
Color-coded layouts of the exits for each floor are presented in Figures 6 through 9. Each exit discharge
from the building provides a direct and unobstructed access to a public way, per IBC 1027 “Exit
Discharge” with the following exceptions:





The main exit has a vestibule. It provides exit capacity for less than 50% of occupants and is
constructed (size and separation) in accordance with IBC 1027.1, Exception 2.
This main exit and the center exit stairway both discharge to a large court of sufficient size to
accommodate capacity for all exits into this court and meets all of the exception criteria of IBC
1027.5 “Access to a Public Way.” The court is over 20,000sf and exceeds 5sf per occupant. The
discharge capacity required (combined from both buildings) is 1204 occupants to exit into the
court.
The north exit from the assembly occupancy to the exterior discharges to an 18ft wide 210ft
long pathway that runs alongside the east side of the adjacent 3-800 building. The pathway is
covered and sprinklered.
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Figure 6: Exits and means of Egress First Floor

Horizontal Exit on Second Floor









The new 3-802 building is permitted as an addition to the existing 3-800 building.
There is a common wall with a 1-hr fire barrier rating between the Office are in the existing
building and the new Assembly area.
The opening to the adjacent building is protected with a normally open horizontal sliding
accordion folding 60-minute fire-rated door (required to be minimum of 45 minute.
The exit from new second floor assembly area goes through the existing building to north
through a 7 ft wide corridor, leading to a 2-hr barrier exit stairway, and out a horizontal exit
corridor on the first floor with 2-hr barrier construction to discharge.
The exit stairway in the adjacent building is 44” wide and is protected by 2-hour fire rated
barrier construction. The exit stairs discharge to an exit corridor leading to the exterior of the 3800 building and the corridor is protected by 2-hour rated fire barrier. There are also 4
alternate exit corridors branching from the main exit corridor on the first floor of the 3-800
building that are each protected by 1-hour fire barrier construction.
Horizontal exit construction in the existing building satisfies the requirements of IBC 1025
“Horizontal Exits” for alternate exits, fire separation between the existing building and the new
addition and extending vertically through floors (2-hour rating), and protected by a self-closing
(smoke-detector activated) door.
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Figure 7: Exits and means of Egress Second Floor

Figure 8: Exits and means of Egress Third Floor
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Figure 9: Exits and means of Egress Penthouse
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Occupant Load
Occupant Load is based on use/function per IBC Table 1004.1.2 “Maximum Floor Area Allowances per
Occupant.” Table 1 shows the occupant load per square foot and total occupant load for each area on
each floor.
Table 1: Occupant Load for Spaces by Floor
Floor/Space

Occupancy

Use/Function

Area (sf)

OLF (sf/occ)

Occupant
Load

Seating areas

Assembly Group A-3

Assembly Unconcentrated
tables & chairs

2,323

15 (net)

155

Luggage room

Accessory to Assembly
Group A-3

Storage

646

300 (gross)

3

Break Room

Accessory to Business
Group B

Assembly Unconcentrated
tables & chairs

2,475

15 (net)

165

Parts Control Area
(PCA) 72

Business Group B

Business

3,621

100 (gross)

37

Lockers and
restrooms, etc

Business Group B

Business

3,990

100 (gross)

40

Warehouse

Storage Group S-1

Warehouse

14,628

500 (gross)

30

First Floor

430

Delivery Event

Assembly Group A-3

Assembly Unconcentrated
tables & chairs

3,323

15 (net)

222

Delivery Balcony

Assembly Group A-3

Assembly Unconcentrated
tables & chairs

861

15 (net)

58

Departure Lounge

Accessory to Business
Group B

Airport terminal waiting area

1,619

15 (gross)

108

Kitchen

Accessory to Assembly
Group A-3

Kitchen, commercial

671

200 (gross)

4

Offices, small conf
rooms

Business Group B

Business

24,254

100 (gross)

243

Second Floor

635

MIC Room

Assembly Group A-3

Assembly Unconcentrated
tables & chairs

1,657

15 (net)

111

Roof Terrace

Accessory to Business
Group B

Assembly Unconcentrated
tables & chairs

722

15 (net)

48

Offices, small conf
rooms

Business Group B

Business

22,963

100 (gross)

230

Third Floor
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Exits
Number of Exits and Capacity
Width provided exceeds width required if one exit is lost for all areas and floors. Table 2 shows the
number and capacity of each exit in each area. Capacity of exits is per IBC 1005.3.1 and 1005.3.2 for
stairways and other egress components from spaces. Number of exits is per IBC 1021.1 and 1021.2 for
floors and roof and per IBC 1005.5 “Distribution of Egress Capacity” for each occupancy area where
more than one exit is required.
Corridors are in accordance with this requirement. Occupancies A, B and S are not listed in the IBC
Table 1018.2 “Minimum Corridor Width”, therefore the minimum width required is 44”.
The third floor exit width required based on occupant load is calculated to be 39.6 inches. The exit
width provided by each of the two doors at the top of the stairs is only 36”. This would be insufficient if
one exit is blocked. The architect4 was contacted and responded that the finding is accurate and
changed the design by up-sizing the doors in these stairways to be 40” clear egress width. The
calculations here show the correction to the “egress width provided” for clarity.
Table 2: Number of Exits and Exit Capacity
Floor/Space

Occupant
Load

Exits Required

Exits/ Access
Provided

Width Required per
exit (in)

Exit Width
Req’d Floor

Exit Width
Provided

Seating

155

2

2

(.2”)(155)(1/2)=15.5

64 ea.

Luggage room

3

1

1

(.2”)(3)=.6

36

Assembly Areas total

158

2

25

(.2”)(155)(1/2)=15.5

64 ea.

Break Room

165

2

2

(.2”)(165)(1/2)=16.5

36 ea.

Locker room

26

1

1

(.2”)(26) =5.2

36

Men

7

1

1

(.2”)(7)=1.4

36

Women

7

1

1

(.2”)(7)=1.4

36

Business Area (east) total

205

2

2

(.2”)(205)(1/2)=20.5

65 ea.

Parts Control Area 72

37

1

16

(.2”)(37) = 7.4

36

Warehouse

30

27 per IBC Table
1015.1

3

(.2”)(30) = 6.0

36

First Floor

430

2 per IBC Table
1021.2 (2)

58

(.2”)(430)=86

324” (4@65,
1@64)

4

Jim Beckett, AIA, LEED AP, Architect | Senior Associate, jbeckett@dlrgroup.com, DLR Group, Architecture Engineering Planning Interiors, 51
University Street, Suite 600 Seattle, WA 98101
5 The door between 3-800 and 3-802 is a 45 minute fire rated door, part of the 1-hour fire separation wall between the two buildings.
6
The second door for “PCA 72” room enters to warehouse, but the warehouse is not the same or lesser hazard area and so the door does not
serve as a means of egress.
7 Per IBC Table 1015.1 “Spaces with One Exit”, two exits are provided for a Storage occupancy with occupant load more than 29.
8 Doors are not intended to be used by the public: fire, main electrical, ramp from luggage room, and door for seating area by south door ramp
(does not discharge from the building to a public way).
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Delivery Event

222

2

4

(.2”)(284)(1/2)=28.4

36 ea.

Delivery Balcony

58

2

2

(.2”)(284)(1/2)=28.4

36 ea.

Kitchen

4

1

2

(.2”)(4) = .8

36

Assembly Areas total

284

2

39

(.2”)(284)(1/2)=28.4
(.3”)(284)(1/2)=42.6

Departure Lounge

108

Open
(no doors)

(.2”)(108)(1/2)=10.8

Offices, small conf rooms

243

2

Part of
business
area
2

Op Strs 71,
H Exit Strs 44,
H Exit Strs 60
= 175
>36

(.2”)(243)(1/2)=24.3

36

Business Areas total

351

2

2

(.2”)(351)(1/2)=35.1
(.3”)(351)(1/2)=52.7

Second Floor

635

410 separated
occupancy

MIC Room

111

2

2

(.2”)(111)(1/2)=11.1

36

Roof Terrace

48

1

1

(.2”)(48)=9.6

36

Offices, small conf rooms

230

2

2

(.2”)(230)(1/2)=23

36

Third Floor

389

2 per IBC
1021.2

218,19

Penthouse

Unoccupied

1

120,21

411,12,13,14,15,
16,17

(.3”)(284)=
85.2

(.3”)(351)=
105.3
(.3”)(635)=
190.5

(.2”)(389)(1/2)=38.9
(.3”)(389)(1/2)=58.4

(.3”)(389)=
117

36” doors
60” stairs
= 120
Business
and Assembly

36” doors
40” doors
60” stairs =
120
36” door
60” stairs

9

The horizontal exit to building 3-800, 246ft total travel distance to 1.5 hr enclosed stairway exit, 44”. Second floor is divided from adjacent
building (3-800) by 1-hour fire barrier with a fire rated accordion folding door in the corridor. If fire blocks or door activates, this means of
egress is not available to the 3-802 second floor occupants and must utilize instead the open stairs to first floor or the door on the south side of
assembly area leading to exit stairs. Egress capacity remaining is 131” and each exit exceeds 50% capacity (42.6”). Each accordion folding door
activates independently based on nearby smoke detection and includes panic hardware.
10 The second floor is divided by 1-hour fire barrier with a 45-minute door opening in the barrier serving a single room and also a fire rated
accordion folding door in the corridor. If fire blocks or door activates, this means of egress is not available to the second floor occupants and
must utilize instead the open stairs to first floor or horizontal exit through building 3-800 leading to exit stairs. Egress capacity remaining is 115”
and each exit exceeds 50% capacity (42.6”). The business and the assembly occupancies are each evaluated separately for accessibility and
capacity. When evaluated together, total number of exits required is only 3 per IBC 1021.2.4.
112 of the 4 exits are interior exit stairs that function as exits but do not discharge to exterior. This is allowable, as a minimum of 50% of the
required exits shall be interior or exterior exit stairways per IBC 1021.1.
12 The Delivery Event/Balcony area has less than 300 occupants and so does not require a main exit in order to accommodate half of the
occupants and so is in accordance with IBC 1028.2 “Assembly Main Exit.”
13 West interior exit stair has no direct discharge to exterior but is in accordance with IBC 1027.1 Exception 1. Not more than 50% is permitted
to egress through level of discharge.
14 Center exit stair discharges to a vestibule and is in accordance with IBC 1027.1 Exception 2.
15 Lobby vertical opening and unenclosed stairway serves as an exit per IBC 712.1.12 “Unenclosed Stairs and Ramps” and 1009.3 Exception 1
“Exit Access Stairways” as it only communicates between 2 stories.
16 North Horizontal Exit is in accordance with IBC 1025 “Horizontal Exits” as not more than 50% are required to egress by this exit path. See
footnote #8 also.
17
Doors not intended to be used by the public: roof access near elevator.
18 See footnote #12
19 See footnote #13
20 See footnote #12
21
Roofs with elevator equipment are required to have stair exit per IBC 1009.17 “Stairway to elevator equipment.”
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Arrangement of Exits:
Using the exception for sprinklered occupancies, the remote exits are placed apart no less than onethird the length of maximum diagonal dimension of building or area served pre IBC 1015.2.1. Travel
distances are sufficient in accordance with IBC Table 1016.2 “Exist Access Travel Distance.” Common
paths are per IBC Table 1014.3 “Common Path of Egress Travel.” Table 3 compares the limits to the
actual common paths, travel distances and exit separations. The exit locations and paths have been
identified in Figures 6 through 9.
Table 3: Exit Arrangement (Common Path, Distance and Separation)
Common Paths(ft)
per IBC 1014.3
Space
Assembly Areas First Floor

limit

Travel Distance(ft)
per IBC Table 1016.2

Actual

limit

Exit Separation (ft)
per IBC 1015.2.1
Min. 1/3
diagonal
Actual

Actual

√1042 +762
3

75

23

250

76

100

37

300

80

100

0

300

87

=
43

106

Business Areas First Floor
PCA 72

45
One means
egress

108
n/a

√1502 +1082

Warehouse

=
62

3

100

96 and 82

250

75

58

250

162, 144, 130
172’ to main exit first
floor via open stairs,
246’ to Bldg 3-800
stairs by horizontal
exit

100

0

250

133

Assembly Areas Second Floor

Departure Lounge Second Floor

43
One means
egress

99

107
n/a

√1112 +742

Business Areas Second Floor

3

100

<20

300

194

=
45

208

√412 +362

MIC Room

3

75

20

250

170

=
18.2

35

√1112 +742

Business Areas Third Floor

=
45
One means
egress
3

100

<20

300

175

75

0

250

160

Penthouse
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Arrangement of Exit Signs
Exit signs are in accordance with IBC 1011.1 “Exit Signs” at all exits, in exit corridors within 100 ft of exit
and in spaces required to have more than 1 exit. Recommended locations are shown in Figures 10-13.
First Floor


Over the north exit door and near the door from the lobby corridor visible from the corridor.

 Over exit door at main entrance, in the corridor approaching the main entrance and at the
bottom of the stairway coming down from the second floor to the lobby.








Over exit door at bottom of center stairway and over door from corridor to vestibule.
Over door between locker room corridor and lobby corridor.
Over door in locker room.
Over each door in break room.
Over door from corridor to south exit and over south exit door.
Over doors from warehouse to south corridor, to loading dock, to west corridor and at the
center of the warehouse aisle (from the ceiling) visible from either end of the warehouse aisle.

 Over the PCA 72 room door.
 In the west corridor, over the door from the corridor to the exit and over the west exit door.

Figure 10: Exit Signs First Floor
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Second Floor









Over the north horizontal exit doorway.
Over each door from the delivery balcony to the delivery event area.
Over four door in delivery event area leading to the corridor.
At center of east corridor with arrow to stairway and adjacent to the top of the unenclosed
stairway, visible from both directions in the east corridor.
From east corridor ceiling in front of center exit stairway door, visible approaching from both
directions in the corridor.
From west corridor ceiling at the west end of both east-west running corridors pointing toward
the exit stairway. These are also visible from the departure lounge.
From ceiling at multiple locations in office area branch corridors.
From ceiling in corridor adjacent to west exit stairway.

Figure 11: Exit Signs Second Floor
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Third Floor






From ceiling near elevator lobby, visible from east corridor
From east corridor ceiling in front of center exit stairway door, visible approaching from both
directions in the corridor.
From west corridor ceiling at the west end of both east-west running corridors pointing toward
the exit stairway.
From ceiling at multiple locations in office area branch corridors.
From ceiling in corridor adjacent to west exit stairway.

Figure 12: Exit Signs Third Floor
Penthouse
Over doors in each area leading to elevator lobby and top of exit stairway.

Figure 13: Exit Signs Penthouse
Cynthia Wernet
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Exit Finishes (Walls and Ceilings) by Occupancy Classification
Interior wall and ceiling finish materials for corridors and exit stairways are classified for fire
performance and smoke development. The classifications required per IBC Table 803.9 “Interior Wall
and Ceiling Finish Requirements by Occupancy” for a sprinklered building are based on the occupancy
group of the area that the corridors and stairways serve. The occupancy groups are listed below in
Table 4 with the required finish classifications for exits and exit passageways. Room finishes are also
noted.
For all groups the finishes provided exceed the minimum fire performance and smoke development
ratings required by the IBC. The Room Finish Schedule in the architectural drawings and the contractor
submittals provide detailed product information and specifications.
Table 4: Interior Walls and Ceiling Finish Classification
Interior exit stairways and
exit passageways
Required
Provided
B
A
vinyl on
south wall of
Lobby Stairs
B
A

Exit Corridors and exit access
stairways and ramps
Required
Provided
B
A

Rooms and enclosed spaces
Required
C

Provided
A22 Walnut Plank on
South Wall of Seating
Area

B

A

C

Warehouse Group S-1
Assembly Areas Group A-3,
Second Floor

C
B

A
A

C
B

A
A25
Metal Panel
Ceiling

C
C

Business Areas Second Floor
MIC Room
Business Areas Third Floor
Penthouse

B
B
B
B

A
A
A
A

B
B
B
B

A
A
A
A

C
C
C
C

A23Sound Absorbing
Wall Panels
A24 Wall Partitions and
Acoustic Wall Panels in
conf rooms
A
A26 Acoustic Wall Panels
in Event Spaces, Wood
Panel Departure lounge,
Elevator lobby
Same as first floor
Same as first floor
Same as first floor
A

Space
Assembly Areas Group A-3,
First Floor

Business Areas First Floor

22

Flame Spread rating for Wood Panel Ceilings (drawing code WC-1), also UL or other testing required. See Construction Specification, Section
095445-6.
23 Fire-Test-Response for fabric-wrapped panels tested per ASTM E 84 by UL, Flame Spread 25 or less, Smoke Index 450 or less. Specification
Section 098433-2.
24
Operable Wall Partitions in conference rooms and assembly areas. Per ASTM E 84, Flame Spread max 25, Smoke Developed max 450.
Specification Section 102226-3.
25 Metal Panel Ceiling (drawing code MC-4), Flame Spread rating per IBC, ASTM E 1264.
26 Acoustic Wall Panels (drawing codes AWP-1, 2, 3 and 4) Flame Spread max 25 and Smoke Developed Index max 50. Specification Section
098433-4.
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Exit Finishes (Floors) by Occupancy Classification
Interior floor finish materials are classified based the NFPA 253 standard for critical radiant heat flux.
IBC Section 804 “Interior Floor Finish” for groups A, B and S and also for other occupancies in a fully
sprinklered building are required to be at least Class II (resistant to flux of 0.22 watts/cm2 or greater). In
all areas of the building including corridors, ramps, and stairs, as listed in the Room Finish Schedule of
the architectural drawings, Class I finishes are used and exceed the IBC requirement as shown here in
Table 5.
Table 5: Interior Floor Finish Classification
Interior exit stairways and exit passageways, corridors and rooms
Space
Assembly Areas Group A-3, First
Floor

Required not
less than

Provided27

Class II

Class I, Carpet Tile in seating, TSA and departure lounge, privacy rooms
Class I, Tile flooring in corridors, reception, restrooms

Class II

Class I, Carpet Tile in TSA and departure lounge, corridors, privacy rooms, conference
rooms and offices
Class I, Resilient Flooring in kitchens, kitchenettes, small storage, janitorial,
Class I, Resilient Stair products

Warehouse Group S-1

Class II

Class I, concrete floor

Assembly Areas Group A-3,
Second Floor

Class II

Class I, Carpet Tile in TSA and departure lounge, corridors, privacy rooms
Class I, Tile flooring in delivery event and balcony and lobby, restrooms

Business Areas Second Floor

Class II

Class I, Carpet Tile in TSA and departure lounge, corridors, privacy rooms, conference
rooms and offices

MIC Room

Class II

Class I, Carpet Tile in conference rooms and corridors

Business Areas Third Floor

Class II

Class I, Carpet Tile in TSA and departure lounge, corridors, privacy rooms, conference
rooms and offices

Penthouse

Class II

Class I, concrete (cooling tower is roof assembly)

Business Areas First Floor

27

--Resilient Tile Flooring tested according to ASTM E 648 or NFPA 253. Critical Radiant Flux Class I.
--Resilient Stair Riser/Tread Rubber Base, tested according to ASTM E 648 or NFPA 253. Critical Radiant Flux Class I.
--Carpet Tiles CPT-1 and 2, Construction Specifications Section 096813. Submittal from supplier does not include flammability information.
--Carpet Tiles CPT-3: Flammability ASTM E 648 Class I, Smoke Density ASTM E 662 less than 450.
--Vestibule Area “First Step Modular”, Flammability passes DOC-FF-1-70 Pill Test. Flooring Radiant Panel Test meets NFPA Class 1 and Class II
when tested under ASTM E-648 glue down. Smoke Density NFPA 258 less than 450.
--Carpet Tiles CPT-9 & 10 &11: Flammability ASTM E 648 Class I, Smoke Density ASTM E 662 less than 450.
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Occupants
Occupants of the building will fall into one of three categories: local employee, remote employee or
visitor. Each of these three categories bears many similarities as they include adults with the same
physical, psychological and social demographics commonly associated with an office workforce. In
addition, the occupants are associated with the manufacturing and transportation industries. Because
of the nature of the business, the degree of knowledge about workplace hazards, the willingness to
comply with work site procedures and the shared cultural value of safety are all very high.
General trust of coworkers and building safety features will allow the occupants to tolerate some
difficulties with evacuation and cooperate despite queuing delays and high density movement during
evacuation.

Occupant Characteristics
Familiarity
Local employees are assigned to a work station or desk here and work in the building on a daily basis.
Local employees are familiar with the building, have participated in evacuation drills, and have been
trained in evacuation procedures are likely to start evacuation rapidly.
Remote employees have a work location other than this building and may be somewhat less familiar
with the building, but are familiar with the same procedures and general features and layout of the
company facilities. Remote employees are less familiar than local employees but will have fewer preevacuation activity delays since the remote employee is not assigned to isolate hazards, secure assets or
evacuate others.
Visitors are escorted by an employee who is familiar with company facilities and will most likely
supervise the visitors’ evacuation during initial phases. Visitors are least familiar with the building and
its fire protection features, however, they are part of a group which includes an escort and the escort
will reduce evacuation delays given the responsibility for security and safety of the visitors.
All occupants will be able to recognize emergency alarm signals and will be willing to evacuate once the
alarm is recognized and a true emergency condition is decided. Some percentage of occupants will
delay the decision to evacuate, assuming that a true threat does not exist and continue to work until the
alarm becomes too annoying to remain in the area. Further discussion about pre-movement delay is
included below.
Responsibility
Occupants are unlikely to perform firefighting. Only 1.5% of occupants surveyed engaged in firefighting
in office occupancies.28 Although occupants are trained to use fire extinguishers at this company, they
are also limited by procedure to only attempt if it is safe to do so and instead are encouraged to leave
the area of the fire.

28

J.L. Bryan, “Smoke as a Determinant of Human Behavior in Fire Situations,” University of Maryland, College Park (1977).
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Social Affiliation
Occupants are unlikely to have a feeling of personal responsibility toward the building during an
emergency; however, they may have responsibility to coworkers who require assistance during
evacuation.
Also, minor delays to evacuation might occur as local employees notify others, but able-bodied
occupants will not likely delay evacuation to first gather into a group. Groups of visitors may experience
a delay as they evacuate with their escort and wait for group members.
Commitment
Local employees are committed to work activities and may experience some delay as they secure
whatever work they are involved in when an alarms activates. However, in general, occupants are
willing to evacuate and leave this work behind.
Alertness and Limitations
This is a business occupancy building. As such, occupants are awake, alert and general do not have any
perceptual or intellectual limitations that would delay evacuation start time.
Staff
In this office building, many occupants do not immediately perceive any danger and will wait until the
alarm persists for a period of time long enough to indicate that it is not a false alarm. Occupants will
decide to evacuate on their own or when they are told to evacuate by someone else.
The building has several volunteers from the local employee population working on each floor who
serve as fire coordinators. The coordinators are responsible for an area that would take no more than 3
minutes to perform a sweep prior to evacuating. Their primary responsibility is to move quickly through
their assigned sweep area and instruct others to leave. They are not expected to fight fire or secure
building systems.
The building is also equipped with a desktop (computer-based) emergency notification system. This
reinforces audible evacuation alarms with specific written instructions appearing to occupants sitting at
their desks and notifying them of the emergency condition and that evacuation is urgent. This
instruction, however, is considered as not a primary alarm and may be delayed until the fire department
incident commander arrives on scene and gives an additional command to send the notice. The notice
may not be sent for several minutes after the alarm but it does serve as a convincing tool for occupants
with a delayed commitment to evacuate.

Pre-movement Activities
Prior to evacuation, occupants who have been notified of a fire will engage in other activities.29
Kuligowski and Hoskins state that, “actions performed during this (pre-movement) period increase an
29

E. Kuligowski, B. Hoskins, “Occupant Behavior in High-Rise Building Fire,” NIST Technical Note 1664, June 2010.
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occupant’s delay time, and certain actions in particular, i.e., searching for information and confirming
information about an incident, have been identified as ones that increase pre-evacuation delays.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that each action type performed by occupants increases their overall preevacuation time.”
Actions that add pre-movement time, neglecting influence of floor location (based on Kuligowski’s
study) include:





Waiting—continuing to work, adding 1.5 minute delay for 50% of occupants.
Seeking information—looking around, asking others for information, adding .2 minute delay for
30% of occupants.
Helping others—looking for and warning others, adding 1.2 minute delay for 20% of occupants.
Preparing—gathering personal items or securing the office, adding 1 minute delay for 50% of
occupants.

The resultant combined effect of these various pre-actions and delay times provide an estimated mean
delay time for the population in the office survey. Approximately 58% delay movement by 1.5 minutes
or less in the referenced study. Figure 14 shows the distribution of occupant delay time in one high rise
evacuation study. This distribution is somewhat linear.

Figure 14: Delay Time Distribution Based on Kuligowski Study of a High Rise Evacuation
Literature has provided some boundary data for pre-movement times and the types of activities that
occupants participate in. Pre-evacuation times for occupants surveyed and located on floors 4 and
below during an actual fire in a high rise office were all less than 15 minutes and the majority (over 75%)
of the occupants began movement in 5 minutes or less.
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Another study provides sample delay time (minutes) for a Mid-Rise office building.30 Both sets of data
are shown in Table 6 below and compared to the referenced high rise study. The most similar
circumstance to the Customer Delivery Center is the Mid-Rise building.
Table 6: Evacuation Delay Time Surveys (Minutes)
Data Source

1Q

Mean

3Q

Max

High-Rise below 5th floor30

<2.5

4

5

15

Mid-Rise30

0.5

1.1

1.4

<5

Mid-Rise31

0.4

Additionally, the midrise office evacuation delay distribution is not linear, but may be described as a
lognormal distribution as is shown in Figure 15.

Figure 15: Distribution of delay to start evacuation of a Midrise Office31

The interpretation of a fire alarm in an open office environment, which is the selected design fire
discussed later in the performance based section of this report, is made easier by observation and
communication with other occupants as well as other signals such as visual and smell of smoke. The
combination of the fire location and the occupant characteristics described above provide the analyst
with confidence in selection of delay times in the range of 1 to 2 minutes.
Delay time selected for this analysis will be a mean time of 1.5 minutes with a standard deviation of 1
minute for simulations that accommodate statistical models. Delay time selected for this analysis will be
a maximum time of 2.5 minutes for hand calculation methods.

30

G. Proulx, A. Kaufman, and J. Pineau, “Evacuation Time and Movement in Office Buildings, Internal Report No. 711, National Research Council
of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario (Mar. 1996)
31 G. Proulx, R. Fahy. “The Time Delay to Evacuation: Review of Five Case Studies,” Fire Safety Science Proceedings of The Fifth International
Symposium.
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Estimated Evacuation Time
Hand-Calculation Method
A hydraulic method of calculation is used to estimate the total evacuation time after movement begins.
Calculations are shown below in Table 7. A more detailed analysis is then used to evaluate the impact of
merging flows at the 3rd floor doors to the stairways and also as the 3rd floor occupants descending
merge with 2nd floor occupants entering on the 2nd floor landing.
Pauls’ method was applied to this building but is not presented here. This empirical equation was based
on data collected under a very limited set of circumstances and was intended for use in a high rise
building, but this building is not a high rise. Also, the SFPE empirical method was applied but the results
are not presented here. Both of these methods are designed for multi-story buildings that have egress
from the same stairways on each floor. These methods do not match the building layout since the
second floor has additional exits that are not available to the third floor.
These two methods were used, however, to determine that the south zone of the building will have the
greatest effect on evacuation time and would be about 3 ½ times the evacuation time of the north zone.
These methods were also helpful in quickly evaluating the effect of occupants changing exit choice. In
one scenario, when 1/3 of the occupants in the south zone exited through the north zone on the 2nd
floor, the total evacuation time was reduced by 1 minute, or about 17%.

Assumptions
Only the south zone of the building is evaluated using the hand calculation method. The south zone will
take the longest to evacuate because it has the greatest population density and the lowest exit capacity.
The south zone also has one more floor than the north zone.
The locker room and the break room, used by the same local employees will most likely never be fully
occupied simultaneously. The office area conference rooms will most likely be occupied by local
employees assigned to desks in the open office areas. And, even though it would be a rare occasion to
have each of the assembly areas fully occupied simultaneously, the building is evaluated here with full
occupancy in every room and every area.
Occupant disabilities are not accounted for in the hand-calculated model and all have the same egress
speed based on conditions presented. All occupants start egress at the same time. The hand
calculations method does not account for varying evacuation start times.
With all occupants moving at the same time, the exits become funnels or pinch points. Queuing occurs
at the exit doors.
The occupants on the first floor do not cause delay to the occupants from the 2nd and 3rd floor as the
first floor has sufficient additional means of egress that do not pass by the base of the stairs. The
occupants on the 2nd floor do cause delay to the occupants descending from the 3rd floor. More detailed
analysis is performed on the center stairs, which appear from hydraulic calculations to be the location
with the highest impact due to a combination of merging and transition effects.
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Limitations
In an actual event, it is probable that some occupants will use or attempt to use the two elevators from
the second and third floors to travel to the first floor. It is assumed, however, that the elevators are not
used and so have not been included in the egress time calculation.

Analysis
Speed traveling through doors or down stairs is a function of density.32
Discharge time per egress element is the time for all occupants passing through a stairway. The lesser of
the calculated flows for either the door or the stairs is used to determine the discharge time in the
stairway. Calculated flows are derived from the Maximum Specific Flow in NFPA Table 4.2.8.33 For
example, the lobby stairs do not have a door at the top and so the stairs are the egress controlling
element.
Total evacuation time is the discharge time for the stairway plus the time to descend from the second
floor to the first floor. And the total time for the south zone, the total time for the building is
determined by exit with the greatest time. By this calculation, the occupants evacuating by the center
stairway take 9.2 minutes with the 36 in wide doors at the stairway. With the upsized door revision to
the design, the new evacuation time is 7.9 minutes.

32
33

Fahy, R. “Calculation Methods for Egress Prediction,” Ch 4-2, NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 20th Edition, 2008.
NFPA Table 4.2.8 source is Table 3-14.5 in SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 3rd edition 2002.
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Table 7: Hand Calculation of Evacuation Time, Hydraulic Method Results

Element

Pop
2nd
Floor

Pop
3rd
Floor

W (in)

We (in)

Fsm,
Max
Specific
Flow,
(p/ft
min)

Fc,
Calculated
Flow
(p/min)

Egress
element
controls
flow

stairs

S, speed
(ft/min)

Lobby Stair 7x11

189

0

71

59

18.5

91.0

Horz Stairs 7x11

95

0

44

32

18.5

49.3

106

Center Stair 7x11

230

194

60

48

18.5

74.0

106

West Stair 7x11

121

195

60

48

18.5

74.0

106

Lobby door

189

0

71

59

24.0

118.0

118

Horz Door

95

0

36

24

24.0

48.0

door

106

118

48.0
Center door

230

194

36 40

24

24.0

56.0

door

118

48.0
West door
Total in south
zone

121

195

36 40

24

24.0

56.0

door

118

Discharge
time (min)

Total
evac
time
(min)

2.1

2.3

2.0

2.3

8.8

9.2

7.6

7.9

6.6

6.9

5.6

6.0
9.2

635

7.9

Further analysis is conducted using a node to node type of evaluation. This method is adopted from
NFPA chapter 4-2, the calculations are shown in Table 8 and the results are described here below.
The floors are 14.75 ft apart and it takes 13 seconds for the first occupants from each floor to reach the
next floor below.
At the rate of 56 occupants per minute moving through the 40” wide stairway doors, there are 12
occupants per floor in the stairway, or 24 occupants total in the stairway after 13 seconds. At this time
there are 12 occupants waiting at each door to the stairway. At this time, there are 171 occupants yet
to arrive at the door on the 3rd floor and 121 arriving at the 2nd floor door.
It takes another 3 minutes to clear occupants from the 3rd floor and through the door to the stairway,
giving preference to the occupants on the third floor. The 3rd floor occupants take 25 seconds to
descend two floors.
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It then takes 2.2 minutes for the 121 occupants waiting on the 2nd floor to enter the stair way and an
additional 13 seconds for them to descend one floor to the level of exit discharge.
The center stairway exits to a vestibule and travel 4 ft to the exterior door. This travel time is negligible.
Table 8: Hand Calculation of Evacuation Time, Node Analysis Method
Time (s)

Event

30

Congested flow reaches top of stairs, traveling 100 ft at 200 ft/min

43

24 occupants fill stairway, entering doors at 56 occupants/min
12 are now queued at door at a rate of 53 P/min

226

220 more have entered door at 3rd floor at 48 P/min

251

3rd floor occupants descend to level of exit discharge

381

121 more have entered door at 2nd floor

394

Descend to first floor

This additional analysis now includes consideration of travel time to reach the exit as well as the effects
of critical transitions in egress width and major merging of flows. With the 36” wide stairway doors the
time is 8.5 minutes and with the upsized 40” wide door design revision the new evacuation time is 6.6
minutes.
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Computer-Based Egress model
Pathfinder 2014 is the model (Revision 2014.3.1020 x64) used to evaluate egress from this building.
Pathfinder is a widely used agent-based model. Figure 16 is a 3-dimensional image from the simulation,
showing occupants (agents) moving through each floor and leaving via exit pathways. Walls, corridors,
doorways and stairway dimensions are to scale and based on architectural plan drawings.

Figure 16: Pathfinder simulation of the 3-story building, 210 seconds after evacuation alarm

Assumptions
As with the hand-calculation method, the building is evaluated with full occupancy in each area, totaling
to 1,441 occupants. Full occupant load in every area of the building would be a rare condition for this
office building with meeting rooms and a warehouse and so this assumption affords a qualitative safety
factor built in to the total required egress time.
It is estimated that 6% of the occupants have some level of disability that will affect movement and
inhibit their ability to descend stairs. This is based on US population 2010 survey of employment.34
Disability will reduce speed by an average of 0.3 m/s based on the Fire SERT research published in 1999
(See SFPE Handbook Table 3-12.4 and .5).35
Occupant characteristics described in the previous section of this report are applied to the evacuation
delay time. When modeling evacuation of the Customer Delivery Center, the minimum delay time is set
at 0 minutes and the maximum delay time is set at 2.5 minutes. A uniform distribution and a lognormal
distribution of occupant delay times were both applied for comparison. The simulation allows delay
times to range from 0 to 2.5 minutes. All occupants begin to evacuate before 2.5 minutes and most
begin to evacuate before 1.5 minutes.
34

U.S. National Census Bureau (2010) http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk
K.E. Boyece, T.J. Shields, and G.W.H. Silcock, “Toward the Characterization of Building Occupancies for Fire Safety Engineering”, Fire
Technology, 35, 1, pp. 35-86 (1999).
35
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Agent attributes and behaviors applied to the model are listed below:







No priorities given to any group of occupants
Speed 3.9 fps (1.2 m/s)
6% Population Disabled Speed 2.95 fps (0.9 m/s)
Delay behavior, uniform distribution 0 s to 150 s
Shoulder width 18 in (45cm), Height 6 ft, Comfort distance 1 ft
Door choice, any exit with 35% preference for nearest exit

Limitations
The primary limitation of this model is that the occupant behaviors are difficult to predict as there are
many variables that can be attributed to the agents in the program but there is not much actual data to
support selection of these variables for this particular situation.
It is possible that the speed and size attributes selected for these evacuees is idealistic.
Additionally, the graphic interface showing the design of the building and the simulated movement of
agents through this virtual building may create a false sense of security that the model variables
selected are in fact valid for this building. Figure 17 shows a large conference room fully occupied and
arranged for maximum seating but the model does not include the effect that common office furniture,
such as tables and chairs, might have on occupant behavior during an evacuation.

Figure 17: Screenshot of the Management Information Conference (MIC) Room fully occupied
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Use of Simulation and Comparison with Hand-Calculation Method
Ease of Use of Methods
Pathfinder requires a great amount of setup time, compared to the hand calculation methods. Learning
the basics of the application and preparing the building elements of the model (e.g. floors, doors, stairs)
to scale and without digital data available, took about 12 hours. Running simulations, manipulating the
occupant behaviors and attributes and collecting and analyzing the results entailed another 6 hours
throughout this project.
In comparison, all of the hand calculations took only 4 hours to perform.
The Pathfinder simulation results in a shorter movement time and total evacuation time. The visual
graphics in Pathfinder and the door flow charts also confirm that the center and west exit stairways are
the critical collection points for occupants. These tools visually depict that increasing capacity of the
stairway exits decreases overall evacuation time. The hand calculations show similar results, however, it
is difficult to prioritize between the two stairways using the hand calculation methods.
Effect of Delay
The Pathfinder simulation allows the occupant delays, distributed across the population, to help the
overall evacuation time because the queuing effect (at critical locations such as the doors to the exit
stairways) is diminished. The distributed delay time is simple to program into the Pathfinder simulation.
In contrast, delay time must be added to the beginning of the node hand calculation or to the end of the
hydraulic hand calculation and cannot easily be integrated into occupant arrival at the top of stairs and
other exits using these other methods.
Using the data from the high rise study a lognormal distribution of times was created, which is a
function that Pathfinder offers. This results in a significant reduction in pre-movement time and the
overall evacuation time. Times are distributed such that occupants move early in the range of times
allowed. With this distribution, 50% of the occupants move in the first minute which is closer to how
this occupant population is likely to behave.
Results Compared by Calculation Method
The overall results are shown in Table 9. Of the three methods presented here, the hydraulic method
gives the longest total evacuation time and the computer based simulation gives the shortest
evacuation time, with a variance of 36%.
By comparison with evacuation drills conducted at this company location, a planned site-wide drill
conducted in 2008 involving nearly 4,000 employees at an entire manufacturing site was completed in
less than 12 minutes, with the most notable successes at the two mid-rise office buildings on site. Based
on that, the 10.4 minutes after notification result with the hydraulic method is considered as a very
conservative result.

Cynthia Wernet

Page 43

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

Table 9: Required Evacuation Times by Calculation Method
Method
36”Door & Hydraulic
36”Door & Node
36”Door & Pathfinder
40”Door & Hydraulic
40”Door & Node
40”Door & Pathfinder
Pathfinder w/ lognormal
distribution pre-movement time

Delay Time (min)
2.5
2.5
0-2.5
2.5
2.5
0-2.5
min=0,max=2.5, n=1.5, σ=1

Movement Time (min)
9.2
8.5
7.9
6.6

Total Evacuation Time (min)
11.7
11.0
7.1
10.4
9.1
6.3
6.5

Effect of Door Width
The design change of upsizing the exit stairway doors by an additional 4 inches of clear width,
surprisingly, did not have a significant effect on reducing the overall evacuation time, but it did reduce
the movement time by about 18 seconds and reduced the total evacuation time by 36 seconds.
Exit Door Flows
The effect of delay times on the flow rate through exit doors can be viewed qualitatively and
quantitatively with Pathfinder.
By comparing the flow rates through the main lobby door (Door 46) with and without delay times, it is
apparent that no occupants in the assembly areas on the first and second floors have movement times
greater than 4 minutes. Also, the door is able to accommodate the early surge of evacuees. The
conclusion is that the 4 minutes is determined by the travel distance and is not affected by the width of
the main lobby door. See Figure 18 below.
The graphic also shows the typical effect of the delays on smoothing out the flow rates through the
primary exits subject to surging (Main Lobby Dr 46, West End Dr 75 and South-East Dr 30 by the Break
Room). The central door Dr40 at the base of the stairs primarily serves the central exit stairway and the
stairway funnels the flow so that it is less affected by a surge.

Figure 18: Flow Rates for First Floor With/Without Delay
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The distributed delay in starting evacuation has the obvious effect of delaying the start and extending
the total evacuation time. Without a delay, half of the occupants have left the building in about 1.6
minutes. With the delay, no occupants have evacuated in 0.5 minutes and half have evacuated after 2.5
minutes. See Figure 19 below.
The distributed delay also, however, changes the rate of evacuation over time. Instead of having a high
rate of evacuation initially and then slowly tapering off, the delay has a tendency to smooth out the
evacuation rate. It is also much easier to view the rates of evacuation before and after the main lobby
and delivery event areas have been cleared.

Figure 19: Occupants Exited With/Without Delay
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Summary of Egress Analysis
All design elements analyzed meet the IBC 2012 code requirements for exiting and are referenced
throughout the report.
In accordance with occupancy groups for the building, floors and spaces, the number, location, and
capacity of exits is in accordance with IBC. Appropriate separation is used, considering rated fire
barriers and door assemblies. Also, fire resistance of rated finishes in exits and corridors has been
determined to exceed minimum requirements of the code.
As a result of this analysis, one design change has been made, resulting in an increase in clear width of
the exit doors for the stairways.
Occupants of this multi-use facility have been characterized and literature has been used to identify
model parameters for pre-movement activities, delay times, and occupant attributes. Various hand
calculations are performed and a computer based simulation is also performed. These methods are
compared and used to determine total evacuation time for the building. Based on these models, total
evacuation times calculated range from 6.5 to 10.4 minutes after alarm notification.
This information is be used in the performance based analysis section of this report when compared to
the available safe egress time for this building as designed and design fire scenarios.
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Fire Resistance
Construction Type
In accordance with Table 601, IBC (2012), the fire resistance ratings are consistent with Type I-A
construction. However, this rating exceeds the requirements identified in the IBC for a B-occupancy.
Before any allowances for a fully sprinklered building, the IBC Table 503 allows construction types Type
I-A, Type II-A, and Type I-B for a building height of 63’ with 3 stories and with the area of the second
floor 35,000 sf.
It is interesting to note, however, that if the future use of the building were to change to the auxiliary
occupancies, the new uses would limit the construction to types I-B or I-A. So Type I-A construction
provides the owner with flexibility for future use or sale of the building. This owner typically plans for
future change of use for new construction. It is even useful to recognize that Table 10 shows that
construction Type I-A allows the future of the building to be used for education, factory, mercantile, and
even high hazard H-3, H-4, H-5 use.
An additional consideration for this building is that it is being constructed concurrently with a major
remodel of the adjoining existing building and is permitted as an addition. The first floor and second
floor have corridors between the buildings and the construction documents are permitted using the
combined floor area for both buildings. The combined second floor area is 69,340sf. The Type I-A
construction allows an unlimited floor are for business use.
Type was selected, primarily for business reasons instead. The following calculations show that with the
size of the new building alone and the allowances in the code for frontage and sprinkler protection, the
building could have had a much lower rating for structural fire protection.
Section 504.2 of the IBC allows building height increase of 20’ and one story increase due to automatic
sprinkler system installation. The building areas limited by Table 503 shall be permitted by 506.1 to be
increased due to frontage (If) and automatic sprinkler system protection (Is):

Aa = { At + [At × If] + [At × Is] }

(Equation 5-1) IBC 506.1

where:

Aa = Allowable building area per story (square feet).
At = Tabular building area per story in accordance with Table 503 (square feet).
If = Area increase factor due to frontage as calculated in accordance with Section 506.2.
Is= Area increase factor due to sprinkler protection in accordance with Section 506.3, except H-3.

If = [F / P - 0.25] W/30 (Equation 5-2) IBC 506.2

where:

If = Area increase due to frontage.
F = Building perimeter that fronts on a public way or open space having 20’ open minimum width (feet).
P = Perimeter of entire building (feet).
W = Width of public way or open space (feet) in accordance with Section 506.2.1.
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Given that this building has F/P>.5 and W > 30, If =0.25 and Is = 2
Calculate Aa = { At + [At × 0.25] + [At × 2] } = At x 3.25
With this allowance for increased floor area, this sprinklered building with over half of the perimeter
fronting public way, the tabular values shown in the table below could go as low as 11,000 sf and 2
stories and 43’ height and still allow the existing building size. This essentially would allow the building
to be of any construction type except V-B.
It is appropriate for business reasons described above, however, that the building owner has forgone
this type of detailed analysis of allowances and instead selected Type I-A for unlimited area and height.
Table 10: Building Height and Area Limitations per IBC 503
GROUP
TYPE I
HEIGHT
(feet)

A
UL

B
160

TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION
TYPE II
TYPE III
A
B
A
B
65
55
65
55

STORIES(S)
AREA (A)
A-3
S
UL
11
3
2
3
2
A
UL
UL
15,500
9,500
14,000
9,500
B
S
UL
11
5
3
5
3
A
UL
UL
37,500 23,000
28,500 19,000
E
S
UL
5
3
2
3
2
A
UL
UL
26,500 14,500
23,500 14,500
F-1
S
UL
11
4
2
3
2
A
UL
UL
25,000 15,500
19,000 12,000
F-2
S
UL
11
5
3
4
3
A
UL
UL
37,500 23,000
28,500 18,000
H-3
S
UL
6
4
2
4
2
A
UL
60,000
26,500 14,000
17,500 13,000
H-4
S
UL
7
5
3
5
3
A
UL
UL
37,500 17,500
28,500 17,500
H-5
S
4
4
3
3
3
3
A
UL
UL
37,500 23,000
28,500 19,000
M
S
UL
11
4
2
4
2
A
UL
UL
21,500 12,500
18,500 12,500
S-1
S
UL
11
4
2
3
2
A
UL
48,000
26,000 17,500
26,000 17,500
S-2
S
UL
11
5
3
4
3
A
UL
79,000
39,000 26,000
39,000 26,000
A = building area per story, S = stories above grade plane, UL = Unlimited, NP = Not permitted.
Types allowed for
planned use
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Types allowed for
future use

Types using
sprinkler and
frontage allowances

TYPE IV
HT
65

A
50

TYPE V
B
40

3
15,000
5
36,000
3
25,500
4
33,500
5
50,500
4
25,500
5
36,000
3
36,000
4
20,500
4
25,500
5
38,500

2
11,500
3
18,000
1
18,500
2
14,000
3
21,000
2
10,000
3
18,000
3
18,000
3
14,000
3
14,000
4
21,000

1
6,000
2
9,000
1
9,500
1
8,500
2
13,000
1
5,000
2
6,500
2
9,000
1
9,000
1
9,000
2
13,500

Types
not allowed
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Fire Resistance Rating Requirements of Building Elements
Requirements for fire resistance rating of key building elements are shown below in Table 11. These
ratings are consistent with the prescriptive requirements for a Type I-A building in the IBC chapter 6,
Types of Construction.
Tested assemblies include:



Structural frame fire proofing 3 hours per UL X701 1-11/16”
Shaft Enclosures 2 hours per GA File No. WP 7051
Table 11: Fire Resistance Ratings per IBC Table 601

Key Building Element
Exterior Non-bearing Wall
Primary Structure
Permanent Partitions
Shaft Enclosures
Floors, Floor/Ceiling Assemblies
Roof, Roof/Ceiling Assemblies
Stairways

Rating (HR)
0 (non-combustible)
3
0 (non-combustible)
2
2
1½
2

Note
Separation distance ≥ 30’ (Table 602)
2-hr if only roof support

Other Features
Interior Bearing Walls
Duct Shaft
Elevator Machine Room
Elevator Machine Room > 3 stories
Elevator Machine Room 3 stories
Event Balcony 20’-5 ½” and
Main Canopy 23’-2”
Corridor
Doors in Exit Stairs
Doors in 1 HR Fire Barrier
Exterior Wall of Interior Exit Stairs

Rating (HR)
3
2
2
1
0
0

Note
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0
90 min
45 min
1

Not less than the floor (713.4)

(1022.2)

Not less than the wall (714.3)
(3006.4)
(3006.4, Ex 1)
(3006.4, Ex 2)
Not required over 20’ (Table 601 note b and
603.1, Ex 1.3)
(1018.1)
(716.5)
(716.5)
(1022.7)
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Materials of Construction
Columns and structural members
The primary structure is a 3-hour rated system.
Structural steel framing is carbon steel and high-strength low-alloy steel. Columns, beams, girders, and
other members receive sprayed-on fireproofing.
Typically, columns are steel with sprayed-on fire proofing and then wrapped in gypsum wallboard with
metal stud framing. Exterior columns have one or more sides with precast concrete veneer panels
attached to foam insulation.
Cast-in-place concrete is used for footings and foundation. Several columns on the first floor in the
storage area and on the exposed east side of the building facing the air field are also encased in concrete
up to a height of 8 ft.
There is limited use of architecturally exposed structural steel framing. Finishing of these items is in
conformance with the AISC Code of Standard Practice for Steel Building and Bridges, Section 10 with
intumescent coating.
Fire-resistance-rated assemblies for ceiling joists and soffits incorporate non-load bearing steel framing.
Materials and construction are identical to those tested in assembly indicated according to ASTM E119
by an independent testing agency.

Floors
Floors are 2-hour fire rated assemblies.
Composite floors are concrete on galvanized steel decking.
Floor decks are part of an assembly system with fire-resistive construction rating. Assemblies are listed
in the UL "Fire Resistance Directory" and bear the UL label for the system detailed.
Sprayed-on fire proofing is applied to the underside of the steel decking.

Roofing
Roofs are 1 ½-hour fire rated assemblies.
Steel roof deck is galvanized steel.
Roof decks are part of an assembly system with fire-resistive construction rating. Assemblies are listed
in the UL "Fire Resistance Directory" and bear the UL label for the system detailed.
The steel roof deck is evaluated by Factory Mutual (FM) and is listed as Class 1 fire rating.
The roof assembly is made of concrete on a steel deck, layered with rigid insulation and ½” protection
board, then a membrane cover.
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Polyvinyl-Chloride (PVC) roofing, base flashings, and component materials comply with requirements in
FM Global 4450 or FM Global 4470 as part of a built-up roofing system, and listed in FM Global's
"RoofNav" for Class 1 or noncombustible construction, as applicable. Fire/Windstorm Classification:
Class 1A-60. Exterior Fire-Test Exposure: ASTM E108 or UL 790, Class B; for application and roof slopes
indicated; testing by a qualified testing agency.

Applied Fireproofing
Design drawings of the reflected plans for each floor of the building show that spray fire proofing has
been indicated for under concrete decks, metal roof decks, recesses and canopies over the loading dock,
exterior balconies and exits. These applications are listed in Table 12 with the UL specification and fire
rating. Exit stairways are not sprayed except at the top floor of each enclosure.
Table 12: Fireproofing specifications and ratings
Building element
Typical concrete deck
Recesses (exits, restrooms)

Canopies (loading, exit doors)
Metal Roof Deck
Roof Deck cooling tower footprint

Feature
Lightweight concrete deck, 6-1/4”
Spray fire proofing on primary structure
Lightweight concrete deck, 5-1/2”
Spray fireproofing on concrete deck
Spray fire proofing on primary structure
Spray fire proofing
Spray fire proofing on primary structure
Spray fire proofing on 5/8” gypsum
Spray fire proofing on primary steel
In lieu of spray fire proofing, 1” cement board is fastened to
underside of metal deck

Specification
ULX701
ULJ809
ULX701
ULJ809
ULX701
UL719
ULX701

Fire Rating (HR)
2
3
2
1
3
1.5
2
1.5
2
2

Fire proofing materials are tested according to ASTM E119 or UL 263






Concealed/Commercial Sprayed Fire-Resistive Materials
Combustion Characteristics: ASTM E136.
Surface-Burning Characteristics: Comply with ASTM E 84
Flame-Spread Index: 5 or less, ASTM E84/UL723.
Smoke-Developed Index: 5 or less, ASTM E84/UL723
High Density SFRM for use on columns exposed to damage in Penthouse
Combustion Characteristics: tested in accordance with ASTM E136 noncombustible.
Surface-Burning Characteristics: When tested in accordance with ASTM E84 or CAN4-S102
Flame-Spread Index: 10 or less, ASTM E84/UL723
Smoke-Developed Index: 10 or less, ASTM E84/UL723.
Mastic and Intumescent Fire Resistive Coatings
Surface-Burning Characteristics: Comply with ASTM E84
Flame-Spread Index: 25 or less.
Smoke-Developed Index: 50 or less.
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Fire-stopping
At all fire-rated walls, penetration fire stopping is provided and fire resistive joint systems are used
between structural elements of floor and exterior walls. Figures 20, 21 and 22 below illustrate typical
fire proofing design of joints and penetrations.





Fire-rated dampers are used on all penetrations of fire-rated partitions
Penetration Fire-stopping
o For rated walls, UL listed fire stopping is used and joints constructed per UL design number
HW-D-0028
o Wall penetrations of rated walls use fire stopping sealant.
Fire Resistive Joint Systems

Figure 20: Fire Proofing for Through Penetrations
Figure 21: Fire Proofing Rated Wall Penetrations

Figure 22: Fire Resistive Joint for Rated Wall
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Exterior walls
Exterior walls are nonbearing and are noncombustible.
Typical non-load bearing wall assembly type #1 is a 6” precast architectural concrete wall between 4 and
8 ft high backed by spray foam insulation, metal stud and 5/8” gypsum wallboard. This precast
architectural concrete wall is used along the base of the first floor exterior and also alternating with
aluminum curtain wall assemblies at each floor level, extending up to the parapet on the office section
of the building.
Typical non-load bearing exterior wall assembly type #2 is an insulated metal panel with batt insulation,
vapor barrier and 5/8” gypsum wallboard. Insulated metal wall panels are foamed-insulation-core metal
wall panels made with galvanized steel sheet and components and have the following characteristics:






Surface Burning Characteristics:
o Not greater than the following, per ASTM E84 or UL Standard 723, for foam core and
interior surface:
o Flame spread index: 25 or less.
o Smoke developed index: 450 or less.
Fire Performance of Insulated Wall:
o Approved as a Class 1 wall panel per ANSI/FM 4880.
Intermediate Scale Multistory Fire Test:
Back up panel assembly mockup tested per NFPA 285.

Typical metal soffit panel assembly includes an exterior weather barrier of galvanized steel sheet or
aluminum alloy sheet over metal stud framing with mineral wool board insulation. Formed metal wall
panels are preformed metal pan type modular wall cladding and soffit cladding backup panel system
made with galvanized steel sheet and components with the following characteristics:






Surface Burning Characteristics:
o Not greater than the following, per ASTM E84 or UL Standard 723, for foam core and
interior surface:
o Flame spread index: 25 or less.
o Smoke developed index: 450 or less.
Fire Performance of Insulated Wall:
o Approved as a Class 1 wall panel per ANSI/FM 4880.
Intermediate Scale Multistory Fire Test:
Back up panel assembly mockup tested per NFPA 285.

Fire-rated glazed curtain wall assemblies are noncombustible steel frame with rated glazing. Steel firerated glazed curtain-wall systems allow for thermal movements resulting from temperature change
ranges of 120 deg F ambient and 180 deg F of material surfaces. These panels are listed and tested
according to the following test methods: ASTM E119, ASTM E2074-00, and ASTM E2010-01.
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Interior walls
Unless otherwise fire-rated, interior non-load bearing permanent partitions are noncombustible.
Metal Composite Material Wall Panels are aluminum alloy sheet with thermoplastic core. Fiberglass
Reinforced Plastic Wall Panels have a Flame Spread E84 20 and Smoke Developed E84 450
Two types of fire barriers have been installed in the building. See Figure 3 for a typical floor plan layout
of fire barriers. Fire rated walls that are metal stud frame with gypsum wall board cover are 1-hr or 2-hr
rated and constructed per UL design number U419.
A 1-HR barrier per IBC 706 is used between the office occupancy section of the building and the
assembly occupancy section of the building on the first and second floors. The 1-HR barrier is also used
on the common north wall between the new construction building 802 and the existing remodel of
building 800.
A 2-HR barrier per IBC 706 is used around the two interior stairwells and also the two elevators and
elevator hoist rooms. The stairwell walls on the exterior of the building, however are 1-HR fire-resistive
rated. Vertical ventilation shaft enclosures have a 2-HR rating as well.

Shaft wall assemblies
Fire rated shaft walls have metal channel frame and gypsum wall board cover. The 2-hr rated walls are
constructed per GA file number WP 7051. The 1-hr rated walls are constructed per GA file number WP
6800. Materials and construction identical to those of assemblies with fire-resistance ratings
determined according to ASTM E119.

Doors
Fire rated doors are provided in the building for the rated fire barrier walls, including the stairwells, the
elevator equipment rooms and the doors through the 1 hour occupancy separation on the second floor.
The doors listed in Table 13 below are fire resistive rated.
Table 13: Fire-rated Doors
Location

Type

Material

11J6 office to assembly
11F7 to vestibule
15F7 from exit stairs
11A8 from exit stairs
21F7 to exit stairs
22F7 office to assembly
21H7 storage to assembly
21A8 to exit stairs
31F7 to exit stairs
31H7 elevator equipment
31A8 to exit stairs
P1A8 to exit stairs
P3A8 elevator equipment

Double door, 7x40 window
Single door, 4x25 window
Single door
Single door
Single door
Fire Rated Folding
Solid, no window
Single door
Single door
Solid, no window
Single door
Single door
Solid, no window

Hollow metal
Wood
Wood
Wood
Wood
Steel w/ vinyl seals
Wood
Wood
Wood
Wood
Wood
Wood
Wood
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Rating (minutes)
per NFPA 80
45
90
90
90
90
60
45
90
90
90
90
90
90

Fire Barrier Wall
Rating (HR)
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
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The fire-rated folding door is designed and tested by the manufacturer. See Figure 23 below for a similar
installation of the folding door in a wide corridor.36 It is an electrically operated assembly that is selfclosing when an alarm activates. The 60-minute rated door is listed and rated in compliance with NFPA
80, tested according to NFPA 252 and UL10B. The door is also an automatic closing system that is listed
to UL864 including capability to send and receive signals from the Fire Control Panel.

Figure 23: Cross Corridor Fire-Rated Folding Door by Won-DoorTM

36

http://wondoor.com/ Won-Door Corporation, Salt Lake City, UT
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Referenced Fire Resistance Codes and Standards


















ANSI/FM 4880: American National Standard for Evaluating Insulated Wall or Wall & Roof/Ceiling
Assemblies, etc.
ASTM E119: Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials.
ASTM E2074-00: Standard Test Method for Fire Tests of Door Assemblies, Including Positive
Pressure Testing of Side-Hinged and Pivoted Swinging Door Assemblies.
ASTM E2010-01: Standard Test Method for Positive Pressure Fire Tests of Window Assemblies.
ASTM E108: Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Roof Coverings
ASTM E136: Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube
Furnace at 750°C
ASTM E84: Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building
Materials (Tunnel Test)
CAN4-S102: Standard Method of Test for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials
and Assemblies (Tunnel Test)
FM Global 4450: Approval Standard for Class 1 Insulated Steel Deck Roofs Class Number 4450
FM Global 4470: Approval Standard for Single-Ply, Polymer-Modified Bitumen Sheet, Built-Up
Roof (BUR) and Liquid Applied Roof Assemblies for use in Class 1 and Noncombustible Roof Deck
Construction
Gypsum Association Design manual file numbers for Gypsum Board Partition Shaft Walls
o WP 7051
o WP 6800
NFPA 285: Standard Fire Test Method for Evaluation of Fire Propagation Characteristics of
Exterior Non-Load-Bearing Wall Assemblies Containing Combustible Components
NFPA 80: Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives
NFPA 252: Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Door Assemblies
UL Standards
o UL 723: Test for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building. Materials
o UL 790: Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Roof Coverings
o UL 263: Standard for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials
o UL 10B: Standard for Fire Tests of Door Assemblies
o UL 864: Standard for Control Units and Accessories for Fire Alarm Systems
UL "Fire Resistance Directory" Designs
o UL U419: Nonbearing Wall Ratings — 1, 2, 3 or 4 Hr
o UL X701: Spray Applied Fire Resistive Ratings — 1, 2, 3 and 4 Hr
o UL J809: Restrained and Unrestrained Assembly and Unrestrained Beam Ratings — 11/2, 2, 3 or 4 Hr
o HW-D-0028: Joint Systems, Assembly Rating 1 Hr
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Type of Fire Detection, Alarm & Communication System
The fire alarm system is a non-coded addressable system with multiplexed signal transmission and is
dedicated to fire alarm service only. Coded notification signals are not generated. Only general alarm
notification is seen and heard by building occupants in the event of a fire. However, the system utilizes
addressable appliances so that the initiating device(s) can be identified and operation of appropriate
mechanical equipment, recall of the elevators, annunciation of alarms and notifications are made in
accordance with the design specifications.
All fire protection devices, equipment and systems are UL listed and FM approved for their intended
use.
The primary power for the fire alarm system is powered by 120V and provided by the emergency power
circuit for the facility.

System Operating Characteristics
Fire Alarm Signals
The sequence of operation of initiating signals, panel alarms, notifications and system actions is
depicted graphically in Figure 24.

Initiating Signals
•Smoke
•Heat
•Manual
•Duct smoke
•Waterflow
•Supervisory
•Trouble

Fire Alarm
Control Panel
•Identify Zone &
Alarm type/group
•Identify Trouble and
Supervisory Signals
•Operator Interface
•Switches & Control
Relays
•Power & UPS

Primary Actions
•Alert occupants by
strobe and voice com
•Notify Remote and
Proprietary Stations
•Activate Smoke
Dampers in Ducts
•Recall Elevators
•Activate Folding Fire
Doors

Secondary
Actions
•Notify Fire
Department
•Notify Maintenance
Contractor

Figure 24: Sequence of Alarm Actions
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Fire alarm signals are initiated by the following devices:






Manual pull stations(NFPA 72:17.14)37
Heat detectors (NFPA 72:17.6)
Smoke detectors (NFPA 72:17.7)
Duct smoke detectors (NFPA 72:17.7.5)
Automatic sprinkler system water flow (NFPA 72:17.12)

Fire alarm signals initiate the following actions:








Continuously operate alarm notification appliances (NFPA 72:18.1)
Identify alarm at the fire alarm control unit (NFPA 72:10.18)
Transmit an alarm signal to the remote alarm receiving station (NFPA 72:26)
Close smoke dampers in air ducts of designated air conditioning duct systems (NFPA 90A:6.4)38
Recall elevators to primary or alternate recall floors (NFPA 72:21.3)
Close accordion folding fire doors on second floor (NFPA 72:21.8)
Record events in the system memory

Supervisory and Trouble Signals
Supervisory signals are initiated by the following actions:




Valve supervisory switch (NFPA 72:17.16.1)
Dry pipe sprinkler low air pressure switch (NFPA 72:17.16.2.2.2)
Elevator shunt trip (NFPA 72:21.4.4)

Trouble signals are initiated by the following actions:








Open circuits, shorts and grounds (NFPA 72:12.6.1)
Opening, tampering or removing signal devices
Abnormal AC voltage internal to fire alarm control panel (FACP)
Open circuit or ground or loss of primary power at FACP
Battery failure to charge or break in circuit
Abnormal switch position in FACP
Dry pipe sprinkler low air pressure switch

37

Manual pull stations are not required for Group A with fewer than 300 occupants or Group B if automatically sprinklered. International
Building Code (2012), 907.2.1-2.
38 Smoke Detection for Automatic Control, NFPA 90A, 2012 edition. NFPA 90A states that duct smoke detectors are required to be installed in
accordance with NFPA 72 (see 6.4.4.1 of NFPA 90A). In addition, NFPA 90A states that where an approved fire alarm system is installed in a
building, the duct smoke detectors required by NFPA 90A are required to be connected to the fire alarm system.

Cynthia Wernet

Page 58

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

Control Panel
The Gamewell-FCI E3 series combined fire and mass notification system was selected for this building.
The fire alarm control panel (FACP), depicted in Figure 24, is a field-programmable, microprocessorbased modular design, complying with ANSI/UL Standard 864 and listed and labeled by UL and approved
by FM.
The fire alarm control panel is located in the electrical room (11F8) on the first floor, centrally located in
the structure and adjacent to the data room (13F8). There are two side-by side cabinets.
The main control cabinet contains the annunciator panel (network graphics annunciator NGA) and the
firefighter microphone and telephone devices with associated control and power supply boards. In
addition to relay modules, this panel also supplies power to 165 smoke detectors, 15 heat detectors and
31 duct detectors.
The transponder control cabinet contains the amplifier boards and associated control and power supply
boards, supporting 271 smoke detectors, 23 heat detectors and 31 duct detectors.
Each of two battery cabinets also contains two 12V 55 amp-hour batteries.
A remote annunciator panel is located just inside the vestibule of the main customer entrance of the
building. Smoke detection is not provided in the vestibule but is in the ACP room in accordance with the
code.39
Firefighter telephone jacks, shown in Figure 25, are located on each floor in the stairwells.

Figure 25: Gamewell E3 series main control panel

Figure 26: Firefighters phone jack

39

IBC (2012) 907.4.1 Protection of fire alarm control unit.
In areas that are not continuously occupied, a single smoke detector shall be provided at the location of each fire alarm control
unit, notification appliance circuit power extenders, and supervising station transmitting equipment.
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Detection Devices
Types
Smoke detectors and heat detectors are Gamewell brand and are associated with intelligent mounting
bases. The smoke detectors are Gamewell Velociti Series analog addressable photoelectronic type.
Models ASD-PL2F, shown in Figure 27, and ASD-PL2FR, in Figure 28 comply with UL 268 and UL268A.

Figure 27: Gamewell ASD-PL2F Photoelectronic smoke detector
The PL2FR is a remote test detector for use in ducts. Remote test capability allows the system to comply
with general accessibility requirements of NFPA 72:17.4.4.
The duct housing is rated 100-4,000 ft/min (.5-20.32 m/s) air velocity.

Figure 28: Gamewell ASD-PLD2FR remote test duct smoke sensor with InnovairFlex DNR housing
Heat detectors are Gamewell Velociti Series model ATD-L2F, shown in Figure 29. They are fixedtemperature thermistor type, ordinary range, rated for 135°F (57°C). These sensors comply with UL 521
and are UL approved for 50 ft center to center spacing and FM approved for 25 ft x 25 ft spacing.
Also model ATD-RL2F combination fixed and rate of rise (15°F/min) are used in select locations and one
fixed temperature (190°F) detector (ATD-HL2F) is also used.
Using UL testing procedures and Table B.3.2.5 of NFPA 72, the listed spacing and temperature at a
reference velocity of 5 ft/sec (1.5 m/s) results in a time constant τ0 of 44 and RTI of 8.9 (ft-s)1/2 (54 (ms)1/2). Manufacturer’s literature, however, does not list the RTI for these devices (NFPA 72:17.6.1.4).

Figure 29: Gamewell ATD-L2F Fixed Temperature Thermal Sensor
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A variety of types of sprinklers are used to detect fire. Outside areas subject to freezing are dry
sprinklers and interior areas are wet.
Wet Sprinkler System Quick Response:









Interior Heated Areas with Suspended Ceilings: Recessed pendent heads with recessed
escutcheons, 155°F.
Interior Heated Areas without Suspended Ceilings: Upright sprinkler heads, 155°F.
Interior Unheated Areas Subject to Freezing: Dry pendent or dry sidewall heads, 155°F.
Concealed Sprinkler Heads: Flush mounted, concealed pendent heads with 135°F cover plate.
Elevator Pit: Vertical or horizontal sidewall; 212°F.
Elevator Pit Sprinkler and Machine Room Shut Off Valve. A supervised shunt trip in elevator
equipment room controlled by a 135°F heat detector at the top of the elevator hoist room is set
to shut down the elevator power prior to water being discharged from sprinkler.
First Floor Warehouse area ESFR pendent, 165°F.

Dry Sprinkler System:



Outside areas subject to freezing: Quick response, upright or sidewall, pendent.
Outside Canopy Areas: Recessed dry pendent heads with recessed escutcheons.

Loading dock and covered walkways have sprinkler coverage. NFPA 72 does not require detection in
these areas per 17.5.3.1.5 because the following conditions have been met.





Space is not accessible for storage purposes or entrance of unauthorized persons and is
protected against the accumulation of windborne debris.
Space contains no equipment such as steam pipes, electric wiring, shafting, or conveyors.
Floor over the space is tight.
No flammable liquids are processed, handled, or stored on the floor above.

In addition, the covered balcony area on the second floor has heat detection as well as sprinklers
because this area is occupied.
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Location and Placement
Detectors
Smoke detectors are located on each floor in every room, with some exceptions. In each large room or
corridor, multiple detectors are spaced approximately 15 ft apart providing general area protection.
Detectors are mounted on the smooth ceiling or sidewall in accordance with NFPA 72: 17.7.3.2.1. The
distance between detectors does not exceed 30 ft, the distance to the wall does not exceed 15 ft and no
location is more than 0.7 times 30 ft away from at least one detector per NFPA 72: 17.7.3.2.3.1. Figures
30 and 31 illustrate a typical ceiling plan overlaid with the maximum spacing and detector coverage.
Additional detectors have been placed on each side of partitions such as the one behind the visitor
reception desk at the first floor main entrance, to comply with NFPA 72:17.5.2.

Figure 30: NFPA 72 maximum spacing 30 ft between detectors

Figure 31: NFPA 72 all locations within each walled area are within 21 ft of detector
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Smoke detectors and fire smoke dampers are also placed in each main exhaust and supply air duct
between floors and at supply grilles in the event area in the first floor reception and second floor event
areas as these are large open assembly areas.
The number of heat, smoke and sprinkler detection devices is listed in Table 14 by type and floor.
Table 14: Detector Quantity By Type and Location
Floor/Location
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
Penthouse
Penthouse

Detection devices (qty)
Dry sprinkler riser (1)
Wet sprinkler riser (2)
Duct detectors (21)
Temperature Rate of rise (4)
Temperature(1)
Smoke (64)
Wet sprinkler riser (2)
Duct detectors (10)
Temperature Rate of rise (3)
Temperature(5@135F & 2@190)
Smoke (99 with 4 remote LEDs)
Wet sprinkler riser (2)
Duct detectors (10)
Temperature Rate of rise (2)
Temperature(6)
Smoke (64 with 5 remote LEDs)
Wet sprinkler riser (1)
Smoke (3 with 1 remote LED)

All heat detectors are ceiling mounted in accordance with NFPA 72:17.6.3.1.3. Heat detectors are
placed above and below the covered balcony outside the second floor delivery event room. Figure 32
shows the typical detector placement above the balcony. They are spaced no more than 25 ft apart,
well within the UL listed spacing of 50 ft and compliant with the FM approval for 25 ft per NFPA
72:17.6.3.1.1. The balcony faces directly toward the airplane terminals on the east side of the building.

Figure 32: 25 ft spacing between heat detectors on balcony
In place of smoke detectors, the kitchenettes in office areas on the first, second and third floors have
135°F fixed temperature heat detectors. The catering kitchen on the second floor has a 190°F heat
detector.
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Rate of rise heat detectors are placed in the first floor locker room, the janitor closets on the first and
second floors and the restrooms located on each of the three floors.
Manual Fire-Alarm Boxes are identified in the alarm point list as one each located on the first floor by
the fire panel and by the sprinkler riser. However, the manual pull stations are not identified in the
FACP drawings or the alarm riser or alarm plan drawings.

Fire Doors
There are two folding accordion fire-rated doors located on the second floor and separating the
assembly occupancy area from the rest of the second floor. The doors close when a smoke or fire alarm
signal is detected on the second floor. This is intended to provide additional time for occupants to exit
while preventing smoke from moving from the office areas of the two buildings to the center section of
the building where the customer events are conducted.

Elevators
There are two elevators in the building. An elevator is recalled when:



Elevator lobby smoke detectors activate (and alternate floor if detector activates on recall floor)
Elevator machine room or hoistway smoke detectors activate

An elevator is shut down when:


Water flow alarm for a sprinkler in an elevator shaft or machine room

Zones
The alarm points of the building are organized by floor and by detector type and are listed in Table 15.
Secondary groups are also assigned to elevator lobby detectors for controlling of elevator recall to the
appropriate floor.
Table 15: Alarm Zone by Floor and Group List
Floor/Zone
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
Penthouse
Penthouse
Penthouse
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Type
Manual
Smoke
Thermal
Smoke duct
Tamper
Waterflow
Smoke
Thermal
Smoke duct
Tamper
Waterflow
Smoke
Thermal
Smoke duct
Tamper & elevator shunt
Waterflow
Smoke
Tamper & elevator shunt
Waterflow

Group
9
10
11
12
13
14
20
21
22
23
24
30
31
32
33
34
40
43
44
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Smoke Control
Passive smoke control is accomplished with the fire smoke dampers. Located in HVAC supply/exhaust
duct penetrations between floors and fire rated barriers, the combination fire/smoke dampers close by
a 165°F electric sensor thermostat (in place of fusible link) and a photoelectric type smoke detection.
The dampers are UL555S Leakage Rated Class: I.
NFPA 90A40 is specific to air conditioning and heating systems installation. The purpose of the NFPA 90A
6.4.2 is to prevent the spread of smoke and fire through duct work and ventilation systems for air
conditioning and heating systems with high capacities. Dampers are required in air supply systems with
a capacity greater than 2000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) downstream of the air filters and upstream of
any branch ducts and for multi-story buildings at each story with a common shared return and having a
capacity greater than 15,000 cfm. The detection device should be installed before the connection to the
common return and before any connection to any recirculation or fresh air inlet in the return air
systems. This would include plenums where the plenum is used for a common return.
Ventilation fan systems used to remove air from the inside of the building to the outside of the building
are excluded from the above requirements and return air smoke detectors are not required when there
is protection of the space served by a system of area smoke detectors. However, this building has fire
smoke detection in both the supply and the exhaust duct systems.

When damper(s) close:
• HVAC system enters smoke control mode

40

•

AHU’s maintain cooling maximum airflow, heating dampers are closed

•

Alarms activate and fans shutdown in affected alarm zone

•

Smoke concentration increases locally and spreads throughout floor as plume is pushed toward
exhaust vents in other zones

•

Fire floor becomes pressurized as additional dampers close

NFPA 90A, Standard for the Installation of Air-Conditioning and Ventilation Systems. (2012)
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Alarm System
This supervised system has two communication connections external to the alarm control panel. The
first is an off-site third party central station service. The second is a proprietary communication center.
The system automatically transmits alarm, supervisory and trouble signals to both locations
simultaneously.
The central station is a listed service, compliant with UL 827 and NFPA 72:26.3. The building owner
subscribes to this service that continuously monitors alarms, provides runner service and also provides
sole-source alarm inspection, testing and maintenance services to all of the owner’s facilities in the
region and many of the U.S. facilities.
The proprietary station serves as a redundant alarm monitoring station, with oversight of fire and
security systems and a dispatch center for security guard staff and full time fire department. The
proprietary station is at another secured owner location and maintains a staff of four to six dispatchers
at all times 24 x 7 x 365.
The proprietary fire department is located on the property, in another building or on patrols, staffed
with six to nine firefighters at all times. The local station for the large municipal fire department is
located nearby, less than 1 mile away. The building is located on property adjacent to the county airport
and although the county fire department is devoted primarily to protecting county assets and aircraft
rescue firefighting, it has jurisdiction over this area and will opt to respond as resources allow.
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Disposition
Alarm Actions is a simplified alarm matrix. See table below for sequence of operations for the alarms.
Table 16: Sequence of Operations Matrix
Device /
Actions
Annunciate at fire control
panel
Notify Remote and
Proprietary Stations
Alert occupants by strobe
and voice com
Activate Smoke Dampers
in Ducts
Shutdown Elevators
Recall Elevators
Activate Folding Fire
Doors

Manual

Smoke
Heat

Elevator
Machine Room

Duct
Smoke

Waterflow
Switch

Supervisory or
Trouble

yes

Elevator
Lobby
Smoke
yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes
yes

Alarm - Following an alarm signal that is initiated by a manual pull, smoke, heat or water flow detector,
the fire alarm control panel sends the signal to the central station. The central station receives this
signal and reporting screens are generated by software utilized by the central station. The proprietary
station is notified simultaneously and views the same reporting screens at that location.
Retransmission - All alarms are retransmitted immediately by voice over phone line to public
announcing speakers at the proprietary fire station on property and by voice over the private two-way
radio system to responders.
The alarm is also retransmitted without delay to the 911 city emergency center by the central station.
But because the proprietary fire department and the proprietary communication center track all fire
protection system impairments and hot work, prior to retransmitting the alarm, the central station will
first contact the proprietary communication center and confirm that the alarm is not the result of a test,
scheduled shutdown or other known impairment. The additional communication does not delay the
notification or response of the proprietary fire department. This complies with NFPA 72:26.3.8.1.2.
Response – The proprietary fire department will typically be the first on scene at the alarm panel and
establish command while other public departments will arrive next and depending on fire conditions,
provide mutual aid or be transferred command. If additional actions are required to provide mass
notification or voice instructions to occupants over the speakers, the fire department commander will
initiate from the alarm control panel. The incident commander will also be in contact with the
proprietary communication center and request that occupants in the building and in adjacent buildings
receive a textual desktop notification over the company network with instructions for evacuation or
sheltering in place.
Recall - If conditions allow, the proprietary fire department may assess conditions at the building, recall
the public fire agency responders by way of the proprietary communication center and request that
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notification devices are silenced until an alarm technician from the central service provider can arrive to
correct any system anomalies.
Generally, the proprietary firefighters or on-site maintenance workers are not trained or authorized to
reset the equipment. They can, however, address immediately any water flow issues and protect the
property from additional damage.
Supervisory – Upon receipt of a supervisory signal, the central station immediately notifies the
proprietary communication center which dispatches a proprietary fire department member to the
panel. This on-scene person conducts a walkthrough of the system and investigates the cause of the
signal and conditions in the building. At the same time, a third party contract alarm technician is
dispatched to the location and the arrival time and information is coordinated between the fire
department and the technician by the proprietary communication center.
Trouble – Upon receipt of a trouble signal, the central station immediately notifies the proprietary
communication center which dispatches a proprietary fire department member or maintenance
electrician to the panel. This on-scene person conducts a walkthrough of the system and investigates
the cause of the signal and conditions in the building. At the same time, a third party contract alarm
technician is dispatched to the location and the arrival time and information is coordinated between the
fire department and the technician by the proprietary communication center.
Scheduled and requested system impairments are coordinated through the proprietary communication
center. The proprietary fire department member assigned to the system completes an impairment
form, hangs a tag on the system component or panel and is responsible for returning to verify system
status upon completion of the scheduled work or test and restoration of the system. All system
impairments are recorded and any that exceed 8 hours require that the insurance underwriter is also
notified by the communication center via a toll-free phone number messaging center.
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Notification Devices
Types
Notification devices include strobes, speakers, and combination speaker-strobes. The appliances are
summarized in Table 17.
Table 17: Notification Devices, Locations and Sizes
Device Type
Wall-mounted strobe
Ceiling-mounted strobe

Model
SW
SCW

Floor (qty)
2(5)
1(8), 2(23), 3(15)

Audible

Ceiling-mounted speaker
Ceiling-mounted speaker strobe

SPCW
SPSCW

1(8), 2(34), 3(22)
1(48), 2(90), 3(38), P(5)

Outdoor speaker strobe

SPSWK

1(1), 3(4), P(8)

.25W/77dBA
.25W/76dBA
.5 W/79dBA
.25W/80dBA

Visible
75 cd
15, 30, 75 or 110
cd
15, 30, 75 cd
75 cd

Strobes are field selectable with intensity settings to include 15, 30, 75 and 110 candela based on
location and conditions. Wall-mounted strobe is shown in Figure 33 and the ceiling mounted strobe is in
Figure 35. Flash rate of these models is one flash per second, meeting NFPA 72:18.5.3.1. And where
speakers are installed, System Sensor model SPSWK (weatherproof, Figure 34) or the combination
models are used. The speakers in Figures 36 and 37 have adjustable powertaps and are set to 0.25 W or
0.5W to produce an output ranging 76 to 80 dBA at 10 ft.

Figure 33: Wall-mounted strobe
Figure 34: Outdoor weatherproof speaker strobe

Figure 35: Ceiling mounted strobe
Figure 36: Ceiling mounted speaker
Figure 37 Ceiling mounted speaker strobe
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Location and Placement
Throughout the building, there is at least one audible and one visible notification device in every
occupied room. In corridors, speakers are spaced no more than 20 ft apart. Since the speakers are
producing 76 to 80 dBA at 10 ft, this allows every location in the building to receive approximately 80
dBA. This meets NFPA 72:18.4.1.2 not to exceed 110dBA. This also allows that the sound level is at least
15 dB above the average ambient sound level per NFPA 72:18.4.3.1, which for business occupancies is
55, for storage occupancies is 30 and for places of assembly 55. This installation is also compliant with
the building code sections addressing notification appliances.41
The chiller, pump and air handling unit rooms in the penthouse area potentially have a very high
ambient background noise level but the design for audible signaling has been approved by the AHJ as
allowed in NFPA 72:184.3.2 to use similar speakers because visible signaling is also provided.
Table 18: Speaker spacing
Location/Occupancy
Business/Offices
Assembly/Event
Storage/Warehouse
Mechanical rooms

Background (dBA) NFPA
72:Table A.18.4.3
55
55
30
85

Speaker (dBA @ 10ft)

Exceeds avg ambient

76
79 or 76
76
80

21
24 or 21
46
Unknown

Ceiling mounted strobes vary in intensity and spacing and are in accordance with the Room Spacing for
Ceiling-Mounted Visible Appliances, Table 18.5.5.4.1(b).
Table 19: Strobe Spacing
Location
Offices
Conference Rooms
Large Conf Rooms
X-Large Conf Room
Assembly Areas
Warehouse
Penthouse rooms

Room Size/Space per
strobe
20 x 30
20 x 20
20 x 32
40 x 48
20 x 30
20 x 30
36 x 16, 50 x 20

Ceiling Height

Required output

Design output

9 ft
9 ft
9 ft
9 ft
10, 19 ft
14 ft
15 ft

30
15
30
>75
30, 45
45
75

30
30
75
110
75
30
75

One ceiling mounted 110 candela strobe is located in the center extra-large conference room on the
third floor which is 40ft x 48 ft. This room also has four speakers placed with 20 ft spacing and 10 ft
from each wall.
Also, in the large event assembly rooms on the first and second floors, multiple ceiling mounted speaker
strobes are arranged throughout, and approximately 20ft spacing. These strobes exceed the minimum
required output because they are placed in a high-ceiling area. The entire east exterior wall is

41

IBC (2012) 907.5.2.1.1 Average sound pressure.
The audible alarm notification appliances shall provide a sound pressure level of 15 decibels (dBA) above the average ambient sound level or 5
dBA above the maximum sound level having a duration of at least 60 seconds, whichever is greater, in every occupiable space within the
building.
907.5.2.1.2 Maximum sound pressure.
The maximum sound pressure level for audible alarm notification appliances shall be 110 dBA at the minimum hearing distance from the
audible appliance. Where the average ambient noise is greater than 95 dBA, visible alarm notification appliances shall be provided in
accordance with NFPA 72 and audible alarm notification appliances shall not be required.
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constructed of windows and with the very bright ambient light during day, additional strobe output may
be necessary to be visible.
The first floor warehouse also has speaker strobes placed 20 ft x 30 ft apart and mounted to a 14 ft high
corrugated steel ceiling. Compared to values in Table 18.5.5.4.1(b), the strobes are under-sized. It is
recommended that these be evaluated in the field for visibility by brightness and by direct line of sight
around other ceiling mounted equipment such as lighting and circular fans. They should be suspended
below the ceiling in areas where they can be protected from damage.
Where smoke detectors have been placed inside in locked or normally unoccupied rooms, such as the
data room or the elevator machine room, there is a remote LED indicator outside the door. The janitor
closet has a heat detector also with a remote LED indicator outside the door.
In rooms with partitions reaching to the ceiling such as the luggage storage room, shown in Figure 38,
and the main entry reception area, additional strobes are placed so that the alarm is visible from all
areas.

Figure 38: Strobes located on both sides of partition wall
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Mass Notification System
The building has an emergency voice/alarm communication system (EVACS) for building occupants.
The system has operating capabilities and characteristics that comply with NFPA 72:24.4.2. This system
includes dedicated automatic equipment for originating and distributing voice instructions, as well as
alert and evacuation signals pertaining to a fire emergency, to the occupants of the building. Although
the system is capable of issuing zone-specific instructions, a building wide evacuation will most likely be
used. The code does not exclude systems used to automatically and simultaneously notify all occupants
to evacuate the premises. Any system using voice messaging must meet the requirements of Section
24.4, although not all systems are required to have all the features described in Section 24.4.











Centralized emergency communication system is part of the fire alarm control unit.
Alarm channel for automatic and simultaneous transmission of different announcements to
different zones.
Alarm channel for manual transmission of announcements by use of the central-control
microphone.
The evacuation signal indicates the number of zones and, at same time, allows voice paging to
other zones selectively or in any combination.
Tone and message sequence selection is programmable.
There are standard digitally recorded messages for “Evacuation” and “All Clear.”
Tone patterns
The voice/alarm speakers and the firefighters’ two-way telephone communication system are
monitored for integrity at the fire control panel by zone.
Preamplifiers, amplifiers, and tone generators automatically transfer to backup units, on
primary equipment failure.
Speakers comply with UL 1711 and are listed.

There is also a two-way voice emergency communication system installed with firefighter telephone
jacks on each floor in the exit stairs and in the elevator equipment room.
The building and the site also has a type of mass notification system which is a desktop emergency
notification system (DENS). The system has no interaction with the fire alarm system. The DENS is a
computer popup message sent to those who, based on their IP address and their normal work location,
will see this message with specific text instructions and information regarding the nature of the
emergency and directions to shelter in place or evacuate the building. Based on an alarm and confirmed
by radio or cell phone communication from the on-scene fire incident commander, the proprietary
communication center at another company location creates an incident specific text message and sends
to a distribution list of personnel. Personnel receiving the message that are at their computer
workstations have the opportunity to acknowledge the message on the screen before leaving the area.
Follow up messages may also be sent after the incident is resolved. This messaging function has the
capability to be used for one-way communication over the closed circuit screens located in the lobby,
the delivery event rooms and the employee break room.
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Secondary Power Supply
The secondary power supply complies with NFPA72:10.6. It satisfies requirements for a 20% safety
margin capacity, 24 hour quiescent load and 5 minutes maximum connected load for all evacuation
alarm notification appliances and 15 minutes for an in-building fire emergency voice/alarm
communication system.42
The fire alarm control panel is a two-cabinet system such that each cabinet with its contents, input
devices and notification device circuits have a dedicated standby battery power supply. Figure 39
illustrates the power supply requirements for each alarm control cabinet and the strobes for each floor.

Figure 39: Cabinets and Batteries
However, the power supply for the strobes and the strobe portion of the speaker/strobes are in a
separate cabinet than the speaker panels. The strobe circuits are provided with a standby battery
power supply at each SNAC capable of supplying 12AH, 24VDC. The speakers are tied into the 50W
amplifiers in the fire alarm control panel on the first floor and each of the fire alarm control panels has a
12VDC, 55AH battery. Typical wiring detail for the speaker and strobe circuits is illustrated in Figure 40.

42

IBC (2012) 907.5.2.3.2 Employee work areas.
Where employee work areas have audible alarm coverage, the notification appliance circuits serving the employee work areas shall be initially
designed with a minimum of 20-percent spare capacity to account for the potential of adding visible notification appliances in the future to
accommodate hearing impaired employee(s).
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Figure 40: Speaker and Strobe device circuits
The secondary power supplies were sized to exceed minimum requirements. The standby mode was
sized for 48 hours duration, instead of 24. The alarm mode was sized for only 5 minutes instead of 15
minutes. The owner specified the extended battery life for increased reliability and excess capacity for
future growth or building expansion. A summary is provided in Table 20; detailed calculations are in the
Appendix of this report.
Table 20: Summary Battery Calculations
Cabinet

Required Battery (AH)

Selected Battery (AH)

Main cabinet power supply

19.83

55

Amplifier cabinet power supply & speakers

22.49

55

SNAC-1 strobe cabinet power supply #1

3.08

12

SNAC-1 strobe cabinet power supply #2

2.96

12

SNAC-2 strobe cabinet power supply #1

3.25

12

SNAC-2 strobe cabinet power supply #2

3.13

12

SNAC-2 strobe cabinet power supply #3

2.87

12

SNAC-3 strobe cabinet power supply #1

2.94

12

SNAC-3 strobe cabinet power supply #2

2.82

12

SNAC-3 strobe cabinet power supply #3

3.10

12

Furthermore, voltage drop calculations are also provided in the Appendix. Voltage that is below the
operating range of the appliance can cause the appliances to produce visible signal intensities or sound
pressure levels that are below the levels assumed in the design of the system. Voltage drop calculations
are located in the Appendix. The speaker strobes have an operating voltage rage of 16 to 33V, or +/33%. No circuit has a voltage drop exceeding 12.3%. This ensures that notification appliances will be
capable of signaling per the manufacturer specification.
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Inspection, Test and Maintenance Requirements
Inspection, testing and maintenance of the alarm, detection and notification system in the building are
conducted and documented in accordance with NFPA 72:14 in order to verify performance and
reliability to the design and specifications. The central communication service provider and subcontractors ensure that qualified and experienced service personnel perform inspection, testing and
maintenance. However, a test plan for this building had not yet been developed for use at the time of
this analysis. The following Table 21 illustrates a proposed test plan adapted for this building from
Tables 14.3.1 & 14.4.1 in NFPA 72.
Table 21: ITM plan and frequency by component
Component

Initial Accept

All equipment

X

Control Equipment
Fuses
Interfaced Equipment
Lamps and LEDs
Primary power supply
Trouble signals
Supervising station system
Signal receipt
Voice/Alarm Com equipment
Batteries-Lead Acid

x
x
x
x
x
x
X
X
X

Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Semiannual
Annual
Daily
Semiannual
Monthly inspect
electrolyte;
Corrosion, leakage;
tightness of
connections

X
X
X
X
X

Semiannual
Annual
Annual
Semiannual

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Semiannual
Semiannual
Semiannual
Semiannual
Semiannual
Quarterly
Quarterly
Semiannual

x
X

Semiannual
Annual

Remote annunciator
NAC power extenders
Remote power (generator)
Transient suppressors
Conductors
Initiating devices
Duct detectors
Suppression switches
Manual alarm boxes
Heat detectors
Smoke detectors
Supervisory (dry press.)
Waterflow devices
Fire alarm control interface
Notification appliances
Strobes and Speakers
Mass notification system

Cynthia Wernet

Frequency
Inspection
Annual

Frequency Testing

Frequency Maint
As needed & if
indicated

Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual

Annual
 Annual replace
 Annual charge
test
 Semiannual
voltage, sp
gravity
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Annual
Semiannual

Annual
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Water Supply Analysis
Test data used for the water supply analysis is from 2013 and is the most recent. Table 22 is a summary
of the water sources, pressures and capacities.
Table 22: Water Sources
Source
Pump 1
Pump 2
Pump 3
Pump 4
City

Type
Diesel
Diesel
Electric
Electric

Rating (gpm @ psi)
2000 @ 100
1000 @ 100
2000 @ 100
2000 @ 100
2295 @ 124

Churn (tested)
0 @ 114
0 @ 105
0 @ 115
0 @ 114
0 @ 131 static

~150% @ 65% (tested)
2953 @ 63
1444 @ 88
3062 @ 72
3173 @ 72

Primary Source
Water is supplied from two sources, as is the standard for this highly protected risk rated FM Global
client. Primary water source is a series of on-site ground level storage tanks and pumps. These two
300,000 gallon tanks feed the industrial loop and also serve other critical assets, including three airplane
paint and maintenance hangars with deluge systems and risers, as well as extra hazard occupancy
buildings, hazmat storage and high value storage.
Four site fire pumps are sequentially activated based on pressure drop. Only one pump is used,
conservatively, for the design basis in case of a pump failure or a power outage. There is also a 150 gpm
service pump to maintain 135 psi static pressure but is not considered as part of the supply.
Pumps test data is taken from the September 2013 annual test.
The following information is from a test conducted at the point of connection to the building from the
12” industrial loop fire line for three contiguous buildings.
Connection to building: 6” pipe from loop into riser room
Static pressure:

133 psi

Residual pressure:

105 psi

Flow:

2035 gpm at point of connection

Secondary Source
FM Global evaluates the client’s risk based on the assumption that one pump is out of service.
Therefore, a secondary source is available. The secondary water source is city supply, which provides
consistently reliable flow and pressure for this heavy industrial zone of south Seattle. The city water
connects to the site at 5 different locations along a 12 inch city main and a 21 inch city main.
Flows for all city connections are routed through the pump house test header and a testing apparatus.
City water supply was tested in October 2013 for this building project. With all connections open the
test data gives a very “flat” curve. This water source can meet the duration demands of a fire in the new
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building. Review of past hydrant tests reveals that the static and residual pressures have decreased less
than 2% in the last 15 years.
City Water at the pump house
Static pressure:

131 psi

Residual pressure:

124 psi

Flow:

2295 gpm at pump house test apparatus on property

System is designed to ensure that demand pressure is at least 10% below the supply curve. This supply
is known to operate reliably at a high pressure, even as high as 150 psi, according to the site fire
protection engineer, and so the new system and components are rated for a working pressure of
175psig. The system is also hydrostatically tested at 200 psi and held for 2 hours.
The point of connection to the water supply is 46 ft from the west end of the building, through a 6”
underground pipe. An exterior fire department connection is also located 46 ft away through a separate
6” underground pipe from the building. The layout and location of the water supply to the building is
shown in Figure 41.

Figure 41: Site Plan and Water Supply
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Hazard Occupancy
A color-coded layout of the hazard occupancies for each floor is shown in Figures 42 through 45. The
various occupancy groups are according to NFPA 13, unless otherwise noted. These classifications are
not used for other purposes.43

Figure 42: Hazard Occupancy First Floor

43

NFPA 13, Occupancy Classifications, 11.2.1.2
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Figure 43: Hazard Occupancy Second Floor

Figure 44: Hazard Occupancy Third Floor
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Figure 45: Hazard Occupancy Penthouse
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System Design Criteria
The sprinkler systems are hydraulically designed using the density/area curves for water demand. 44
This is a supervised system and so the lower duration values allowed have been selected.45 Quick
response sprinklers are used throughout and also quick response extended coverage types are used in
some areas.
Concealed spaces above ceilings are sprinklered and covered exterior walkways are also sprinklered.
The two largest flow demand areas in the building are the extra hazard area for the covered loading
dock at the warehouse and the storage rack served by ESFR sprinklers in the warehouse area. Sprinkler
demand calculations are provided below and organized by hazard occupancy.

Light Hazard
Sprinkler systems for all areas, not otherwise designated, are designed to Light Hazard occupancy. Table
23 shows the light hazard demand calculation for 0.10 gpm/sf over the hydraulically most remote 1500
sf with 100 gpm allowance for inside/outside hose stream for 30 minutes.
These criteria actually exceed minimum required demand because design area of 1500 sf could have
been reduced when using quick response sprinklers by 40% to just 900sf in accordance with Figure
11.2.3.2.3, NFPA 13. This is typical for both the Light and Ordinary Hazard areas because it is the
owner’s standard to overdesign if the water supply is available. Similarly, allowed reductions in design
area for high temperature sprinklers, per 11.2.3.2.6, have not been applied.
Table 23: Light Hazard Demand
Light Hazard
Density (gpm/sf)
Design Area (sf)
Sprinkler demand (gpm)
Hose demand (gpm)
Total demand (gpm)
Duration (minutes)
Nominal water supply required (gal)

Selected by designer
.10
1500
150
100
250
30
7500

Sprinkler K-factors = 5.6 and 8 at 7psi. Wet piping 2 inches and smaller is schedule 40 black steel pipe.
Piping over 2 inches varies schedule for black steel pipe.

44
45

NFPA 13, Water Demand Requirements –Hydraulic Calculation Methods 11.2.3.1, Figure 11.2.3.1.1 and Table 11.2.3.1.2
NFPA 13, 11.2.3.1.3
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Ordinary Hazard
Sprinkler systems for parking (ground floor covered) areas, mechanical rooms, electrical rooms, baggage
handling areas, kitchen areas, recycle, mail room, TSA screening areas and storage rooms with storage
less than 8 feet high are designed to Ordinary Hazard, Group 2 occupancy. Table 24 shows the ordinary
hazard demand calculation for 0.20 gpm/sf over the hydraulically most remote 2500 sf with 250 gpm
allowance for inside/outside hose streams for 60 minutes. As stated in the previous section, the system
has been over-designed in the ordinary hazard occupancy areas.
Table 24: Ordinary Hazard Demand
Ordinary Hazard
Density (gpm/sf)
Design Area (sf)
Sprinkler demand (gpm)
Hose demand (gpm)
Total demand (gpm)
Duration (minutes)
Nominal water supply required (gal)

Selected by designer
.20
2500
500
250
750
60
45,000

Extra Hazard
Extra Hazard, Group 1 occupancy are designed with 0.30 gpm/sf over the hydraulically most remote
2,500 sf with 500 gpm allowance for inside/outside hose streams for 90 minutes. The sprinkler system
for the loading dock area is designed as Extra Hazard, Group 1 and the calculation is shown in Table 25.
Table 25: Extra Hazard Demand
Extra Hazard
Density (gpm/sf)
Design Area (sf)
Sprinkler demand (gpm)
Hose demand (gpm)
Total demand (gpm)
Duration (minutes)
Nominal water supply required (gal)
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Storage
Sprinkler systems for rack storage areas with storage below 12’ high are designed for cartoned,
unexpanded plastics, per FM specifications.46 Pendant K=16.8 ESFR sprinklers with 12 heads flowing at
35 psi per sprinkler head are used for system design criteria and the calculation is in Table 26.
In-rack sprinklers are not used or required. NFPA requirements for these ceiling level protection for
storage racks when ESFR method is used with 12 heads may have a K factor of 16.8 and pressure of 35
psi for lowest water demand and 250 gpm hose line for 60 minutes.47 FM guidelines also call for 250
gpm hose line and 60 minutes duration.48 The owner specifications and the design, however, used 500
gpm hose line allowance and 120 minutes duration for the demand calculations, exceeding both the
NFPA standard and FM guidelines.
FM Data Sheet 8-9 accommodates lower ceiling heights than the NFPA table. And the FM guide favors a
lower K factor and higher pressure than NFPA. Therefore, the K factor of 16.8 is used. In this case, the
FM standard for storage protection is used.
Table 26: Storage Area Demand
Warehouse Rack Storage, ESFR
K factor for QR wet pendant 160F
# sprinklers
Sprinkler spacing (sf)
Minimum psi
Sprinkler demand (gpm) Q=K√𝑷 (#)
Hose demand (gpm)
Total demand (gpm)
Duration (minutes)
Nominal water supply required (gal)
Water Supply Available on Site (gal)

NFPA 13
16.2.3.1
16.8
12
100 max
35
1193
250
1443
60
86,580

Nominal Demand
Per Owner Spec
16.8*
12
100 max
35*
1193
500**
1693
120**
203,160
600,000

* FM Data Sheet 8-9, for 14’ ceilings: K-factor with pressure
* * Demand for hose flow and duration are double minimum requirements

Dry System
For areas that are protected by a dry pipe sprinkler system, the hydraulically most remote area is
increased by 30%.49
Dry piping is galvanized pipe.

46

FM Data Sheet 8-9 “Storage of Class 1,2,3,4 and Plastic Commodities”, Table 8 “Ceiling-level Protection Guidelines for
Cartoned Unexpanded Plastic Commodities in Open-Frame Rack Storage Arrangements.”
47 NFPA 13, Table 16.2.3.1, standard configuration, Class IV commodity, Max height 20’, Max ceiling 25’ and Table 12.8.6.1
“Hose Stream Allowance and Water Supply Duration”
48 Table 14 “Hose Demand and Water Supply Duration Design Guidelines” in FM Data Sheet 8-9
49 NFPA 13, Dry Pipe, 11.2.3.2.5
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System Components
Risers: Locations and Sizes
There is a main 6” schedule 10 wet combination system riser/standpipe for the sprinklers and fire
department hose connections located in the west stairwell, at column location A8. It reaches the
penthouse level. The second standpipe is in the center stairwell, at column F7 and reaches the third
floor. The locations are reflected in Figure 46 and an elevation view is provided here. A standpipe is not
required in the north zone of the building where there are only two floors.

Figure 46: Elevation details of wet risers and controls
These are Class I standpipes with 2 ½” hose connections to an automatic wet system. Hose connections
are located on each landing between floors and at the penthouse level in the stairwell and also inside
the boiler room at the penthouse level.
In addition to the wet system, the building has two dry system risers to supply the two dry system areas
serving the exterior walkways and covered customer entrance at the north portion of the first floor, the
covered employee entrance on the west end and the loading dock on the south side of the warehouse.
The 2 ½” dry system connection to the wet system is located in the closet adjacent to the central
elevator.
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Another 2 ½” dry system connection is made to the 4” standpipe/riser extension at the west end of the
building. The connection is located inside the chiller/pump room at the penthouse level to serve the
cooling tower located just outside. An elevation detail is shown in Figure 47.

Figure 47: Elevation Detail of Dry System Risers

Cross-mains and Branch Lines: Locations and Sizes
A 6” main transverses the center of the warehouse on the first floor from west to east. On the first floor
cross mains are 4” schedule 10 and branch lines are 2 ½” schedule 10. The systems, wet and dry, are
laid out in a tree configuration. Cross mains leave the main at approximately 30 ft spacing. The last 4”
cross main on the east end of the 6” main serves the first floor locker room, break room and customer
event areas in the north portion of the building.
A 4” schedule 10 main on the second floor extends from the west riser down the center of the building
and turns north. This main serves the 2 ½” cross mains and branch lines. The third floor is laid out
similarly to the second floor.
Some riser nipples are 2 ½” schedule 40; some are schedule 10. Branch lines of diameter less than 2”
are schedule 40.
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Sprinklers: Locations, Types and Sizes
A variety of types of sprinklers are used depending on the hazard and the location. Table 27 lists the
variety of sprinkler types and applications. Outside areas subject to freezing are dry and interior areas
are wet.
Wet Sprinkler System Quick Response:








Interior Heated Areas with Suspended Ceilings: Recessed pendent heads with recessed
escutcheons.
Interior Heated Areas without Suspended Ceilings: Upright sprinkler heads.
Interior Unheated Areas Subject to Freezing: Dry pendent or dry sidewall heads.
Soffit Areas: Recessed sidewall heads with recessed escutcheons.
Concealed Sprinkler Heads: Flush mounted, concealed pendent heads with 135°F cover plate.
Elevator Pit: Vertical or horizontal sidewall; 212°F.50
Elevator Pit Sprinkler and Machine Room Shut Off Valve. A supervised shunt trip in elevator
equipment room controlled by a 135°F heat detector at the top of the elevator hoist room is set
to shut down the elevator power prior to water being discharged from sprinkler.

Dry Sprinkler System:



50

Outside areas subject to freezing: Quick response, upright or sidewall, pendent.
Outside Canopy Areas: Recessed dry pendent heads with recessed escutcheons.

Elevator pit, NFPA 13, 8.15.5.1

Cynthia Wernet

Page 86

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

Table 27: Sprinkler Types and Locations
Type
Wet,
quick response

Position
Decorative Concealed
pendent

K-factor
5.6

Temp(F)
155

Spacing (ft)51,52
7-15

Wet,
quick response

Ceiling Recessed
pendent

5.6

155

7-15 light
7-12 ord

Locations
Interior heated areas:
assembly event areas, lobby and event
lobby, departure lounge
Interior heated areas:
Offices, stairwells, corridors, elevator
lobbies
luggage storage, kitchen
Elevator Pit

Wet,
Quick response
Wet,
quick response,
extended coverage
(16’ x 16’)
Wet,
Quick response
Extended coverage
(16’ x 16’)
Wet,
quick response

Horizontal side wall

5.6

200

6-14

Horizontal side wall

8.0

155

10-20

stairwells
Luggage room,

Ceiling pendent

8.0

155

10-20

Interior Heated Areas without Suspended
Ceilings:
stairwells

Ceiling Upright

8.0

200

7-15

Dry,
quick response
Dry,
Quick response

Ceiling pendent

5.6

155

7-15

Upright

8.0

200

7-15 light

ESFR

Pendent

16.8

165

8-12 extra
8-12 storage

Interior Heated Areas above or without
Suspended Ceilings:
Stairwell landings, penthouse, all
concealed spaces above ceilings
Covered walkways, covered entry
doorways, covered balconies
Interior Unheated Areas Subject to
Freezing:
Below cooling tower, concealed space
above covered walkways
Exterior Loading dock
Rack storage in warehouse

51

Tables 3, 4, 5, & 17 for spacing of non-storage and storage sprinklers, FM Data Sheet 2-0 Installation Guideline for Automatic Sprinklers.
Tables 8.6.2.2.1 for spacing, standard upright and pendant sprinklers, and Table 8.7.2.2.1 for sidewall sprinklers, Table 8.8.2.1.2 for extended
coverage. NFPA 13.
52
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Hydraulic Calculations
It is estimated that, although there are several remote areas for this building, the rack storage has the
highest pressure at the sprinkler and the greatest total flow and is selected for analysis. The ceiling plan
is shown in Figure 49. The hand calculation layout is shown in Figure 48 and calculation details are in
the Appendix to this report. The supply / demand curve is shown in Figure 50.

Figure 48: Hydraulic Calculation Nodes for Remote Area

ESFR
12 heads

Figure 49: Remote Area, First Floor, ESFR for warehouse rack storage
Cynthia Wernet

Page 88

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

Figure 50: Water supply curve and warehouse storage rack demand
The existing supply at the point of connection to the building is sufficient to meet the calculated water
demand rate of 1784 gpm @ 96.8psi in the warehouse rack storage area. The water supply is 110psi at
a flow rate of 1784 gpm, which exceeds the 10% margin.
A single 2,000 gpm pump, rated for 100psi is not shown because the sequential pumps do not serve the
building, but instead are part of the water supply system that serves the entire site. The supply curve is
extended in a straight line with confidence because of the reliable water source flow and pressure at the
site.
The first floor warehouse has rack storage and other storage, for which the largest water demand exists
and so this calculation has been included in the course project analysis. Other significant hydraulic
calculation areas are identified in Table 28 for comparison.
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Table 28: Significant Hydraulic Calculation Areas
Remote area

Density/Area

Level 1,
Warehouse
Penthouse, Boiler
plus Chiller Room
Level 2, North
Events area
Level 3, East
Offices
Level 1, North
Events DRY
system

Cynthia Wernet

Hose demand
(gpm)

Sprinkler spacing
(sf)

K-factor

End Pressure
(psi)

100 max

Estimated
Number of
heads
flowing
12

ESFR

500

16.8

35

.20 gpm/ 2500sf

250

100

34

8

7

.10 gpm/ 1500sf

250

70

~20

8

7

.10 gpm/ 1500sf

250

70

~20

8

7

Dry +30% (approx
2000sf)

250

70

~8

8

7
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Inspection, Testing and Maintenance
References consulted for inspection, testing and maintenance standards as they apply to the building
and the private industrial water supply include:




NFPA 24 (2013) Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their
Appurtenances
NFPA 25 (2014) Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire
Protection Systems
FM Data Sheet 2-81 "Fire Safety Inspections and Sprinkler System Maintenance"

Commissioning
The new building system piping is hydrostatically tested at 200 psig for a two hour period with no
pressure loss allowed. The piping between the exterior fire department connection and the inlet pipe
check valve is also tested.53 The dry system piping is also tested at 40 psig air pressure for 24 hours
continuously with 1.5 psig pressure loss allowed.
Also prior to use, the underground feed main is flushed prior to connecting to the sprinkler piping. Both
the hydrostatic test and flushing require a test certificate.

Building Inspection Schedule
Building inspections for life safety and general fire hazards at this site are accomplished by the in-house
fire inspectors, members of the private fire prevention organization. The frequency of inspection is
according to a schedule established based on the occupancy type that occupies the largest square
footage of the building occupancy for multi – occupancy buildings. This building does have a warehouse
and some assembly functions, but is primarily office space. Therefore, relative to high hazard
occupancies such as paint hangars and fuel storage facilities which are inspected monthly or medium
hazard occupancies such as warehouses and manufacturing buildings which are inspected quarterly, this
office building will be inspected annually.
This building has fire rated folding doors and a kitchen hood extinguishing system that are tested by
certified service providers.
Sprinklers and other components should be tested in accordance with NFPA 25.54 In addition to visual
inspection, NFPA 25 requires a representative sample of the sprinklers are tested periodically and
eventually, after 50 years of service, will be replaced. Gauges are to be calibrated periodically and
replaced as needed. Gauges are calibrated by a certified service provider and tested during the annual
system test.

53

NFPA 13, 10.10 “Underground Piping, Testing and Acceptance”, NFPA 25, 5.5 “Sprinkler Systems, Component Action Requirements”, 6.3
“Standpipe and Hose Systems, Testing”
54
NFPA 25, 5.3 “Sprinkler Systems, Testing”
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Water Based Fire Protection System Inspection and Testing
In addition to building inspections, inspection and testing of water based fire protection systems is part
of the highly protected risk management program agreement between the building owner and its
insurers.
Control valves 55are inspected to be identified and marked indicating the system or portion of the
system it controls, accessible, and not leaking. Each normally open valve is verified that it is open and
secured by means of a seal, lock or is electrically supervised. Normally closed valves are also secured or
supervised. Locked and supervised valves are inspected monthly while sealed controlled valves are
inspected weekly.
Each normally open control valve is operated annually through its full range (open to closed) and
returned to its normal open position. There is a post indicator valve (PIV) at the water source to the
building. The PIV is operated to verify that it is open and operating. Outside screw and yoke (OS&Y)
valves are visually checked and when operated, are backed a one-quarter turn from the fully open or
closed position to prevent jamming
A main drain flow test is conducted annually on each system riser and/or any time the system valve is
closed and restored to verify the control valve is open and unimpaired.
Water flow devices are tested semiannually. Testing is conducted on the wet pipe system only via the
inspectors test valve. At this time, other inspections would be scheduled as needed, such as the
backflow prevention assembly for the riser, required every 5 years.
Summary of the inspection schedule






Sealed valves are inspected weekly
Locked valves are inspected monthly
Water flow alarm device is tested semi-annually
Valve operation is tested annually
Main drain flow is tested annually

Dry Sprinkler System Trip Test and Winterization
Trip testing and winterization of all dry systems are scheduled on an annual basis with the in-house
facilities services organization (plumbers) and are performed in the early fall prior to freezing weather.
Test results are documented and retained. The procedure provided to the plumbers is included in the
Appendix for illustration purposes. It includes instructions for water flushing and removing sediment,
checking system pressure, alarm operation, air flushing and system valve priming and reset.

55

NFPA 25, 13.3 “Control Valves in Water-Based Fire Protection Systems”
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Fire Protection System Impairments and Restorations
Fire protection system impairments are required to have control, coordination, and follow up to
document system impairments and restorations.56 A Factory Mutual Red Tag Permit is completed and
attached to the system for every impairment regardless of the duration or purpose except for
impairments as a result of testing by the in-house fire prevention organization. Impairment requests for
all other activities are given to the fire prevention organization and the owner’s in-house
communications center that monitors alarms is notified prior to the impairment. The fire alarm system
is by-passed if affected by the impairment. Following the impairment, all parties are notified, alarms are
cleared and a 2 inch drain test is performed. Valves are inspected and the alarm system is restored.
In addition, the local Factory Mutual office is contacted for the following water based impairment
situations at this particular building:




Impairment to a fire pump or water supply having duration of one hour or more.
Impairment to the system involving the warehouse area having duration of one hour or more.
Impairment exceeding eight hours for one sprinkler system.

Testing of Underground Water Supplies and Fire Pumps
The in-house fire prevention organization at this site is involved in the testing, but a contracted certified
service provider conducts this testing. Prior to conducting any testing of the underground water
supplies and fire pumps, a Test Conductor in the fire prevention organization is identified and a Safety
person is appointed to ensure safety procedures are followed during the tests. The Safety person
assigned has the authority to shut down all testing until the identified safety issues are resolved.
Because water flow and pump testing presents physical hazards to the testing personnel, proper PPE is
utilized during all testing. Most often, the insurance underwriter representative is also present for this
testing event.
The city water supply connections are tested separately on an annual basis. Following the completion of
each separate connection test, a test with all connections open is conducted.
To facilitate comparison of water flow tests year to year, flow and residual pressure reading points are
relatively consistent year to year. The testing records for the site were obtained as reference during
this analysis. Water flow data is tabulated and graphically represented in Table 50.
Each pump test57 includes measurement of no-flow or churn, rated flow capacity and 150% rated flow
capacity. All pump controller alarm functions and driver interconnections are tested. RPM
measurements are taken at each test point and documented. Pitot readings at the test header are
made and the diameter and coefficient noted. Suction and discharge pressures are documented for
each test condition and the information is later used to evaluate pump performance and condition.

56
57

NFPA 25, 15 “Impairments”
NFPA 52, 8 “Fire Pumps”

Cynthia Wernet

Page 93

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

Hydrant Inspections and Flow Testing
Outside the building, on the industrial loop, fire hydrants are flowed, flushed and inspected annually.58
Again, the in-house fire prevention organization at this site is involved is the testing, but a contracted
licensed service provider conducts this testing.
Testing and inspection of hydrants includes flushing, hydrant inspection, cleaning and lubricating of
ports. Fire protection personnel are looking for discrepancies involving:








Operation and accessibility of foot valve
Operation of operating nut and conditions of caps
Operation of freeze protection drainage
Conditions of paint, proper color coding and numbering
Condition and painting of protective barriers
Condition of No Parking stripes around hydrant
Ease of accessibility and visibility (vegetation removed)

Records and Document Retention
Records listed are securely stored and retained for the minimum time specified. Short term records are
filed at the fire station; long term records (over 5 years) are sent to a company record retention
service.59













58
59

Dry Valve Trip Test Inspections, Calendar Year +2
Fire Door Test Records, Calendar Year +2
Fire Extinguisher Inspections, Calendar Year +1
Fire Hydrant Inspection Records, Calendar Year +1
Fire Inspection Report, Calendar Year + 3
Kitchen Hood System Test Records, Calendar Year +2
Insurance Inspection Reports, Life of Company
Sprinkler Valve/Standpipe/FDC Inspections, Calendar Year
System Impairment Records, 3 Months
Valve Inspection Tags, Last Activity
Water Flow Tests; Primary & Secondary Supplies, Life of Company
Weekly Pump Run Records, Calendar Year +2

NFPA 25, 7 “Private Fire Service Mains”
NFPA 25, 4.3 “Records”
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Performance-Based Analysis
Performance Objectives of Section 5.2 of LSC
According to Section 5.2 of the Life Safety Code, the following four performance objectives shall be
achieved.







A structure shall be designed, constructed, and maintained to protect occupants who are not
intimate with the initial fire development for the time needed to evacuate, relocate, or defend
in place.
Structural integrity shall be maintained for the time needed to evacuate, relocate, or defend in
place occupants who are not intimate with the initial fire development.
Systems utilized to achieve the prescriptive design requirements shall be effective in mitigating
the hazard or condition for which they are being used, shall be reliable, shall be maintained to
the level at which they were designed to operate, and shall remain operational.
Any occupant who is not intimate with ignition shall not be exposed to instantaneous or
cumulative untenable conditions.

In order to satisfy the fourth objective and determine when untenable conditions exist in the occupied
areas, a methodology is selected.

Methodology
This type of mixed use facility has not been constructed to prevent fire effects in all occupied areas.
Therefore, the method to evaluate tenability takes into account that occupants may be exposed to some
smoke and fire effects but will be able to escape.
Using the smoke filling approach, occupants are not exposed to fire effects. However, this method
presumes that smoke will eventually descend to the occupants’ level and they may need to bend down
during evacuation to avoid over exposure. This method requires that smoke and toxic gas will not
descend to a level lower than 6 ft from the occupied floor before each area is fully evacuated.
This method also involves modeling fire and smoke and toxic gas spread in the building to determine
time for each space in the building to become untenable and then this time must exceed required
evacuation time for each occupant in each space by a conservative safety factor.
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Tenability Criteria
To ensure that occupants are not incapacitated by fire effects requires consideration of tenability
criteria for smoke obscuration (visibility), smoke toxicity and thermal effects. Irritating smoke
concentration is also a key factor



Design objective: Maintain tenable conditions throughout the office building (Group B) during
the required safe egress time.
Performance criteria:
o Visibility beyond 4 m for familiar areas (employee offices, warehouse, break rooms) and
beyond 13 m for areas occupied by those unfamiliar with the building (assembly events,
restrooms, lobbies and corridors)60
o CO concentration not to exceed 1000 ppm throughout the building for the required
evacuation time estimated, following the tenable concentration curve Ct and Haber’s
rule for CO)61
o Temperatures below 100 °C (tolerable for up to 12 minutes)62 in room of origin and
below 60°C in all areas of building.
o Radiation less than 2.5kW/m2 at floor level is tolerable for greater than 5 minutes60

Visibility
Local employees assigned to work in the building on a daily basis are familiar with the building, have
participated in evacuation drills, and have been trained in evacuation procedures are likely to start
evacuation rapidly. Visitors are least familiar with the building and its fire protection features, however,
they are either escorted by an employee who is familiar with the building or are part of an assembly
event and thus located in portions of the building that will have a more stringent visibility criteria.
Visibility criteria will be such that smoke concentration does not cause behavioral effects that
compromise safe escape. The visibility of 4m for unfamiliar and 13m for familiar occupants is based on a
1981 published test involving subjects emotionally affected versus smoke density. 4m correlates to a
population affected at a density of 0.15 m-1.

Toxicity
The tenability criteria for toxic gas exposure is represented by carbon monoxide concentration and
Haber’s rule that toxic dose is a constant and is the product of concentration and exposure time for
short exposures in range of RSET. Although other toxic and irritant gases affect and contribute to lifethreatening conditions, CO is the most significant asphyxiant agent causing most fatalities by
incapacitation.63 The fractional effective dose methodology is simple to apply to a design fire based on
availability of model-generated data for CO concentration as a function of time. An FED of 0.3 is an

60

Jin, Tadahisa. Table 2-4.2 Allowable Smoke Densities and Visibility that Permits Safe Escape. “Visibility and Human Behavior in Fire Smoke.”
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (2008), P. 2-59.
61 Purser, David. Figure 2-6.16, “Assessment of Hazards to Occupants from Smoke, Toxic Gases, and Heat.” SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection
Engineering, 4th Edition (2008), p. 2-102.
62 Purser, David. Table 2-6.20 Limiting Conditions for Tenability Caused by Heat. “Assessment of Hazards to Occupants from Smoke, Toxic
Gases, and Heat.” SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (2008), p. 2-145.
63 R.C. Anderson, et.al. “Study to Assess the Feasibility of Incorporating Combustion Toxicity Requirements into Building Materials and
Furnishing Codes of New York State,” Reference 88712, Arthur D. Little, Cambridge, MA (1983).
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appropriate criterion, with only 11% of the population susceptible to this level of CO and a published
value of Effective Ct (concentration x time) for CO is 35,000 ppm-min.64 The Effective Ct has been
established by such sources as NIOSH and the LC50 for CO (5700 ppm) for a 30 minute exposure.65 Using
an RSET, for example of 11 minutes, the average CO concentration for an exposure for that duration
would be:
[𝐶𝑂]𝑎𝑣𝑔 =

(𝐹𝐸𝐷𝐶𝑂 )(𝐶𝑡𝑒𝑓𝑓 ) (0.3)(35000)
=
= 954 𝑝𝑝𝑚
𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑇
11

Time-based concentration data may be used. Alternatively the average value may be used as the
maximum for tenability and would be conservative because the occupants would experience a lower
total dose during the entire time to egress.

Temperature
Temperature is not the only measure of potential for heat exposure since radiant and convective heat
flux will cause incapacitation, however, temperature is a significant and early measure of conditions that
affect safe egress. Thermal tolerance for unprotected skin at 100°C is approximately 12 minutes for low
humidity conditions.66 A more conservative approach is to use 60°C during sprinkler activation or
application of water suppression causing high humidity. Tolerance for these conditions is greater than
30 minutes, more than the RSET. Thermal contact tolerance limits also exist at 60°C and so escaping
occupants who must contact metal door handles will be able to safely egress under these conditions as
well.

64

“Life-Threatening Components of Fire—Guidelines for the Estimation of Time Available for Escape Using Fire Data,” ISO 13571, International
Organization for Standardization, Geneva (2007).
65 NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, Department of Health and Human Services, Publication 2005-149.
66 Purser, D.A., “Toxic Product Yield and Hazard Assessment for Fully Enclosed Design Fires Involving Fire Retarded Materials,” Polymer
International, 47, pp 1232-1255 (2000).
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Fire Scenarios Considered
Based on the performance objectives of the Life Safety Code, one exterior exposure fire and six fire
scenarios are considered using basic calculations for smoke detector and sprinkler responsiveness and
heat release rate at time of detection and activation of the sprinklers. All of the results are summarized
here in Table 29. Detail calculations, scenario descriptions and explanation of the results are found in
the Appendix of this report.
Table 29: Design Fire Selection Basis
Scenario

Smoke Detection
time (s)
52

HRR at detection
(kW)
72

Sprinkler Activation
time (s)
332

HRR at Sprinkler
Activation (kW)
523

Blocked Egress

5

31

N/A

N/A

Storage Room Stacked Chairs

48

58

209

608

Concealed Cabinets

96

47

341

386

Luggage storage room

94

45

341

386

Warehouse Class I-IV Commodities Racks

131

144

385

805

Exterior Exposure Fuel Spill

N/A

N/A

UL

85,000

Open Area Office Workstations

The open area office workstation fire is the most likely scenario for this occupancy and is evaluated for
available safe egress time vs. required safe egress time. In addition, an exterior exposure aircraft fuel
spill fire is considered. This analysis was performed by hand calculations.
The blocked egress fire is the scenario that will be detected quickly by the smoke detector. However as
designed, the peak heat release rate for densely packed debris with a small surface area is not likely to
exceed 60kW and the sprinkler may not activate at all. Therefore the scenario will not need to be
evaluated further unless another fire protection measure, such as the doors or fire separation, is
compromised in the scenario.
The stacked chairs fire causes a minimal delay to alarm activation because it is detected quickly in the
small room. The occupants in adjacent areas evacuate quickly because there is sufficient exit capacity.
Furthermore, the second floor assembly area has a higher ceiling level and the smoke layer will take
much longer to affect occupants than in the office areas. Therefore this option was not selected for
design fire modeling.
The concealed fire and the luggage room fire are similar in growth and detection time. Each of these
two scenarios may affect a large number of occupants in the immediate area. Both of these areas are on
the first floor, separated from the exit stairways that serve the other two floors. Occupants from these
areas have the highest exit capacity. Therefore this option was not selected for design fire modeling.
The warehouse fire will take the longest to detect of all of the scenarios. The high ceiling is the primary
factor for this result. However, this area of the building has very few occupants and has multiple
options for exiting with short exit distances. This fire scenario has the greatest potential for property
damage but this option is not selected for design fire modeling for the purpose of life-safety analysis.
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Design Fire Selected: Open Area Office Workstation
The design fire selected for the purpose of required safe egress analysis is the occupancy-specific fire
representative of a typical fire for a business occupancy. The open area office workstation fire is
selected because it has the greatest potential for creating untenable conditions for evacuees and risk
that the required safe egress time (RSET) may exceed the available safe egress time (ASET).
This fire is in an open space, is well ventilated and involves a relatively large amount of fuel, compared
to other areas of the building. The egress pathways are open directly to the large office area and nearly
one third of evacuees from this area must pass by the fire in order to reach one of the two third floor
exit stairways. The significant queueing effect at the top of the stairs, illustrated in Figure 51, as
modelled by the Pathfinder simulation presents the major difficulty.

Figure 51: Queueing Effect at the top of the Exit Stairs (West)
As the fire grows and smoke fills the queueing area at the top of the stairs, occupants have only two
exits to choose from. Third floor evacuation takes two minutes longer than all other areas of the
building.
The cause of the fire is an electrical fire. Interconnected modular furniture units are energized by the
building’s electrical supply through a single, large power cord, or “whip,” providing ample power to all
served workstations. National Electric Code Article 605 states that a maximum of thirteen 25Amp,
125Volt receptacles are permitted on any partition or group of partitions. However, the modular office
furniture power strip may be overloaded by an employee, using an electric space heater on the same
strip with computer equipment, and consequently overheats cables inside the partition wall.
The fire is initially slow developing, then ignites office workstation contents and develops further as a
medium growth rate, t2 fire.
This fire occurs in the large office space on the third floor where there are 53 workstations with people
at their desks. This is approximately the same number of occupants as predicted by the business
occupancy density 100 sf/occupant (gross). The location is the open office area on the 3rd floor; 50 ft x
90 ft space with a 9 ft suspended ceiling.
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Modular office furniture is located in this area (chairs, computers, laminated press wood desk top and
metal cabinets, low height synthetic fabric partitions); office workstations are each approximately 40 sf
and the fire occurs at the center of four adjacent workstations. Typical workstation layouts are shown in
Figure 52.

Figure 52: Typical workstations in open office areas
A radius distance from the center of the fire to the nearest smoke detector is 4.1 m and the room width
is 15 m. Figure 53 shows four workstations in a room with a 9 ft ceiling. There are 4 air changes per
hour with normal HVAC functions. The ambient temperature is 68°F (20°C).

Figure 53: Workstation fire in the 3rd floor office area
Using fire test data published in the SFPE handbook67, four modern workstations with a mass of 1086 kg
reached a peak heat release rate of 2271 kW in 732 seconds.
𝑄 = 𝛼𝑡 2 = 𝛼(732)2 = 2271𝑘𝑊

67

Babrauskas, Vytenis. Figure 3-1.61 HRR of four unit workstations tested at NRIFD. And Table 3-1.19 Workstations
Tested by NRIFD “Heat Release Rates.” SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (2008), p. 3-32.

Cynthia Wernet

Page 100

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

Solving for 𝛼 results in 0.004, which is a slow developing fire. Compared with the NIST heat release
profile, the fire transitions to a medium growth fire following the incipient stage. Therefore a medium
growth rate is used to estimate the detection time and HRR at detection.
Using the Alpert correlations for ceiling height(H) and smoke detector distance ( R) from the center of
four workstations, the detector is found to be in the ceiling jet. R/H = 4.1/2.74 = 1.5 which is greater
than 0.15 and so the detector is in the ceiling jet.
Assuming that the total heat released by the fire is convective heat, then for ceiling jet temperature:
2

2

𝑄̇ 3
2271 3
5.38 ( 𝑟 )
5.38 ( 4.1 )
𝑇𝑐𝑗 − 𝑇𝑎 =
=
= 132°𝐶
𝐻
2.74
With an ambient temp of 20, this results in a gas temperature at the detector location of 152˚C.
1

𝑢𝑐𝑗 =

1

0.20 (𝑄̇ )3 (𝐻)2
5
𝑟6

1

=

1

0.20 (2271)3 (2.74)2
5
4.16

= 1.31 𝑚/𝑠

This velocity exceeds the critical velocity of 0.15 m/s for listed detectors and so there will be sufficient
velocity for smoke to enter the detector.
Using the optical density/temperature analogy, a typical detector will respond when the temperature
rises 7.2°C. This is supported by NFPA 72 Table B.4.7.5.3 for smoke from other polymer materials and so
this value is acceptable for estimating the response to the computer monitor smoke. The ceiling jet
temperature exceeds the smoke detector response temperature and so the detector will respond. For a
smoke detector, assume that the temperature of the detector is approximately the same as the gas
temperature (no lag).
𝑇𝑐𝑗 𝑜𝑓 152℃ 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑠 >> 𝑇𝑑 = 𝑇𝑎 + 7.2 = 27.2℃
Use the DETACT spreadsheet to plot the heat release rate (HRR) and Temp vs. time, the detector will
respond when the ceiling jet gas and the detector reach 27.2°C and this will occur at approximately 52
seconds and a heat release rate of 32 kW. Accounting for the transport time of additional 25 s for the
hot gases and smoke, the HRR will be 72 kW. Figure 54 charts the fire growth rate and the temperature
of the detector and the estimated detector activation time.
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Figure 54: Smoke Detector temperature and heat release rate at time of activation
To analyze sprinkler response and estimate the time of activation and HRR at that time, the DETACT
spreadsheet is used to plot the HRR and Temp vs. time. The first sprinkler will activate when the
sprinkler reaches 68°C and this will occur at approximately 332 seconds and a heat release rate of
463 kW. Accounting for the transport time of additional 21 s for the hot gases, the HRR will be 523
kW. Figure 55 charts the fire growth rate and the temperature of the sprinkler and the estimated
sprinkler activation time

Figure 55: Sprinkler activation time and HRR for workstation fire
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Fuel Properties
Selection of a model fire is an important first step for the simulation. Test data from several sources has
been used in order to determine the fuel, the products of fire, the peak heat release rate and the rate of
heat release of the office workstation fire. 68 A large scale calorimeter fire test conducted for a 4workstation assembly with the following materials arranged in the workstations with a total mass of
1086 kg is the basis for the heat release rate curve and the types of materials that burn.
Stoichiometric yields of CO and soot were not appropriate for this analysis as complete combustion is
not expected in real fire conditions even though the office area is well ventilated.69 Instead, test results
are consulted. Values selected are based on mean values from compiled literature studies concerning
various large scale calorimetry burn tests of furniture.
Carbon monoxide and soot yields are estimated based on the relative amounts of different combustible
materials in the tested workstations. Yields are explicitly defined in the model, and listed in Table 30.
Based on the yields of the several categories of materials; wood and paper have lowest carbon
monoxide and soot yields while the plastics are higher.
Table 30: Workstation materials and smoke product yields
Items

Material

Paper
Desks

Paper (cellulose)
Wood (cellulose /FR
particle board)
Polyurethane (G27)
Nylon
Polypropylene
Polypropylene
Non-combustible

Chairs
Computers
Carpet
Metal Frames
Weighted Average

% by weight combustible
materials

Soot Yield
(kg/kg)70

CO Yield
(kg/kg), ,
72and73

0.015
0.009

Heat of
Combustion
(MJ/kg)71
15
46

32
27
1
21
11
9
Remainder

0.20
0.075
0.059
0.059

48
200
13
25

0.024
0.038
0.024
0.054

0.037

31

0.017

0.004

The chemical formula of the reacted fuel is also a weighted set of values for carbon, hydrogen, oxygen
and nitrogen based on the material components of the tested workstation arrangement, essentially
lumped together for a simple chemical reaction in the FDS simulation.

C4.36 H7.46 O2.98 N0.22
Heat Release Rate Curve
Selection of an appropriate heat release rate curve is an important input parameter for the simulation.
The curve in Figure 56 for the 4-workstation arrangement with panel walls was selected from burn tests

68

D. Madrzykowski, W.D. Walton. Cook County Administration Building Fire, 69 West Washington, Chicago, Illinois, October 17, 2003: Heat
Release Rate Experiments and FDS Simulations. NIST Special Publication SP-1021. July 2004.
69 Tewarwon, A., Table 3-4-18: Stoichiometric Yields of Major Products, “Generation of Hat and Gaseous Liquid and Solid Products in Fires,”
SFPE Handbook, 4th Ed. 2008
70
Robbins, A.P. and Wade, C.A. “Study Report No. 185 Soot Yield Values for Modelling Purposes- Residential Occupancies. Branz, 2008.
71 Babrauskas, V. “Tables and Charts,” (compiled) Section 6-17. NFPA Handbook, 20th Edition, 2008.
72 Tewarson, A. “Generation of Heat and Gaseous, Liquid, and Solid Products in Fires,” Table 3-4.16 SFPE Handbook, 4th Ed. 2008.
73 Hou, J. “Distribution Curves for Interior Furnishings on CO2, CO, HCN, Soot and Heat of Combustion,” University of Canterbury, Christchurch.
2011.
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conducted by the National Research Institute of Fire and Disaster in Japan. Test 4 peaked at 2271 kW in
732 seconds and was a medium growth t-squared fire following a 3-minute incipient stage.74

Figure 56: Heat Release Rate Curves, burn tests with office workstations
Using this peak heat release rate and time, a medium growth fire that maintains steady state after the
first sprinkler activates is charted in Figure 57. The design fire has the following characteristics:





Burner surface is 4m2 and heat release rate per unit area is 570 kW/m2
Medium rate is 220 seconds to reach 1055 kW (0.01172 kW/s2 growth rate coefficient)
The fire is ramped for 180 seconds when the first sprinkler activates.
Total heat release at steady state at that time reaches 388 kW, or 17% of the peak rate.

Figure 57: Heat Release Curve in Simulation

74

Babrauskas, V. “Heat Release Rates,” p. 3-32SFPE Handbook, 4th Ed. 2008.
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Simulation
FDS is the software application used for modeling the selected design fire. This tool is made available by
the National Institute of Standards and Testing (NIST). FDS uses inputs of the building geometry and
materials to numerically solve the heat and smoke generation and transport model.

Layout
The fire is located on the west end of the third floor. A plan of the third floor is in Figure 58. This floor
has two large open office areas with systems furniture that includes desks, cabinets, short wall panels
and chairs. Across the east and west ends of the floor and in the center section are small conference
rooms. One large assembly meeting room is on the north side. The open areas and the large meeting
room are included in the model. In order to simplify the simulation, several small conference rooms in
the model are closed off to show closed doors at the time of the fire and, as demonstrated by
progressive modeling of the large meeting room, smoke does migrate to these small rooms but very
slowly relative to the evacuation timeline.
The calculation mesh is set to 0.2m to allow sufficient detail for heat and fluid dynamics. The simulation
is run for 15 minutes as this accommodates the required safe egress time and some reserve for a safety
margin. The ambient temperature is 20°C inside the office and at the open vents and exit doors.
Walls are all set to the default surface, representing gypsum wall board for the purpose of heat transfer.
However, the room of origin is large (20m x 30m) and the ceiling directly above the fire is the only
surface that is exposed to significant convective or radiative heat transfer.

Figure 58: Third floor areas included in simulation

Cynthia Wernet

Page 105

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

Devices
Six K-5.6 sprinklers are included in the simulation, located around the fire. The nearest sprinkler is 2.1m
from the center of the fire and the furthest is 4.8 meters from the center of the fire. These dimensions
are based on the actual sprinkler and furniture layouts. The predicted DETACT sprinkler activation time
is 1.8 times longer than the FDS simulation time because the DETACT method used longer, estimated
distances.
Table 31: Time of fire detection and sprinkler activation
Method
DETACT / Hand
Calculation
FDS Simulation

Smoke Detection
time (s)
52

HRR at detection
(kW)
72

Sprinkler Activation
time (s)
332

HRR at Sprinkler
Activation (kW)
523

65

45

185

388

In the FDS simulation, the first sprinkler to activate at 185 seconds determines the time that the fire is
controlled to a constant heat release rate. Sprinklers act to control but not suppress the fire. Some of
the fuel is shielded by the three-dimensional shape of the workstation. The arrangement of connected
workstations provides sufficient fuel to keep the fire burning and ventilation is sufficient to provide
oxygen for combustion, so it is unreasonable to assume that a single sprinkler would extinguish the fire.
There is sufficient water supply capacity to prevent the fire from growing uncontrolled. Without
including the cooling effect of the water particles, all six sprinklers eventually activate and reach a
temperature range between 80 to 100°C at the ceiling, as charted in Figure 59.

Figure 59: Sprinkler Activation time
Three photoelectric smoke detectors are placed in the room of origin, within 5m of the center of the fire
and smoke height is detected in front of each of the two exit doors to the east and west stairways.

Tenability Results
Data are collected for tenability analysis with a combination of devices and slice files in FDS.
Temperature is measured at 3 feet and 6 feet above the entire third floor. Visibility and extinction
coefficient are measured at 6 feet above the floor. Carbon monoxide volume fraction is measured by
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devices located 6 feet above the floor at three locations (in front of each exit door and in the center
east-west corridor.
Third floor conditions are worst case for tenability conditions throughout the building in this design fire
scenario, therefore it can be assumed that the rest of building has longer ASET than the 3rd floor.
Neither carbon monoxide concentration nor temperature reach untenable conditions at any time during
evacuation from the third floor during the simulation. Figure 60 is an FDS graphic of the maximum
temperatures on the third floor at 6 ft above the floor. None of these temperatures exceed 60°C.

Figure 60: Temperatures stay below 100°C in all exit paths
Each of the tenability criteria are applied to the room and floor of origin as well as the building. These
results are summarized in Table 32. The criteria of smoke visibility for public areas such as the event
assembly rooms located on the first and second floors are not considered in this design fire scenario.
Table 32: Tenability Performance of Areas Affected by Design Fire
Tenability Criteria

Limit

Room of Origin

3rd Floor

Building

ASET (min)

Temperature 6ft above floor Room of
origin
Temperature 6ft above floor exit
pathways, all areas
Carbon Monoxide concentration

<100°C

<60°C

n/a

n/a

>15

<60°C

n/a

<60°C

<<60°C

>15

<1000ppm

<100ppm

<100ppm

<<100ppm

>15

Visibility offices/familiar areas

>4 m

390 s

>390 s

>900 s

>15

Visibility in the room of origin reaches the tenability limit of 4m at 390 seconds after ignition. The
tenability limit is reached for the nearest exit on the west stairway door at just about the same time.
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There are still 90 occupants on the third floor when the room of origin is untenable. Figure 61 is an FDS
graphic of the smoke visibility on the third floor at 6 ft above the floor at the time that all occupants
have evacuated the third floor.

Figure 61: Visibility of 4 meters at west exit of 3rd floor 6.5 minutes after ignition
In order to observe the effects of one exit reduced visibility impact to the occupants using the west exit,
the Pathfinder egress simulation is re-run with the exit door to the west stairwell unavailable 2.5
minutes after alarm notification. Occupants are allowed to seek the alternate exit. The results of this
trial reveal that even using the single exit, occupants are able to leave the third floor 7.1 minutes after
alarm notification and tenable conditions remain during this time. This provides confidence that if the
conditions near one of the exit doors were to become untenable, the other door would accommodate
the evacuation of all occupants. Figure 62 shows the Pathfinder illustration of third floor occupants
rerouting from the west stairway to the east stairway if the west door were unavailable.
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Figure 62: Trial egress simulation, third floor exit unavailable 2.5 min after alarm
However, with all exits available, the visibility does not reach the tenability limit. Occupants who have
to evacuate through the east stairwell have tenable conditions to find the exit and remain near the door
and elevator lobby and in the nearby office areas while they are waiting to exit the third floor.
All occupants have left the third floor 6.5 minutes (390 s) after ignition and all occupants have left the
building after 7.8 minutes (468 s).
Table 33 summarizes egress times from all of the different calculation methods. The required safe
egress time (RSET) is calculated by adding the time to detect the fire to the pre-movement time and the
time required for all occupants to leave the building.

Table 33: Summary of Egress Times
Method
Hydraulic (Hand Calc)

Detection
time (min)
0

Delay Time
(min)
2.5 max

Movement Time
(min)
7.9

Total Evacuation
(min)
10.4

RSET (min)

Node (Hand Calc)

0

2.5 max

7

9.5

Pathfinder all exits (Simulation)

0

(min=0,max=2.5, n=1.5, σ=1)

6.5

3rd Floor Exit closed (Simulation)

0

(min=0,max=2.5, n=1.5, σ=1)

7.1 (3rd floor)
9.0 (building)

3rd Floor Design Fire Scenario

1.1

2.5

2.9

6.5 (3rd floor)

Building Design Fire Scenario

1.1

2.5

4.2

7.8

RSET3rd floor = tdet + tdelay + tegress = 65 + 150 + 174 = 389 seconds after ignition.
RSETbuilding = tdet + tdelay + tegress = 65 + 150 + 253 = 468 seconds after ignition.
Cynthia Wernet

Page 109

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

The result is that the time required to leave the third floor for this design fire is less than the time
available by a margin of safety exceeding 100% of the RSET. Figure 63 shows this timeline.
AVAILABLE SAFE EGRESS TIME (Visibility in exit pathway above 4m)

MARGIN OF SAFETY

REQUIRED SAFE EGRESS TIME BUILDING

MOVEMENT TIME BUILDING
253
MOVEMENT TIME THIRD
FLOOR
174
PREMOVEMENT
TIME

150
DETECT
TIME
65
IGNITION

TIME (s)
TIME (min)

65
1.1

210
3.5

389
6.5

468
7.8

900
15

Figure 63: ASET vs RSET
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Exterior Exposure Design Fire
The prescriptive and performance based analyses for the Customer Delivery Center have been
addressed in the body of the report. These analyses were based on the IBC and IFC life safety and fire
protection requirements for a Group B office building. One of the unique functions of this building,
however, is the airport terminal gates for access to customer airplanes. This section analyzes the
exterior fire for an airport terminal building separate from the requirements for an office building.

Prescriptive Requirements for an Airport Passenger Terminal
Accessory space is classified the same way as the occupancy that it is accessory to, per IBC 508.2.1
“Accessory Occupancies: Area Limitations.” Accessory spaces are not separated. The accessory spaces
in this building total less than 10% of the area of the main occupancy of each floor. The airport terminal
passenger spaces on the second floor area are considered as accessory to the business occupancy area,
as these areas are less than 10% of the area of the floor. Therefore, this building complies with IBC but
is not designed for compliance under Part IV of the IFC, Special Occupancies and Operations, and so
Chapter 20, “Aviation Facilities,” is not explicitly applied to this building.
Nevertheless, IFC Chapter 20 and NFPA 415, “Standard for Airport Terminal Buildings, Fueling Ramp
Drainage, and Loading Walkways” (2016) are applied here in this section as the basis for a prescriptive
design review as if the Customer Delivery Center were designed to meet these requirements.
Table 34 describes the requirements of the IFC Chapter 20 “Aviation Facilities” and how these
requirements are met by the building fire protection systems and design.
Table 34: Requirements of IFC Chapter 20 for Aviation Facilities
IFC Section
2003 General
Precautions
2006.17.1 Position of
Aircraft

Requirement
Ignition sources, housekeeping, fire department
access and combustible/flammable materials
Aircraft being fueled shall be positioned such that
any fuel system vents and other fuel tank openings
are a minimum of 25 ft from buildings.

Comment
Provisions are made for each requirement by design
and by administrative procedures and policies.
Aircraft positions are 25 ft from the building, fuel tank
openings are 25 ft from the building. (See figure below)

Requirements of the fire code that are administrative in nature are also enforced by Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). The federal 14 CFR Part 139 requires FAA to issue airport operating certificates to
airports. To obtain a certificate, an airport must agree to certain operational and safety standards and
provide for such things as firefighting and rescue equipment.75
The requirement for aircraft position separation distance from the building is met and is illustrated in
Figure 64.

75

Airport Safety, Federal Aviation Administration. http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/
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Figure 64: Layout of Aircraft, fuel vents and openings and aircraft are at least 25 ft from building
NFPA 415, summarized in Table 35, addresses three main areas of fire safety. It specifies the minimum
fire protection requirements for the construction and protection of airport terminal buildings. The
standard specifies the minimum requirements for the design and maintenance of the drainage system of
an aircraft fueling ramp to control the flow of fuel that can be spilled on a ramp and to minimize the
resulting possible danger. In addition, it contains the minimum requirements for the design,
construction, and fire protection of aircraft loading walkways between the terminal building and
aircraft. Prescriptive requirements for building fire protection design, ramp design and loading
walkways and how the building meets these requirements are addressed in the following table.
Table 35: Requirements of NFPA 415 for Airport Terminal Buildings
NFPA 415 Section
Chapter 4 Terminal
Building
4.1.1
4.1.2

Requirement

Comment

Type I, Type II, or Type IV construction
Interior finish materials Class A or Class B

4.1.3

Aircraft fueling facilities and ramps shall be
designed in accordance with NFPA 407 and Chapter
5 of this standard.

4.1.5.3

Automatic water spray system protecting glazing
located less than 100 ft (30.5 m) horizontally from
potential fuel spill points Except glazing 7 ft (2.1 m)
above finished floor level.
Water spray density of at least 0.25 gpm/ft2 [10.2
(L/min)/m2] over the exterior surface area of the
glazing material.
HVAC intake and exhaust openings for not less than
10 ft (3 m) above the ramp and at least 50 ft (15 m)
from any point of flammable vapor release.

Building is Type IA
Interior Finishes in all areas are Class A in all corridors,
exit passageways, stairways, ramps, rooms and
enclosed spaces
Facility is not operated as a fueling facility. Fueling
operations are conducted remote to this building in a
designated area and aircraft are towed in and out of
gate positions. See section below regarding Chapter 5
requirements.
The sprinkler is not designed to protect the glazing
material.

4.1.5.3.1.1

4.2.2
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for dry pipe system.
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Sprinkler design Ordinary Hazard Group 1 for
passenger-handling areas (.15 gpm/sf over 1500sf)
with 500 gpm hose demand

4.5.1.4

Sprinkler design Ordinary Hazard Group 2 for
baggage areas

4.5.2

Fire Alarm and Communications Systems

4.5.2

Fire Hydrants

4.5.4
4.5.5

Standpipe and Hose Systems
Water Supply meets sprinkler demand plus a
minimum of 500 gpm (1893 L/min) for hose
streams and available at the rate specified for a
period of at least 1 hour

5.1 Aircraft Fueling Ramp
Slope and Drain Design
5.1.1

5.1.2
Chapter 6 Loading
Walkways
6.1

6.2

6.5

June 9, 2016

Departure lounge is designed as Light Hazard
occupancy with 0.10 gpm/sf over the hydraulically most
remote 1500 sf, 40% reduction for quick response
heads not included.
Baggage handling areas, TSA screening areas and
storage rooms with storage less than 8 feet high are
designed to Ordinary Hazard, Group 2 occupancy.
Alarm, notification, communications are per NFPA
101:12.3.4. Individual requirements of each occupancy
are met.
Ramp side and the street sides are located within 500 ft
of hydrant.
Class I standpipe systems provided
Hydraulic calculations for warehouse remote area
provides required flow plus 500gpm hose stream
requirement for 2 hours with 10% extra capacity.

Ramps slope away from terminal building and
loading walkways with a minimum grade of 1
percent (1:100) for the first 50 ft and 0.5 percent
(1:200) beyond.
Drain inlets 50 ft from building

Airplane stalls do not slope away from building. Some
slope to catch basins. (See Figure 65). Storm drain
piping slopes 0.5 percent.

Walkway provides a safe means of egress from the
aircraft for a period of 5 minutes under fire
exposure conditions equivalent to a free-burning
jet fuel spill fire.
Interior finish Class A, floor finish Class I. Positive air
supply to walkway. Door swings in the direction of
egress from the aircraft and equipped with panic
hardware on the aircraft side.
Fixed water spray or foam system to protect
exterior of walkway.

Existing technology does not permit establishment of
performance criteria for acceptable levels of smoke
density and toxic products. Assembly testing required
per Performance based analysis required.
Specifications for walkway construction not available
for evaluation. Door swing and panic hardware
compliant.

Catch basins are 50 ft from building

Specifications for walkway construction not available
for evaluation. Water supply or foam system for
walkways is not specified in building design.

Figure 65: Civil plan view, catch basins 50 ft from building, storm drain sloping away from building
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Summary of Prescriptive Analysis of Airport Terminal Building
The building meets requirements of Chapter 20 “Aviation Facilities” of the IFC. However, the building
does not comply with three aspects of the NFPA 415 standard. The departure lounge is provided with
sprinkler coverage for light hazard as an accessory to the office areas and so the departure does not
meet the guidance in NFPA 415 for passenger areas to have ordinary hazard group 1 coverage.
Although heat detection and automatic dry pipe water sprinkler system is provided for the covered
walkway at ground level and for the covered balcony on the second floor, these systems are not
designed to protect the glazing from an exterior exposure on the airport side of the building.
And lastly, the airplane stalls do not slope away from the building with a 1% grade as specified in the
standard in order to prevent fuel spills from flowing toward the building. The airplane stall grade and
approximate fuel spill collection areas are shown in Figure 65.
Because this is an exercise in prescriptive analysis for a non-mandatory standard, it is reasonable to at
least mention some of the mitigating fire protection measures that have been provided by the owner.
By administrative policy, airplanes are not fueled at these boarding locations adjacent to the building
and the airplanes do not enter the delivery stalls under engine power, but instead are towed in and out
of the stall. Also, the proprietary fire department located on the site and equipped for aircraft rescue
firefighting, has an average response time to emergencies of less than 3 minutes. Whenever an airplane
is fueled, an aircraft rescue firefighting vehicle is standing by at the separate fueling facility and a ground
crewmember is also stationed at a portable extinguisher within 25 ft of the fueling activity.
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Performance Based Analysis for Fuel Spill Fire
The Life Safety Code NFPA 101, Chapter 5 “Performance Based Option” provides the basis for a
performance based analysis.
NFPA 101: 5.5.3.7 Design Fire Scenario 7 is described as follows:
(1) It is an outside exposure fire.
(2) It addresses the concern regarding a fire starting at a location remote from the area of
concern and either spreading into the area, blocking escape from the area, or developing
untenable conditions within the area.
The method selected here is that of Method 4 described in A.5.5.2 of NFPA 101 to demonstrate that no
fire effects will reach any occupied room. “The advantage of this procedure is that it eliminates the need
for calculations regarding occupants, including those for their behavior, movement, locations, pre-fire
characteristics, and reactions to fire effects. A further advantage is that it also eliminates the need for
some of the modeling of fire effects, because it is not necessary to model the filling of rooms, only the
spread of fire effects to those rooms.” This procedure is even more conservative and simpler than other
methods in NFPA 101.
Annex C of NFPA 415 (non-mandatory) provides guidance that an exposure evaluation be developed for
potential fuel spill points more than 50 ft (15 m) but less than or equal to 100 ft (30.5 m) from the
airport terminal building. The exposure evaluation describes the location and severity of potential fuel
spill points and the design features that control damage to the airport terminal building and exposure to
occupants. The exposure evaluation should include consideration of each of the following:
(1) Fuel spill points
(2) Fuel spill rates
(3) Fuel spill pool size
(4) Ramp drainage design
(5) Exposed wall construction
(6) Wall openings (windows, doors, etc.)
(7) Interior building fire protection features
Regarding the egress pathway from an airplane, none of the US codes, regulations, or jurisdictions (ICC,
NFPA, or FAA) requires the use of an enclosed loading walkway versus open stairs or ramps directly to
the tarmac.76 Furthermore, when an enclosed walkway is used, the fire and building codes do not
reference the NFPA 415. Only NFPA 1 Fire Code references NFPA 415 although it is strictly from an
76

Swann, J. & Sheffey, J. “Aircraft Loading Walkways-Literature and Information Review” NFPA Fire Protection Research
Foundation, May 2008.
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operational standpoint and does not apply to the design or construction of the loading walkways and so
this standard is not a prescriptive requirement. According to a technical panel consulted during a
literature review for NFPA (Swann, 2008), it is believed that most enclosed walkways in the US are
constructed to comply with NFPA 415. A performance-based review of walkway safety is beyond the
scope of this project.
A single commercial airplane at the gate will have up to 6,900 gallons of Jet-A fuel combined in the three
fuel tanks. Fuel spills from an outboard wing tank vent have been known to occur during some preflight check or functional tests or as a result of a flight crew activity. Total spill volumes greater than 50L
are very rare and not known to occur for this size commercial aircraft unless undergoing refueling.
In this design scenario a leak of 50 L per minute occurs for an extended length of time, long enough for
the fuel to form a large diameter spill and begin to flow down grade to one of the storm catch basin
drains within the aircraft stall. At some time delay after the spill begins, the conditions are optimal for
fuel vapors to be ignited by a source such as an electric discharge or a heat source from a service vehicle
in the area. The fuel spill ignites, burns across the spill area at a flame spread rate consistent with jet
fuel and engulfs the aircraft wing in smoke and flames. The nearest surface of the building is exposed to
a heat flux at the wall and glazing of the first floor, the second floor and under the soffit covering the
second floor balcony. Occupants located on the balconies on the airport side of the building will
observe the smoke and fire incident and leave the balcony. Occupants inside the building may or may
not be notified by heat sensors outside or by smoke detectors inside but occupants inside the building
will not experience fire effects.

Design Objectives and Performance Criteria



Design objective: Rooms in the office building (Group B) will not experience fire effects during
the spill fire.
Design objective: Structural integrity of exposed surfaces of the building will be maintained.

The tenability criteria are different for an exterior fire compared to an interior fire because the objective
is that no occupied rooms of the building will experience fire effects. It is assumed that radiant heat will
be the major form of heat transferred from the fuel spill fire to the building and that the most
vulnerable structural element is the glazing in the aluminum framed window assemblies facing the
airport. A literature search of glass failure as a result of exterior fire exposure reveals that in addition to
the heat flux on the glass, other factors affecting integrity include tempered treatment, single or double
pane, frame type and materials, and temperature differentials due to shielding of surface areas by other
objects in front of the glass. Heat flux values for double pane, non-tempered, non-fire rated glazing
resulting in cracking-but-not-breaking range widely from 3 to 16 kW/m2 and are as high as 70 to 110
kW/m2 to cause the glass to fall out. The manufacturer’s thermal stress guideline for the exterior pane
(double 6mm) is 60°C. This is only a rough reference to the thermal safety of the glazing. 77 Other factors
such as the size of glass areas, handling and installation damage, orientation of the building, exterior

77

Shepard, D. “Guardian SunGuard Performance Calculator for 1”OA ¼ SNX 62/27 (2)-Argon-1/4 clear.” Hartung Glass
industries, September 2012.

Cynthia Wernet

Page 116

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]

June 9, 2016

shading, wind speed and daily temperature fluctuations can increase the probability of thermal
breakage. Ordinary float glass tends to crack when it reaches temperatures of 150 – 200 °C.78


Performance criteria:
o Radiation less than 2.5 kW/m2 heat flux at floor level and on the balcony is tolerable for
greater than 5 minutes60 in order to allow occupants to re-enter the building.
o Radiation less than 9 kW/ m2 heat flux79 at the surface of exterior pane of glazing facing
the airport for the duration of the fuel fire.
o Surface temperature less than 60°C at the surface of exterior pane of glazing facing the
airport for the duration of the fuel fire.77

Fuel Properties
Jet-A fuel used for commercial airplanes is similar in chemical and thermodynamic properties to
kerosene, a mixed fuel. Jet A-1 is like Jet-A, but is specified with a different freezing point and some
additives. Sometimes the literature refers to a similar fuel, JP-8. JP-8 (for "Jet Propellant 8") is a jet fuel,
specified and used widely by the US military, similar to commercial aviation's Jet A-1, but with the
addition of corrosion inhibitor and anti-icing additives.
Flammable Properties of Jet A












Flash Point [Method] : >38°C (100°F) [ASTM D-93]
Flammable Limits (Approximate volume % in air): LEL: 0.7 UEL: 5.0
Autoignition Temperature: 250°C (482°F) [ASTM E659]
Evaporation Rate: <1 [Butyl Acetate]
Boiling Point: 150°C
Vapor Pressure: 1.0 to 1.7 kPa, 0.40 mmHg
Volatile Organic Compounds: 800g/L
Density: 820 kg/m3
Burning Rate: 0.039 kg/s m2
Extinction coefficient and mean beam length corrector (Babrauskas) kβ: 3.5m-1
Heat of Combustion (lower): 43.3MJ/kg

This fuel has a low vapor pressure at ambient temperature and is difficult to ignite unless the fuel is preheated or sprayed. The heat radiated by a fuel spill flame back to the fuel surface is barely above the
heat needed to maintain a steady burn rate by only a 3% margin.80 Heat loss to the surface on which the
fuel is spilled is a critical factor in the ignitability of the fuel and so the design fire scenario includes
worst case environmental conditions.

78

Babrauskas, V., Glass Breakage in Fires. Fire Science and Technology, Inc. The Fire Place. Feb-Mar 1998. p 15-17
Cohen, J. D., and Wilson, P., Current Results from Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM)
Research, presented in Fire Management in the Wildland/Urban Interface: Sharing Solutions, Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada (2-5
October 1994).
80 Drysdale, D., An Introduction to Fire Dynamics, 3rd Edition, 2011. P. 188
79
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Conditions and Environment
A spill fire is a subset of pool fires and will occur following the release of a liquid fuel in a location where
there is no horizontal confinement. The liquid would continue to spread until a dynamic equilibrium is
established. In this design fire scenario, the liquid is flowing at a constant rate onto the surface and it is
assumed that whatever fuel does not burn away will drain from the spill. There is a slight slope to the
surface so it is possible to estimate the size of the fuel spill once the perimeter of the spill reaches a low
point drain on the surface.
The surface on which the fuel is spilled is brushed (rough) concrete. As described in the table above, the
slope of the concrete surface varies, but averages about 0.5%. Surface roughness and slope are the
primary factors affecting the spill and the spill fire behavior according to a study conducted in 2011 for
the purpose of developing forensic techniques.81
Ambient temperatures at the King County Airport in Seattle, Washington range -4.5 to 30.0°C.82
Prediction of the peak surface temperature of concrete during Seattle summers is the ambient
temperature plus 8°C.83 This results in an estimated peak surface temperature of 38°C, which is right at
the flashpoint of the fuel. Under these ideal conditions, an ignition source of sufficient energy may
ignite a jet fuel spill. Wind effects are not included in the analysis.
The surge tank vent acting as the spill opening, is located on the outboard end of the wing. In order to
achieve the 50L/minute flow rate, at least two of the three tanks would be leaking at the same time.
Summary of configuration








Fuel spill points
Fuel spill rates
Fuel spill pool size
Ramp drainage design
Exposed wall construction

Outboard fuel tank vent
50L/minute
17.5 m2
0.5% slope, stormwater catch basins
Precast concrete up to 4ft, Insulated 6” frame, metal
wall panel 3-5m & 10-13m high
Wall openings (Glazing)
Double pane 6mm, aluminum frame 1-3m & 5-10m high
Interior building fire protection features Type IA, automatic sprinkler

81

Mealy, C., et. al. Fire Dynamics and Forensics Analysis of Liquid Fuel Fires. Hughes Associates, Inc. February 18, 2011.
Klote, J., et. al. ASHRAE Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering. 2012.
83 Bentz, D., A Computer Model to Predict the Surface Temperature and Time of Wetness of Concrete Pavements and Bridge
Decks.” US Dept Commerce, NIST. August 2000.
82
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Methodology
The calculation method used in estimating the heat flux of a fuel spill fire on the building surfaces is the
point source plume calculation found in Beyler’s article in the SFPE handbook beginning on page 3-278,84
which is recommended for heat fluxes in the range of 0-5 kW/m2. This method predicts thermal
radiation from a point source located at the center of the flame and correlates heat flux on a surface
with the radiative energy output of the fire and the inverse of the square of the distance between the
source and the target surface. Figure 66 shows a fuel spill fire with the point source of radiant heat at
the center of the flame. This method is simple for modeling purposes and correlates well with test data
for large pool fires between 1 and 10 kW/m2. A safety factor of 2 is recommended when using for
design purposes but no safety factor is recommended for more realistic results.

Figure 66: Point Source Model
A report published by NIST for the purpose of computing thermal radiation flux and acceptable
separation distance for a Housing and Urban Development (HUD) project building from large fires of
combustible liquids was also consulted.85 The report uses the Shokri and Beyler shape factor method for
prediction of radiation from pool fires assuming that the flame is a cylindrical, blackbody, homogeneous
radiator with an average emissive power. 86 The HUD-recommended method recognizes that the
calculated height of the flame overestimates the radiant heat release because the flame for many
combustible liquids is obscured by smoke and the smoke shields much of the thermal radiation from
striking nearby structures. And so the HUD method instead utilizes view factors for a modified flame
height and an average emissive power for the luminous spots in gasoline and kerosene fires. Figure 67
shows this cylinder geometry and smoke shielding in contrast to the simplified point source model.

84

Beyler, C. “Fire Hazard Calculations for Large, Open Hydrocarbon Fires,” Chapter 3-10SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection
Engineering, 4th Edition. 2008.
85 McGrattan, K. et. al. “Thermal Radiation from Large Pool Fires,” NISTIR 6546, November 2000.
86 Beyler, C. “Fire Hazard Calculations for Large, Open Hydrocarbon Fires,” Chapter 3-10, SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection
Engineering, 4th Edition. 2008, p. 3-281.
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Figure 67: Modified Solid Cylinder model with detail showing smoke obscuring flame
Although the view factor method in the HUD report is not applied here, there is guidance in the
referenced report for acceptable separation distances listed in Table 36. This guidance is helpful in
screening the results that will be found using the point source correlation method.
Table 36: Guidance for acceptable separation distances

Liquid

Kerosene

Mass Burning
Rate

Heat of
Combustion

HRR Per Unit
Area

Screen Acceptable Separation
Distance

kg/m2/s

kJ/kg

kW/m2

Structural
Exposure
31.5kW/m2
15 m

0.039

43,200

1,700

People
Exposure
1.4kW/m2
400 m

Reference

McGrattan (HUD)
Babrauskas87

The point source method is based on correlations for pool fires rather than spill fires. The difference
between pool fires and spill fires is that a spill is an unconfined spill, has a lower depth of fuel than the
tests used to develop the standard correlations, and with a thin layer of fuel many other factors begin to
influence the heat release rate and the other fire dynamics.
For example, testing of full scale unconfined spill fires of kerosene on brushed concrete surface under
test conditions could not sustain burning. Unconfined spills averaged a depth of only 0.7mm, much
thinner than pool fire tests (5mm-20mm). Furthermore, the average test result for burning rate of
unconfined kerosene is 0.023 kg/s m2, which is only 60% of the value used in the SFPE method. The
burning rate of an unconfined spill fire is strongly sensitive to spill depth, substrate properties and
duration of fire.88

87
88

Babrauskas, V. “Heat Release Rates” SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition. 2008
Mealy, C. et. al. “Fire Dynamics and forensic Analysis of Liquid Fuel Fires,” Hughes Associates, February 2011.
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However, continuous flow spills do have burning rates consistent with pool fire depths on the order of
5mm. Because continuous flow conditions are used in this specific design fire scenario, the pool fire
analysis method is acceptable and may be used as a good approximation of a continuous spill fire.

SFPE Point Source Method
Before the heat flux calculation is applied, the size of the spill must first be determined. The area of the
spill is estimated using the flow rate of fuel and the estimated burning rate:

𝐴=

𝑚̇𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒
50𝐿 820𝑘𝑔 𝑚𝑖𝑛
1
=(
)(
)(
)(
) = 17.5 𝑚2
3
𝑚̇"
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚
60𝑠 . 039 𝑘𝑔
𝑠 𝑚2

The distance between the fuel spill source and the catch basin drain is 8m. Considering the non-circular
spill stretching this distance and having a total area of 17.5 m2, an approximate spill diameter is
estimated and used for the following calculations. The approximate spill diameter based on this area is
4.7m.
The edge of the cylinder is estimated to be a distance of 14.6m from the glazing, the target surface. The
center of the spill is therefore this edge distance plus half the spill diameter, or L = 17m. Figure 68
shows the plan view of a spill in relation to the wing, the storm drain and the building. Figure 69
illustrates the spill under the airplane wing.

Figure 68: Plan view sketch of fuel spill using cylinder geometry (not to scale)
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Figure 69: Elevation view sketch of fuel spill and catch basin under the wing (not to scale)
The incident radiative heat flux (kW/m2) is given by
𝑞̇ " =

𝑄̇𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃
4𝜋𝑅 2

Where
𝑄̇𝑟 (kW) = total radiative energy output of the fire
θ = Angle between the normal to the target and the line of sight from the target to the point source
location.
R (m) = Distance from the point source to the target.
𝑅 = √𝐿2 + 𝐻𝑇 2
HT (m) is the vertical distance between the target and the point source, L (m) is the horizontal distance.
The point source P (m) is approximated to be in the center of the flame at half the height H (m) of the
flame as calculated by the Heskestad correlation
𝐻 = 0.235𝑄̇ 0.4 − 1.02𝐷
𝑃 = 1/2𝐻
Where 𝑄̇ (kW) is the heat release of the pool fire and D (m) is the diameter of the fire.
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This model provides a simple relationship between the incident heat flux on a surface and the inverse
square of the distance R to the source. In this case, the fire is not an actual point source, but is a three
dimensional fire and so R is an approximation. The model is explained in the SFPE handbook89 and also
developed in the Drysdale textbook90. The total heat release rate Q (kW) is calculated with the
following expression from Drysdale’s text (pp 166, 186)
𝑄̇ = ∆𝐻 𝑚̇"∞ (1 − exp(−𝑘𝛽𝐷))𝐴
Where
A (m2) = surface area of burning fuel
ΔH (MJ/kg) = Heat of combustion of fuel
𝑚̇"∞ (kg/m2s) = burning rate of fuel
−𝑘𝛽 (m-1)= an extinction coefficient and a mean beam length corrector to modify the burning rate of a
large diameter pool that is radiation-dominated heat transfer back to the surface of the burning fuel.
𝑄̇𝑟 (kW) is the total radiative energy output of the fire; the radiative fraction Xr is a correlated function
of pool diameter D (m). This correlation is fit to a curve of experimental values. This radiative fraction is
sometimes assumed to be 0.3, but Koseki finds that for large diameter fires, the radiative fraction
decreases and can be fit to a line.91 The explanation for this phenomenon is probably smoke blockage
and incompleteness of combustion efficiency in a large tank fire. Figure 69 shows that radiative fraction
varies with the diameter for tank fires, so a similar effect is expected with a spill fire.

Figure 69: Radiative fractions measures for pool fires of large diameters (Koseki, 1989)

𝑄̇𝑟 = 𝑋𝑟 𝑄̇ = (0.21 − 0.0034𝐷)𝑄̇

89

Beyler, C. “Fire Hazard Calculations for Large, Open Hydrocarbon Fires,” SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4 th
Edition 2008. pp 3-278 to 3-280.
90 Drysdale, D., An Introduction to Fire Dynamics, 3rd Edition, 2011. Pp 166-169.
91 Koseki, H. “Combustion Properties of Large Liquid Pool Fires”, NFPA Fire Technology (Vol 25, No. 3) 1989.
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𝑀𝐽
𝑘𝑔
) (0.039
)(1 − exp(−(3.5𝑚−1 )(4.7𝑚))(17.5𝑚2 )
𝑘𝑔
𝑠 𝑚2
𝑄̇ = 29.6𝑀𝑊

𝑄̇𝑟 = (0.21 − 0.0034(4.7𝑚))(29.6𝑀𝑊) = .208 (29.6)
𝑄̇𝑟 = 5.7 𝑀𝑊
𝐻 = 0.235(29,600 𝑘𝑊)0.4 − 1.02(4.7𝑚)
𝐻 = 9.6𝑚
1
𝑃 = 9.6𝑚 = 4.8𝑚
2
Figure 70 illustrates these dimensions and relative positions of the fire and the target surfaces affected.

H= 9.6m

Glazing10.2m target
R=17.8m
Glazing
Cosθ = 0.95
Cosθ = 0.99

P = 4.8m

R=17.0m

3.7m target
Glazing

D = 4.7m

L= 17m
Building

Fuel Spill Fire

Figure 70: Fuel fire and target elevation view

The angle between the ground and the target line of sight from the target to the point source is θ. The
distance from the point source (at the center of the plume) to the target surface is R (m). The heat flux
values at the first and second floor elevations are shown in Table 37.
𝑅 = √(17𝑚)2 + (4.8𝑚 − 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡)2
θ = tan-1 [(4.8-target height)/17]
Table 37: Heat flux at building surface locations
Target height

First floor top of glazing 3.7m above spill
Second floor top of glazing 10.2m above spill

Cynthia Wernet

Radius point
source to
target R (m)

θ (rad)

Cos θ

Heat Flux (kW/m2)
𝑸̇𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝜽
𝒒̇ " =
𝟒𝝅𝑹𝟐

17.03
17.84

1.7
17.6

0.99
0.95

1.56
1.35
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If the recommended safety factor of 2 is used for design purposes, then these values approach the
radiative heat flux limits of 2.5 kW/m2 for the exposed balcony occupants and yet still remain well below
9 kW/m2 for exposed glazing.

Surface Temperature of Glazing
The windows are double pane assemblies with 6mm panes, a 12mm argon gap between and a reflective
coating on the inside surface of the outer pane.
The energy balance for the entire assembly as it is heated by the radiant heat flux from the exterior fire
is as follows
Heat accumulated = (heat radiated from fire and viewed by surface
– heat reflected
– heat transmitted through the assembly)
– heat convected to outside
– heat re-radiated to outside
– heat convected to inside
– heat re-radiated to inside

The glass manufacturer has tested the assembly and determined that the first three terms provide a net
38% heat absorbed by the double pane glazing, the reflective coating and the argon gap.92 This heat
balance is illustrated in Figure 71.

Radiant heat
from fire
Heat absorbed and
reradiated out

Radiant heat
reflected

Heat absorbed and
reradiated in
Radiant heat transmitted
through the assembly

Figure 71: Heat balance for the glazing material

92

Shepard, C. “Guardian SunGuard Perfomance Calculator, 1”OA ¼ SNX 62/47 (2)-Argon-1/4 Clear”, Hartung Glass Industries,
2012.
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This heat balance can be written, grouping the convection terms and the radiation terms and assuming a
lumped capacity model with the glass temperature constant through the material and at both surfaces,
inside and out.
𝜌𝑐∆𝑥

𝑑𝑇
= 𝛼𝑞𝑟̇ − ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 (𝑇𝑔 − 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡 ) − ℎ𝑖𝑛 (𝑇𝑔 − 𝑇𝑖𝑛 ) − 𝜀𝜎(𝑇𝑔 4 − 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡 4 ) − 𝜀𝜎(𝑇𝑔 4 − 𝑇𝑖𝑛 4 )
𝑑𝑡

Where
T (K) = temperature as a function of time t(s)
𝑇𝑔 (K) = Temperature of the glass
𝑇𝑖𝑛 (K) = Temperature of the air inside the building
𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡 (K) =Temperature of the air outside
hout (kW/m2K) = heat transfer coefficient of turbulent natural convection of air at outside temperature
over an isothermal vertical plane; 0.01kW/m2K
hin (kW/m2K) = heat transfer coefficient of natural convection of air at room temperature
ρ (kg/m3) = density of glass: 2,500 kg/m3
cp (kJ/kg K) = heat capacity of glass: 0.800 kJ/kg K
ε = emissivity of glass: 0.89
σ (W/m2K4) = Stefan Boltzmann constant; 5.67 x 10-8 W/m2K4 = 5.67 x 10-5 kW/m2K4
Δx (m) = thickness of assembly: 0.012m, neglecting the argon gap
α = percent absorption: (1.00 - 0.23 transmission - 0.39 reflectance = 0.38 absorption)
𝑞𝑟̇ = radiative heat flux to surface: calculated previously = 1.56kW/m2 , with safety factor = 3.12 kW/m2
Instead of integrating the heat equation, a time-marching approach is used, using a spreadsheet and
time intervals of 10 seconds. The heat balance is rewritten with glass temperatures at time t and t+Δt.
𝑇𝑔(𝑡+∆𝑡) = 𝑇𝑔(𝑡) + (∆𝑡/𝜌𝑐∆𝑥)[𝛼𝑞𝑟̇ − ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 (𝑇𝑔(𝑡) − 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡 ) − ℎ𝑖𝑛 (𝑇𝑔(𝑡) − 𝑇𝑖𝑛 ) − 𝜀𝜎(𝑇𝑔(𝑡) 4 − 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡 4 )
− 𝜀𝜎(𝑇𝑔(𝑡) 4 − 𝑇𝑖𝑛 4 )]
On a hot day for this scenario, with the glass starting at ambient temperature of 311 K (38°C), 5 minutes
of exposure raises the glass temperature to 314 K (42°C).
If a more detailed approach is used, the two panes of glass would actually be at different temperatures.
Each pane would be analyzed separately as radiant heat transmitted through the first pane in addition
to heat reradiated by the first pane affects the second pane temperature.
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Yet a simple and conservative approach to dealing with the double pane is to neglect the heat loss by reradiation and convection from the second pane of glass to the room. Furthermore the radiative heat
flux is increased by a safety factor of two as recommended for design purposes.
𝑇𝑔(𝑡+∆𝑡) = 𝑇𝑔(𝑡) + (∆𝑡/𝜌𝑐∆𝑥)[2𝛼𝑞𝑟̇ − ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 (𝑇𝑔(𝑡) − 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡 ) − 𝜀𝜎(𝑇𝑔(𝑡) 4 − 𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑡 4 )]
Using this approach, with the glass starting at ambient temperature of 311 K (38°C), 5 minutes of
exposure raises the glass temperature to 325 K (52°C) and to 332 K (59°C) if the exposure continues
until the building is fully evacuated at 7.8 minutes. This is just under the manufacturer’s thermal stress
guideline, 60°C. Figure 72 illustrates the temperature increase on the glazing as it approaches the
thermal stress limit. As mentioned before, this limit is only a rough reference to the thermal safety of a
glazing.
335

Glazing Thermal Stress Guideline

Temperature (K)

330
325
320

Building
Evacuation
time (RSET)

315
310
0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

Exposure Time (minutes)

Figure 72: First Floor Glazing Temperature Exposed to Fuel Fire
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Surface Temperature of Wall Panels
A simplified equation for estimating the temperature of the metal panel walls exposed to the radiative
heat flux of the fire plume is used. The insulated metal panels are assumed to behave like a semiinfinite solid, transferring heat from the surface through the glass by conduction as a function of depth
and time. The exterior surface, like the concrete surface in summer, is estimated at 38°C.
Given a constant heat flux 𝑄𝑅̇ "on the surface, temperature in a semi-infinite solid obeys a simplified
expression.
𝑞̇ " = −𝑘

𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑥

Heat flow is a function of depth and time
𝜕 2 𝑞"
1 𝜕𝑞̇ "
=
2
𝜕𝑥
𝛼 𝜕𝑡
With boundary conditions 𝑞̇ " = 𝑞𝑅̇ " for x =0 and t >0
Solving the differential equation for the surface temperature at x=0, let t=300 seconds
𝑇𝑆 = 𝑇0 +

2𝑞𝑅̇ " 𝛼𝑡 1/2
( )
𝑘
𝜋

Estimated thermal properties of metal panel (steel) at 20°C93





Thermal conductivity k = 45.8 W/m K
Heat capacity cp = 460 J/kg K
Density ρ = 7850 kg/m3
Thermal diffusivity α= k/ρc = 1.26 x 10-5 m2/s
𝑇𝑆 = 38 +

2(2)(1730)
45.8

1/2
(1.26𝑥10−5 )(300)
)
𝜋

(

= 43°𝐶 metal wall panels

Above the north event delivery balcony fixed temperature heat detectors, set for 135°F (57°C) and
located 18m from the base of the fire, likely will not activate and alarm the occupants inside the
building. Dry sprinkler system heads, would not open until reaching 155°F (68°C). Either of these
actions would require an exposure time in excess of 5 minutes.

93

Drysdale, D. Introduction to Fire Dynamics, 3rd edition. Wiley, 2011. Table 2.1, p. 37.
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Summary of Performance Based Analysis for Exterior Exposure Fire
Many variables in this design fire analysis were based on conditions representing ideal circumstances for
a significant fuel fire exposure. Fueling of aircraft is not performed at these gates, the building does not
function as a fueling facility. The flow rate of the fuel is above what would be expected for a typical fuel
vent overflow and so represents a significant incident and the size of the spill was estimated as the
maximum area that the minimally sloping airplane stall would allow. Utilizing a continuous flow of fuel
in order to establish sustained burning is also a conservative characterization of a fuel spills. The pool
fire data and methodology is reasonable but does overestimate the heat output if the fire were based
on a limited amount of fuel spilled unconfined on concrete surface. The point source calculation
method includes a safety factor of two. And lastly, the conditions to ignite and sustain burning were
selected at the warmest part of the year.
Analysis of this specific jet fuel spill fire scenario revealed that the model could be simplified to an
equation for the purpose of estimating the heat flux reaching a target buildings from a large diameter
exterior spill fire at least 45 ft from the building. The significant factors include the radiative fraction,
the heat of combustion, and the burning rate of the fuel. Given the surface area of the fuel spilled and
the distance from the center of the fire to the target surface, the heat flux may be estimated:
𝑞̇ " =

𝑋𝑟 ∆𝐻 𝑚̇"∞ (1 − exp(−𝑘𝛽𝐷))𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃
𝑋𝑟 ∆𝐻 𝑚̇"∞ 𝐴
𝐴
≈
≈ 28 [ 2 ] 𝑘𝑊/𝑚2
2
2
4𝜋𝑅
4𝜋𝑅
𝑅

Based on the performance criteria for heat flux and temperature, it is expected that a fuel fire in one of
the airplane stalls will result in a heat flux exposure to personnel on the ground level outside the
building that has the potential for injury but that personnel would have sufficient time (up to 5 minutes)
to safely leave the area. The heat flux to occupants located on the balconies would also be low enough
to allow occupants up to 5 minutes to leave the balcony, return to the building as an area of safe refuge,
unaffected by heat from a fire.
Based on the design fire heat exposure to the building and the manufacturer’s thermal stress guidelines,
however, a large fuel fire has some potential to cause cracking of the windows if the fire is allowed to
continue beyond the typical response time for the on-site fire department. If manual fire control,
application of foam to suppress a spill fire, does not occur within the first 4 to 5 minutes, it is expected
that some damage to the building exterior would occur.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
The Customer Delivery Center satisfies all prescriptive requirements for life-safety egress, structural
design, smoke and heat detection, alarm notification and communication and water-based fire
suppression. The building also exceeds prescriptive requirements for fire resistant finishes and
construction.
Occupant life-safety is improved by an on-site proprietary fire department response combined with
institutionalized emergency preparedness program and FM Global standards for fire system inspection
and maintenance.
Available safe egress time exceeds required safe egress time from the building with a safety margin.
However, third floor exit capacity is strained as a result of reduced visibility from the smoke and
occupant are required to wait at the top of stairway.
Requirements of the fire code and building code have been met for an office building, however, nonmandatory standards for an airplane terminal building and fuel stall have not been achieved. This may
limit the use of the building for future applications. Performance of life-safety and structural integrity of
the building analysis using an exterior fuel fire in an airplane stall indicates that the building is a safe
refuge for building occupants but that a large fuel spill fire may cause damage to the glazing if the
exposure time exceeds the building evacuation time.
Upgrades to the building are recommended if the owner intends to use the building as a public terminal
and meet the NFPA 415 standard. Improvements include re-grading the three aircraft stalls to a 1%
slope away from the building and to a trench drain that leads to an oil-water separator. In addition, the
glazing on the east side of the building facing the stalls should be protected by a heat detection system
and water spray for cooling.
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Appendix A: Hydraulic Calculations
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Appendix B: Dry System Test Procedure
The following instructions are provided to the plumbers:
1. Run two-inch drain to remove any accumulated sediment from the supply line.
2. Partially close system water supply valve (3/4 to 7/8 closed).
3. Note water pressure and air pressure readings on form.
4. Bleed off air from system at inspector test or other appropriate drain point, checking period of time
required to release air to trip clapper and also at what pressure clapper trips. Record separate time and
pressure readings for a quick operating device. The use of a stopwatch is preferable if available.
5. Check local alarm bell system.
6. Close water supply valve and leave 2-inch drain open.
7. Flush dry system piping with air and open all drain points to remove condensation or water.
8. Close all drain points and reset clapper valve, noting condition.
9. Add appropriate level of priming water if system is designed for such.
10. Refill dry system piping with air to recommended pressure limit.
11. Slowly open system supply valve and bring pressure against dry pipe clapper by slowly closing 2-inch
drain valve. Observe main and air pressures to assure that they are normal.
12. Run another 2-inch drain test.
13. Complete all noted fields on the approved inspection form for each valve/test.
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Appendix C: Design Fire Calculations
Design Fire Calculations-Office Workstation
INPUT PARAMETERS
SMOKE DETECTOR
Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

2.74
15
6.38
20
27.2

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

1
2
0.0042
1

m
m
m
C
C

2.74
15
2.59
20
68

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

50
2
0.0042
1
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47
109
50
103

s
s
kW
kW

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

21
332
463
523

s
s
kW
kW

(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

INPUT PARAMETERS
QR SPRINKLER
Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

m
m
m
C
C
(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-
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Design Fire Calculations-Blocked Egress
It is an ultrafast-developing fire, in the primary means of egress, with interior doors open at the start of
the fire. This scenario addresses the concern regarding a reduction in the number of available means of
egress.
Fire ignition caused by renovation materials (flammable liquid soaked rags) and extending to a plastic
bin containing paper, shown in Figure 71. This fire is blocking the employee exit pathway on the first
floor at the west end of the building, and also blocking the bottom of the exit stairs that are one of two
primary exit pathways for the three floor office complex as shown in Figure 70.
This exit accommodates 316 people during a full building evacuation. If the exit is blocked, people will
need to turn back and seek an alternate exit, causing additional delays and queuing in the exit stairs and
corridors of the second and third floors.

Figure 73: Blocked Egress Fire on 1st floor

Figure 74: Trash bin in egress pathway
Detection and sprinkler activation time and temperature calculations are charted in Figures 72 and 73.
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INPUT PARAMETERS
SMOKE DETECTOR
Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

2
2
1
20
27.2

m
m
m
C
C

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

1
2
0.4
1

(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

June 9, 2016

4
5
10
31

s
s
kW
kW

transport lag
Figure 75: Smoke Detection temperature and heat release rate vs. time for blocked egress fire
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QR SPRINKLER
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CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

2
2
1
20
68

m
m
m
C
C

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

50
2
0.4
1

(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

4
37
548
667

s
s
kW
kW

DETACT
Gas temp

Det. temp

HRR

250

900
800

200

700

500
400
100

HRR (kW)

TEMP (C)

600
150

300
200

50

100
0

0
0

5

10

15

20

25
TIME (s)

30

35

40

45

50

Transport lag

Figure 76: Sprinkler activation temperature and heat release rate vs. time for blocked egress fire
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Design Fire Calculations-Storage Room Stacked Chairs
It is a fire that starts in a normally unoccupied room, in Figure 75, potentially endangering a large
number of occupants in a large room or other area. This scenario addresses the concern regarding a fire
starting in a normally unoccupied room and migrating into the space that potentially holds the greatest
number of occupants in the building. The storage room, Figure 74 is adjacent to the delivery event room
with a maximum occupancy of 222. The delivery event room has three exit pathways and one of those
pathways travels past the room of origin.
The event storage room [21G1], approximately 20 ft x 30 ft, on the second floor is a normally
unoccupied room, but contains a large amount of combustible fuel, stacked chairs, tables and linens.
HRR data published in the SFPE handbook is referenced.94 A peak heat release rate of 2200kW occurs at
approximately 600 s.

Figure 77: Event Storage Room with stacked chairs

S

R=3.4m

H=2.74m

Figure 78: Stacked chairs in storage room
Detection and sprinkler activation time and temperature calculations are charted in Figures 76 and 77.
94

Babrauskas, Vytenis. Figure 3-1.18 HRR of stackable chairs, polypropylene with steel frame, no padding. “Heat Release Rates.” SFPE
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (2008), p. 3-13.
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INPUT PARAMETERS
SMOKE DETECTOR
Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

2.74
4.87
3.44
20
27.2

m
m
m
C
C

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

1
2
0.012
1

(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

June 9, 2016

22
48
28
58

s
s
kW
kW

transport lag
Figure 79: Smoke Detection temperature and heat release rate vs. time for stacked chairs
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INPUT PARAMETERS
QR SPRINKLER
Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

2.74
4.87
2.44
20
68

m
m
m
C
C

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

50
2
0.012
1

(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

June 9, 2016

16
209
524
608

s
s
kW
kW

transport lag
Figure 80: Sprinkler activation temperature and heat release rate vs. time for stacked chairs
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Design Fire Calculations-Concealed Kitchenette Cabinets & Appliances
It is a fire that originates in a concealed wall or ceiling space adjacent to a large occupied room. This
scenario addresses the concern regarding a fire originating in a concealed space that does not have
either a detection system or a suppression system and then spreading into the room within the building
that potentially holds the greatest number of occupants.
The maximum heat release rate is estimated using the equation for ventilation limited fire and a surface
area of approximately 1.5m2 and a cabinet height of 1 m.
̇ = 1400 𝐴√𝐻 = 2100 kW
𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
The employee break room has maximum occupancy of 165. The employee break room is densely
occupied (15 sf per occupant, net). The source of the fire would be electrical, fueled by cable and debris
in the concealed wall space. This space, illustrated in Figure 78, could realistically involve the
refrigerators and cabinets below a counter where lunches are prepared or heated in microwave ovens,
toasters, etc.

R=3.5m
H=2.74m

Figure 81: Fire developing in cabinets
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Detection and sprinkler activation time and temperature calculations are charted in Figures 79 and 80.

INPUT PARAMETERS
SMOKE DETECTOR

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

2.74
12
3.5
20
27.2

m
m
m
C
C

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

1
2
0.003
1

(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

29
96
28
47

s
s
kW
kW

DETACT
Gas temp

Det. temp

HRR

35

80

30

70

TEMP (C)

50
20
40
15
30
10

HRR (kW)

60

25

20

5

10

0

0
0

20

40

60

80
TIME (s)

100

120

140

160

transport lag

Figure 82: Smoke Detection temperature and heat release rate vs. time for concealed fire
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INPUT PARAMETERS
QR SPRINKLER

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

2.74
12
2
20
68

m
m
m
C
C

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

50
2
0.003
1

(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

June 9, 2016

18
341
349
386

s
s
kW
kW

DETACT
Det. temp

HRR

100

500

90

450

80

400

70

350

60

300

50

250

40

200

30

150

20

100

10

50

0

HRR (kW)

TEMP (C)

Gas temp

0
0

50

100

150

200
TIME (s)

250

300

350

400

transport lag

Figure 83: Sprinkler activation temperature and heat release rate vs. time for concealed fire
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Design Fire Calculations-Luggage storage room
It is a slowly developing fire, shielded from fire protection systems, in close proximity to a high
occupancy area. This scenario addresses the concern regarding a relatively small ignition source
causing a significant fire.
The luggage storage area on the first floor, [12G1] contains passenger luggage after security screening.
Luggage is piled and also placed on closed shelving, as illustrated in Figure 81. The combination of
shelving and luggage shields a slow developing fire for sprinklers. The fire begins inside a single article
of luggage and grows to involve several articles until the fire is large enough to heat and ignite the entire
contents stored on one wall.
Heat release data published in SFPE handbook is used as a reference.95
Significant smoke is created in the luggage storage room and smoke extends into the seating area on the
first floor, with occupancy of up to 110 people.

R=3.4m
H=2.74m

Figure 84: Luggage storage room

95

Babrauskas, Vytenis. Figure 3-1.55 HRR of suitcases and Table 301.13 Test Description for Suitcases Tested at LSF. “Heat Release Rates.” SFPE
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (2008), p. 3-28.
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Detection and sprinkler activation time and temperature calculations are charted in Figures 82 and 83.

INPUT PARAMETERS
SMOKE DETECTOR

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

2.74
6.7
3.35
20
27.2

m
m
m
C
C

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

1
2
0.003
1

(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

28
94
27
45

s
s
kW
kW

DETACT
Gas temp

Det. temp

HRR

35

60

30

50

25
20
30
15

HRR (kW)

TEMP (C)

40

20
10
10

5
0

0
0

20

40

60

80
TIME (s)

100

120

140

transport lag

Figure 85: Smoke Detection temperature and heat release rate vs. time for luggage store room

Cynthia Wernet

Page 145

[FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]
INPUT PARAMETERS
QR SPRINKLER

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

2.74
12
2
20
68

m
m
m
C
C

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

50
2
0.003
1

(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

June 9, 2016

18
341
349
386

s
s
kW
kW
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Det. temp

HRR
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400
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Figure 86: Sprinkler activation temperature and heat release rate vs. time for luggage storage room
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Design Fire Calculations-Warehouse Class I-IV Commodities on Racks
It is the most severe fire resulting from the largest possible fuel load characteristic of the normal
operation of the building. This scenario addresses the concern regarding a rapidly developing fire with
occupants present.
The largest fuel load will occur in the first floor warehouse. Figure 84 represents Class I through IV
commodities on rack storage, ceiling 14 ft, ESFR ceiling mounted sprinklers on 12 x 8 ft spacing and
smoke detectors 22 x 30 ft apart. Using FM Group A Plastic commodity loaded on a single pallet, the
HRR data shows 4000kW peak in 900s.96

R=5.67m
H=4.27m

Figure 87: Warehouse pallet commodities

96

Babrauskas, Vytenis. Figure 3-1.42 HRR of single pallet loads of various commodities tested at SP. “Heat Release Rates.” SFPE Handbook of
Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (2008), p. 3-23.
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Detection and sprinkler activation time and temperature calculations are charted in Figures 85 and 86.

INPUT PARAMETERS

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)

4.27
33
5.67
20
27.2

m
m
m
C
C

Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

1
2
0.005
1

(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

39
131
86
144

s
s
kW
kW

DETACT
Gas temp

Det. temp

HRR

120

4000
3500

100

TEMP (C)

80
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60

2000
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40

HRR (kW)
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1000
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500

0
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0
1000

TIME (s)

Figure 88: Smoke Detection temperature and HRR vs. time for warehouse commodity fire
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INPUT PARAMETERS
ESFR SPRINKLER
Calculation reset
Ceiling height (H)
Room width (W)
Radial distance (R)
Ambient temperature (To)
Actuation temperature (Ta)
Rate of rise rating (ROR)
Response time index (RTI)
Fire growth power (n)
Fire growth coefficient (k)
Fire location factor (kLF)

1
4.27
33
2
20
74
8.3
50
2
0.005
1

0 or 1
m
m
m
C
C
C/min
(m-s)1/2
kW/s^n
-

CALCULATION RESULTS
Transport lag time (tl)
Detection time (td)
HRR at detection (Qd)
HRR w/transport lag (Ql+d)

June 9, 2016

16
385
741
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s
s
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Figure 89: Sprinkler activation temperature and HRR vs. time for warehouse commodity fire
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Appendix D: Battery Calculations
Battery Calculations –Fire Alarm Control Panel Main Cabinet
Cabinet/Power
Supply

Device Type

Qty

Standby
current
per unit

Standby
current
System

Standby
total
cabinet

Alarm
current
per unit

Alarm
current
System

Alarm
total
cabinet

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

Main cabinet power
supply
Intel. Loop Interface, Main
Board (ILI-MB-E3)
120V Power Supply SubAssembly (PM-9)
ARCNET Repeater (RPT-E3)
Digital Communicator (DACTE3)
Network LCD Annunicator
(NGA)
Auxiliary Switch SubAssembly (ASM-16)
Intel. Network Command
Center (INI-VGC)
Voice Paging Microphone
(Microphone)
Firefighter's Telephone
(Handset)
Addressable Output ModuleTelephone (AOM-TEL)
P/E smoke detector ASDPL2F
Heat detector ATL-L2F
AMM-4F monitor module
AOM-2RF relay module
MOM-6SF 6 ckt. Signal
module
ASD-PL2FR duct smoke
detector
HPFF12 notification
appliance circuit expander
power supply

1

0.0810

0.0810

0.1500

0.1500

1

0.0500

0.0500

0.0500

0.0500

1
1

0.0130
0.0180

0.0130
0.0180

0.0130
0.0180

0.0130
0.0180

1

0.2000

0.2000

0.2000

0.2000

1

0.0110

0.0110

0.0110

0.0110

1

0.1500

0.1500

0.1500

0.1500

1

0.0010

0.0010

0.0010

0.0010

1

0.0200

0.0200

0.0200

0.0200

16

0.0020

0.0320

0.0065

0.1040

165

0.0003

0.0495

0.0065

1.0725

15
8
32
5

0.0003
0.0004
0.0003
0.0023

0.0045
0.0032
0.0096
0.0113

0.0065
0.0058
0.0003
0.0350

0.0975
0.0460
0.0096
0.1750

31

0.0003

0.0093

0.0065

0.2015

8

0.0000

0.0000

0.6634

0.0123

0.0982

Battery
Required

Battery
Selected

(AmpHrs)
19.83

(AmpHrs)
55

Alarm
total
cabinet

Required
Standby
Time

Required
Standby
AH

Required
Alarm
Time

Required
Alarm
AH

Total
Secondary
Load

(amps)
2.4173

(Hrs)

(AmpHrs)
15.9204

(Hrs)

(AmpHrs)
0.6043

(AmpHrs)
16.5247

24
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Battery Calculations –Fire Alarm Control Panel Amplifier Cabinet
Cabinet/Power
Supply

Device Type

Qty

Standby
current
per unit

Standby
current
System

Standby
total
cabinet

Alarm
current
per unit

Alarm
current
System

Alarm
total
cabinet

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

Amplifier cabinet
power supply &
speakers
Intel. Loop Interface, Main
Board (ILI-MB-E3)
120V Power Supply SubAssembly (PM-9)
ARCNET Repeater (RPT-E3)
Intel. Network Voice
Gateway (INI-VGX)
Amplifier Sub-assembly, 50
watt 25V (AM-50)
P/E smoke detector ASDPL2F
Heat detector ATL-L2F
AMM-4F monitor module
AOM-2RF relay module
MOM-6SF 6 ckt. Signal
module
ASD-PL2FR duct smoke
detector
HPFF12 notification
appliance circuit expander
power supply

1

0.0810

0.0810

0.1500

0.1500

1

0.0500

0.0500

0.0500

0.0500

1
1

0.0130
0.1500

0.0130
0.1500

0.0130
0.1500

0.0130
0.1500

4

0.0860

0.3440

2.2000

8.8000

65

0.0003

0.0195

0.0065

0.4225

8
5
16
3

0.0003
0.0004
0.0003
0.0023

0.0024
0.0020
0.0048
0.0068

0.0065
0.0058
0.0065
0.0350

0.0520
0.0288
0.1040
0.1050

10

0.0003

0.0030

0.0065

0.0650

8

0.0000

0.0000

0.6765

0.0123

0.0982

Battery
Required

Battery
Selected

(AmpHrs)
22.49

(AmpHrs)
55

Alarm
total
cabinet

Required
Standby
Time

Required
Standby
AH

Required
Alarm
Time

Required
Alarm
AH

Total
Secondary
Load

(amps)
10.0385

(Hrs)

(AmpHrs)
16.2348

(Hrs)

(AmpHrs)
2.5096

(AmpHrs)
18.7444

24
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Safety
Factor

1.2

10.0385
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Battery Calculations –Strobe Signal Notification Appliance Cabinets
Cabinet/Power Supply

Device Type

Qty

Standby
current
per unit

Standby
current
System

Standby
total
cabinet

Alarm
current
per unit

Alarm
current
System

Alarm
total
cabinet

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

(amps)

SNAC-1 strobe cabinet
power supply #1
HPFF12CM main board
15cd Strobe
30cd Strobe
75cd Strobe (Interior or W.P.)

1
13
8
8

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

HPFF12CM main board
15cd Strobe
30cd Strobe
75cd Strobe (Interior or W.P.)

1
7
18
2

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

HPFF12CM main board
15cd Strobe
30cd Strobe
75cd Strobe (Interior or W.P.)

1
13
7
12

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

HPFF12CM main board
15cd Strobe
30cd Strobe
75cd Strobe (Interior or W.P.)

1
20
8
6

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

HPFF12CM main board
15cd Strobe
30cd Strobe
75cd Strobe (Interior or W.P.)

1
29
1
1

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

HPFF12CM main board
15cd Strobe
30cd Strobe
75cd Strobe (Interior or W.P.)
110cd Strobe

1
12
3
7
1

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

HPFF12CM main board
15cd Strobe
30cd Strobe

1
6
17

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000

HPFF12CM main board
15cd Strobe
30cd Strobe
75cd Strobe (Interior or W.P.)

1
4
8
12

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.0750
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

0.0750

0.2060
0.0660
0.0940
0.1580

0.2060
0.8580
0.7520
1.2640

3.0800

0.0750

0.2060
0.0660
0.0940
0.1580

0.2060
0.4620
1.6920
0.3160

2.6760

0.0750

0.2060
0.0660
0.0940
0.1580

0.2060
0.8580
0.6580
1.8960

3.6180

0.0750

0.2060
0.0660
0.0940
0.1580

0.2060
1.3200
0.7520
0.9480

3.2260

0.0750

0.2060
0.0660
0.0940
0.1580

0.2060
1.9140
0.0940
0.1580

2.3720

0.0750

0.2060
0.0660
0.0940
0.1580
0.2020

0.2060
0.7920
0.2820
1.1060
0.2020

2.5880

0.0750

0.2060
0.0660
0.0940

0.2060
0.3960
1.5980

2.2000

0.0750

0.2060
0.0660
0.0940
0.1580

0.2060
0.2640
0.7520
1.8960

3.1180

SNAC-1 strobe cabinet
power supply #2

SNAC-2 strobe cabinet
power supply #1

SNAC-2 strobe cabinet
power supply #2

SNAC-2 strobe cabinet
power supply #3

SNAC-3 strobe cabinet
power supply #1

SNAC-3 strobe cabinet
power supply #2

SNAC-3 strobe cabinet
power supply #3
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Cabinet/Power Supply

SNAC-1 strobe cabinet
power supply #1

Alarm
total
cabinet

Required
Standby
Time

Required
Standby
AH

Required
Alarm
Time

Required
Alarm
AH

Total
Secondary
Load

(amps)
3.0800

(Hrs)
24

(AmpHrs)
1.8000

(Hrs)
0.2500

(AmpHrs)
0.7700

(AmpHrs)
2.5700

June 9, 2016

Safety
Factor

Battery
Required

Battery
Selected

1.2

(AmpHrs)
3.08

(AmpHrs)
12

SNAC-1 strobe cabinet
power supply #2

2.6760

24

1.8000

0.2500

0.6690

2.4690

1.2

2.96

12

SNAC-2 strobe cabinet
power supply #1

3.6180

24

1.8000

0.2500

0.9045

2.7045

1.2

3.25

12

SNAC-2 strobe cabinet
power supply #2

3.2260

24

1.8000

0.2500

0.8065

2.6065

1.2

3.13

12

SNAC-2 strobe cabinet
power supply #3

2.3720

24

1.8000

0.2500

0.5930

2.3930

1.2

2.87

12

SNAC-3 strobe cabinet
power supply #1

2.5880

24

1.8000

0.2500

0.6470

2.4470

1.2

2.94

12

SNAC-3 strobe cabinet
power supply #2

2.2000

24

1.8000

0.2500

0.5500

2.3500

1.2

2.82

12

SNAC-3 strobe cabinet
power supply #3

3.1180

24

1.8000

0.2500

0.7795

2.5795

1.2

3.10

12
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Circuit Load & Voltage Drop Calculations
For the notification appliance circuits, wire size is AWG 14 @ 3.26 ohms/1000 ft. The voltage source is
24VDC. VD = (2 x L x R x I)/1000 and %VD = VD x 100 / 24
Circuit number

Amp

15cd
speaker
strobe

30cd
speaker
strobe

75cd
speaker
strobe

110cd
speaker
strobe

Total
current
(amps)

Length
one way
(ft)

VD
(ohms)

0.094

0.158

SNAC-1, P/S-1 S1

4

4

3

1.114

355

2.315

2.578

10.7

SNAC-1, P/S-1 S2

8

3

1.002

345

2.249

2.254

9.4

SNAC-1, P/S-1 S3

1

4

2

0.758

235

1.532

1.161

4.8

SNAC-1, P/S-2 S4

2

5

1

0.76

195

1.271

0.966

4.0

SNAC-1, P/S-2 S5

2

6

0.696

205

1.337

0.930

3.9

SNAC-1, P/S-2 S6

3

7

1

1.014

260

1.695

1.719

7.2

SNAC-2, P/S-1 S7

1

6

1.014

250

1.630

1.653

6.9

SNAC-2, P/S-1 S8

1

3

6

1.296

315

2.054

2.662

11.1

SNAC-2, P/S-1 S9

11

4

1.102

365

2.380

2.623

10.9

SNAC-2, P/S-2 S10

6

5

0.866

195

1.271

1.101

4.6

SNAC-2, P/S-2 S11

9

1

0.688

170

1.108

0.763

3.2

SNAC-2, P/S-2 S23

5

2

6

1.466

310

2.021

2.963

12.3

SNAC-2, P/S-3 S12

14

0.924

235

1.532

1.416

5.9

SNAC-2, P/S-3 S13

15

1

1

1.242

320

2.086

2.591

10.8

SNAC-3, P/S-1 S14

6

0.396

375

2.445

0.968

4.0

SNAC-3, P/S-1 S15

1

7

3

1.198

325

2.119

2.539

10.6

SNAC-3, P/S-1 S16

5

0.532

185

1.206

0.642

2.7

SNAC-3, P/S-2 S17

4

4

0.64

160

1.043

0.668

2.8

SNAC-3, P/S-2 S18

1

6

0.63

175

1.141

0.719

3.0

SNAC-3, P/S-2 S19

1

7

0.724

215

1.402

1.015

4.2

SNAC-3, P/S-3 S20

3

8

0.95

400

2.608

2.478

10.3

SNAC-3, P/S-3 S21

1

6

1.014

345

2.249

2.281

9.5

6

0.948

320

2.086

1.978

8.2
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1

3.26

% VD

0.066

SNAC-3, P/S-3 S22

0.202

Resist
14AWG
(ohms)

24
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